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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
“We start with atomic parts, but these atomic parts have transitions, passages, 
‘tendencies,’ which circulate from one to another. These tendencies give rise to 
habits. Isn't this the answer to the question ‘what are we?’ We are habits, nothing 
but habits-the habit of saying ‘I.’ Perhaps, there is no more striking answer to the 
problem of the Self” (Gilles Deleuze). 
 
The above passage from Gilles Deleuze encapsulates the major ideas of 
my dissertation. He begins the problem of a “self” not with identity or body, but 
with its compositional nature. However, he also does not focus on these “atomic 
parts” as merely reductive identities constituting a self, but rather their 
relationships with one another. He wants to know first and foremost about the 
communicative aspects that work below the scale of the self. It is thus crucial that 
he selected the words, tendencies, and habits, both aspects of behavior that 
could be construed as non-conscious because they occur primarily at the level of 
affection, or a body’s capacity to produce and be productive of change.  
My project is primarily concerned with how we affect and are affected by 
machines. Like the above passage, I am interested in the compositional parts 
that make up both human and machine identities, as well as how those parts 
connect the two across the divide of being a living human being vs. being a 
machine devoid of the qualities of life and humanity. The dissertation will discuss 
this human/machine binary as resting on a fundamental problematic of 
communication—namely an ability or inability to self-express or communicate an 
identity that puts a body on one side or the other of the binary. The dissertation 
expands on Deleuze’s tendencies and habits by exploring the posthuman 
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thought within physiology, cybernetics, and ergonomics over a span of several 
hundred years. In the process I will sketch out the precursors and influences that 
resulted in concepts such as environment, system, autopoiesis, and emergence. 
All of these concepts work to redefine already constituted and engrained images 
and ideas of what life, subjectivity, and ethics are. These concepts also work to 
gain their epistemological and ethical significance, I argue, through the figure of 
the machine.  
 My project takes ergonomics, or the scientific study of how humans 
behave in technological environments, as its research object. Since its academic 
inception in 1949, ergonomics has developed as a field that continues to 
research all aspects of human-machine interaction, all of our habitual uses of 
machines, so to speak. The Human Factors and Ergonomics Society, founded in 
1957, uses the two terms synonymously. The editors’ mission statement from its 
inaugural journal issue illustrates a discipline that has historically integrated 
radically non-anthropocentric theories together with humanistic principles: 
In this study [of human factors] in which cross-fertilization between life 
sciences and engineering is encouraged, the human factor is considered 
in relation to the machines and environments in which man works and 
plays…the ultimate aim…is toward the optimal utilization of human and 
machine capabilities to archive the highest degree of effectiveness of the 
total system.1  
 
As the concept of a “human factor” present within all technological environments 
has spread, the defined goals of ergonomics become more philosophical and 
ethical in character. For example, in its definition the National Research Council 
                                                
1 Morehouse, Inaugural Journal Introduction, Human Factors: the journal of human factors society  
of America, 1958, vol. 1, 1. 
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states that the, “goals of ergonomics range from the basic aim of making work 
safe through increasing human efficiency to the purpose of creating human well-
being.”2 According to the Health and Safety Executive in Britain (where Hywel 
Murrell founded Ergonomics as an academic discipline), a human factor is 
thought beyond the individual and every human factor must include the job/task, 
the individual, and the organization. As my dissertation will argue, ergonomics 
has taken this non-individual, non-anthropocentric view of a human factor into 
account.  
This dissertation seeks to understand the intensifying relationship between 
what Manuel DeLanda calls organic and nonorganic life forms. Of human life he 
writes: 
We are all inhabited by processes of nonorganic life. We carry in our 
bodies a multiplicity of self-organizing processes of a definite physical and 
mathematical nature…Yet is there any way to experience this nonorganic 
life traversing us…there is a “wisdom of the rocks” from which we can 
derive an ethics involving the notion that, ultimately, we too are flows of 
matter and energy (sunlight, oxygen, water, protein and so on).3 
 
The claim that nonorganic materials should be considered under the umbrella of 
life is to follow from a basic supposition that drove the works of Michel Foucault 
and Gilles Deleuze, works that very much inform the theory and method of my 
dissertation. That supposition is that subjectivity or identity is produced from 
external forces. This is certainly the most radical element in each of these 
thinkers philosophy; between Foucault’s technologies of self and Deleuze’s 
                                                
2 Human Factors and Ergonomics Society web site, accessed on August 9th 2014, 
http://www.hfes.org/web/educationalresources/hfedefinitionsmain.html#Website 
3 DeLanda, Manuel, "Nonorganic life," Incorporations (New York: Zone Books, 1992) 29. 
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machines without organs, we can see the evacuation of any “inside” to identity. 
An identity that, as Foucault notes becomes both an object of knowledge and an 
image to be projected onto the other for comparison. It is the rationalist cogito as 
inner mind intervening on outer body, and self on other.4 But what happens 
theoretically and ethically when that which Foucault knew as technologies of 
production or apparatuses, and what Deleuze called machinic-assemblages, get 
pulled into our biological/scientific theories of life? What changes about scientific, 
political, and ethical valences of technological machines when we treat their 
actions as part of their subjectivization or becoming? 
 
Saving the Technical Object 
My dissertation is compelled similarly by the work of Gilbert Simondon, 
who has influenced the technical aspects in the thought of both Gilles Deleuze as 
well as Bernard Stiegler, who claims that techne, or the craft of producing 
technological objects, is the immemorially repressed of Western Thought.5 In an 
interview given with the French magazine “Esprit” in 1983, Simondon not only 
confirmed that his work posited that human alienation results from “non 
knowledge” of the technical object, but stated that the purpose of his work was 
precisely to “save the technical object.”6 He continues,  
                                                
4 Michel Foucault, History of Madness, ed. Jean Kalfa, trans. Jonathan Murphy and Jean Khalfa 
(Routledge, 2004). 
5 Bernard Stiegler, Technics and Time: the fault of Epimetheus. Vol. 1 (Stanford University Press, 
1998). 
6 A. Kechkian, and G. Simondon, "Saving the Technical Object: interview with Gilbert Simondon" 
Espirit (1983): 147-152. 
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I think there is a risk in technics. It is certain that the inflation of technical 
objects currently is one, if only the arms of overconsumption. That is why I 
said earlier, it’s a question of saving the technical object, just as it is the 
question of human salvation in the Scriptures. I believe there are humans 
in the technical objects, and that the alienated human can be saved on the 
condition that man is caring for them. It must in particular never condemn 
them.7 
 
Beginning his research and plea for a reconsideration of technology back 
in 1958, Simondon expressed a very different perspective on the social aspects 
of technology that, while highly influential on Gilles Deleuze, has been little 
explored in contemporary media studies. His is a philosophy of technology that 
deserves further consideration in media studies, particularly those threads 
working with new materialisms and affect studies because of its starting premise 
to consider technology beyond its use value to humans. As indicated by the 
above passage, Simondon did not begin from the assertion that modern 
machines and technological infrastructures, instrumentally designed and 
deployed to comply in a capitalist regime, are a prime engine for human 
alienation in labor and social contexts—although he agrees that this is in part a 
reality of our current “inflated” status to technology. Neither did he begin from the 
perspective of the technologist who has increasingly, with the support of the 
market and with government resources, articulated the advancement of 
                                                
7 Ibid.  
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knowledge, health and culture with the continual development of new scientific 
technologies.8  
I am suggesting instead that Simondon called for a turning to the 
technological object that is a caring for it. Ultimately, the guiding problematic for 
Simondon was how to be generous to a “technical mentality” that he saw 
developing and that in turn thought through technologies in non-instrumental, 
ethical ways. His work began always with the technical object and its own reality 
in order to discover the 
common modes of functioning--or of regime of operation--in otherwise 
different orders of reality that are chosen just as well from the living or the 
inert as from the human or the non-human.9  
 
Simondon’s call to save the technical object thusly is of crucial importance as an 
alternative way to study the most contemporary systems of technologies that 
through machines have simultaneously molecularized and digitalized the human 
life processes that modern politics takes as its referent.10 It is my argument that 
much can be accomplished epistemologically and ethically by turning attention to 
these machines not as what Rosi Braidotti refers to as the “four horsemen of the 
posthuman apocalypse: nanotechnology, biotechnology, information technology 
and cognitive science,”11 but as being caught up in the same biopolitical regimes 
of regulation and production as the human life forms they are in relation to. In the 
following chapters I build a historical case for how particular threads of scientific 
                                                
8 Chunglin Kwa, Styles of Knowing (University of Pittsburgh Press, 2011). 
9 Gilbert Simondon, “Technical Mentality,” Arne DeBoever trans. Parrhesia, no. 7 (2009): 17. 
10 Michael Dillon, and Luis Lobo-Guerrero, "The Biopolitical Imaginary of Species-Being," Theory, 
Culture & Society 26, no. 1 (2009). 
11 Rosi Braidotti, The Posthuman (New York, Polity, 2013) 59. 
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knowledge beginning in the 18th century have culminated in Ergonomics to 
produce a scientific practice that does much work to save the technical object in 
human-machine interaction. 
In its most general argument, the dissertation claims that there is a much 
longer and richer posthuman history that should be of interest to Media Scholars. 
From the critical communication and media studies perspective this protracted 
history has a few consequences that render the posthuman less recognizable. 
The first and perhaps most provocative consequence is that the posthuman is 
not directly tied to or contingent upon the digital. Instead, I argue that it owes as 
much of its epistemological and ethical foundations to strands within the Life 
sciences. I begin by describing an epistemology that is found in the history of 
physiology and that borrows from thinkers committed to naturalism and vitalism. 
This results in a profound reinterpretation of Cybernetics and Systems theories 
that are seen as integral to the development of a digital, virtual, and posthuman 
present. As I demonstrate, Cybernetics in particular can be read as a machine 
theory of human beings, organisms, inorganic life, and their ecologies. 
Cybernetics, like the posthuman, is not tied to the digital computer as the 
standard for the modern machine.  
The second general claim I make, albeit as a subtler undertone, is that the 
posthuman derives strongly from the rejection of humanism, or that the 
posthuman is tantamount to anti-humanism. No doubt the theories and thinkers I 
discuss all radically decenter the figure of the human being as the locus of 
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knowledge as well as the center of an ethical system. In fact, ethically I believe 
that ergonomics ends up a powerful tool to move beyond anthropocentrism and 
androcentrism that sees people, animals, objects, and the Earth as expendable 
resources. This dissertation holds that thought, life, and agency occur at levels 
beyond human understanding. However, whenever humans communicate with 
the nonhuman that process of communication involves what Andrew Pickering 
calls a mangle of human/nonhuman agencies. Whether humans 
anthropomorphize in order to bring what is alien into recognizable human scale, 
or they modify the image of the human, keeping what is useful for communication 
and discarding what is not, they engage with the nonhuman the only way they 
can, through human affect and perception. 
The dissertation will contribute a new object for critical media studies—the 
field of scientific experiment and theory called Ergonomics. The term ergonomics 
may have the most saliency as related to Carpal Tunnels Syndrome and other 
work related stress injuries. Orthopedic surgeon George S. Phalen contributed a 
major principle to Ergonomics in his “Phalen’s Maneuver” which was a test of the 
wrist for the syndrome leading to changes in design of office equipment.12 
Similarly, ergonomics has recently been given publicity for contributing to a new 
health-centric trend: the “just stand” phenomena claims multiple health benefits 
to standing instead of sitting while computing or doing other office jobs.13 This 
                                                
12 Pamela McCauley-Bush, Ergonomics: Foundational Principles, Applications, and Technologies, 
(CRC Press, 2011), 221. 
13 Just Stand web site, accessed April 01 2014,  
http://www.juststand.org/OnlineTools/tabid/637/language/en-US/Default.aspx 
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has led to the design and marketing of a standing desk that has fed into the buzz 
that ergonomics has informed us that, “sitting all day is generally a bad idea.”14 
Ergonomics has a much longer history of development as a science, and 
is far reaching in its epistemological and material influence in all areas of life with 
technologies and technological spaces. It is, I will argue, important for a new 
understanding of Posthumanism, one that is less articulated to the 
communicative and representational characteristics of digital technologies, and 
more situated in the histories of human and animal physiology, as well as 19th 
century conceptions of machines. The 20th century trajectory of ergonomics will 
see the significant influences of systems theory and particularly of cybernetics on 
its theories of human machine interaction. But to first parse the definitions and 
descriptions of its function will illustrate that it developed based on strong 
Humanist ideals. Two of these ideals included a most basic equality in the 
workplace and of being physically and mentally able to perform the tasks of the 
job. Technology’s role within ergonomics held these principles implicitly even as 
the industrial economy foregrounded optimization, efficiency, and round the clock 
productivity within work practices and machines. For founding ergonomist Hywel 
Murrell, in order to maximize efficiency in man-machine systems, ergonomics 
had to,  
enable the cost to the individual to be minimized…[i]t should create an 
awareness in industry of the importance of considering human factors 
                                                                                                                                            
 
14 Alan Henry, “Five Best Standing Desks,” Lifehacker web site, accessed April 1st 2014, 
http://lifehacker.com/five-best-standing-desks-1528244287 
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when planning work, thereby making a contribution not only to human 
welfare but to the national economy as a whole.15 
 
In Human Engineering, the “engineering for human use” or the adapting of 
technology design to the various attributes of people, was the U.S. design 
practice that preceded Ergonomics in Great Britain. Its 1957 definition implied a 
latent humanism thusly: 
In Broad terms the goals of human engineering are those of human 
economy, or efficiency, in work activities…implies two more specific goals, 
namely the improvement of work and of human welfare.”16 
 
The intimate connection above of human welfare, well-being, and happiness with 
labor would be a recurring theme in ergonomics. In addition, as its theory takes 
on a more philosophical character, human labor would be conceived of as a good 
in and of itself. 
From 1957 when Murrell founded the Human Factors and Ergonomics 
Society, Ergonomics was adopted in Europe and the U.S. as an umbrella term 
for a field composed of many interrelated disciplines concerned with studying 
human technology interactions. Ergonomists who wished to design human-
centered technologies included researchers in engineering psychology, 
biomechanics, and anthropometry—or “the systematic collection and correlation 
of measurements of the human body.”17 The list of engineering and social 
science fields falling under the domain of ergonomic research continually 
                                                
15 Hywel Murrell, Ergonomics, or Man and his Working Environment (Great Britain: Chapman 
Hall, 1965). 
16 Murrell, Ergonomics, xiv. 
17 “Anthropometry,” Britannica Online Dictionary, accessed April 1st 2014, 
http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/27531/anthropometry 
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increased and diversified immediately following WWII and to that research was 
added a significant new area of design in the 1960’s with the emergence of the 
digital computer. After the explosion of computer engineering and the “micro-
electronic revolution” that enabled visions of a national computerized work force, 
the study of human-computer interaction would also begin to concern itself with 
designing computer technologies to “fit” the human user. The ongoing 
development of the computer introduced an important development in 
ergonomics as well with the growing perception that machines had evolved in 
complexity by an order of magnitude such that machines could be described as 
“partners” to humans or as in “symbioses” with them.18 The moment in which 
researchers began programmed theorizations and material experiments with 
machines that had previously been conceived of only in science fiction (and 
philosophy)—the artificial intelligence, the human modeled robot or android, and 
the cybernetic organism, or cyborg—brought ergonomic theory of machines to 
the foreground but also brought about significant change within it.  
This twofold change is what informs the underlying argument of this 
dissertation, at least as an argument that attempts to enrich a history of 
posthumanism. First, as the field of ergonomics expanded to include many sub 
disciplines that either dealt with specialized objects (computers vs. simple tool-
machines vs. vehicles) or began from different theoretical orientations (biological, 
psychological, physics and material sciences) its proponents sought to unify 
                                                
18 Joseph Licklider and Carl Robnett, "Man-computer symbiosis," IRE Transactions on Human 
Factors in Electronics 1 (1960): 4-11. 
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interdisciplinary and fragmentation through the most basic of principles. The 
more ergonomics began to take account of its own history, it retroactively 
expanded its domain based on an “ancient” desire human beings had to design 
tools for their own purposes. The story of ergonomics then included the 
observation that since the age of early hominids there had been, “specific, 
intelligent reactions to the interactions between man and his environment” and 
that this drive was essentially human, and its quality was essentially ergonomic.19 
This era of complex machines in science and engineering that made liberal use 
of the burgeoning system, information, and cybernetic theories of mid 20th 
century, had the effect of a re-intensification or rearticulation of an essential 
human subject, one that was essentially not only creative but also reflective of 
her creations. From the 1960’s on there would be continual refinement of the 
definition of Ergonomics including a gesture towards its appreciation of human 
agency in relation to machines.  
After researching the many attempts to systematically define the field, I 
believe that there is no strong contradiction or differing opinion on a basic guiding 
principle: ergonomics aim has been, in contrast to other forms of technological 
design, to fit technologies to human beings. My chapter on Ergonomics will 
provide the historical setting in which the humanist and progressive impulses 
arose from moments in the 19th and twentieth century based on the systematic 
efficiency and design processes of the science of labor.  
                                                
19 Julien M Christensen, "Ergonomics: Where have we been and where are we going: II," 
Ergonomics 19 no. 3 (1976): 287. 
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The disciplinary positions that emerged—ergonomist, engineering 
psychologist, human engineer, human factors researcher—were all variations on 
a singular imperative to identify and build around a human factor within a given 
technological system. Coined in 1949 by Murrell in England as the science of 
“Ergonomics,” it was a field that owed its emergence to WWII and the 
subsequent powerful belief in the West that an intricate relationship between 
Scientific thought and the technology it produced, if let to flourish, could prevent 
Fascism and fundamentally better humankind. Ergonomics research flourished 
during this high moment of techno-science20 in the West. Murrell was attempting 
to create a multidisciplinary group whose sole purpose was based on the most 
basic principles of “human research”, “health” and “the good.” What had been the 
“Human Research group” became the Ergonomics Society and quickly shifted its 
scope beyond merely conditions of the work environment and beyond as well as 
designing machines of war and of the factory. As Murrell laid out, ergonomics 
functioned to develop a first principle of the machine where it and the human 
operator were seen as parts of a larger system,  
To achieve maximum efficiency a man-machine system must be designed 
as a whole, with the man being complementary to the machine and the 
machine being complementary to the abilities of man.21 
 
My dissertation will repeatedly point out examples like this that illustrate how 
ergonomics and the scientific thought informing it conceive of humans and 
machines as holistic systems. The larger history of this non-reductive perspective 
                                                
20 I take technoscience to be the conflation of science and technology based on the singular belief 
in their powers to alter reality (physical, political, ethical). 
21 Murrell, Ergonomics, xv. 
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informs communication theory through cybernetics, systems theory, biopolitical 
theory, and, as I will argue, affect theory. 
This project discusses the historical development of knowledge produced 
within human factors and ergonomics research as it became an autonomous 
scientific and engineering field. As there is no strong distinction between 
“ergonomics,” as the coinage in the UK and Europe and “human factors,” or 
“human engineering,” from the field of practitioners—either in method or 
theoretical foundation—I take ergonomics as the name representing the 
discipline. Ergonomics emerged as a field of knowledge suited to the immediate 
exploration and design of the latest human-machine systems. As such, its 
principles put into practice new theoretical paradigms—namely, general systems, 
information, and cybernetic theories.  
Claude Shannon produced, in information theory, a systemic or 
environmental theory of communicative functions, wholly formalizing the 
language of information and equating both physical systems and models of them 
to a “stochastic process.”  He thus articulated a theory of communication that, 
“avoids any reference to ideas or meanings, and thus to people.”  Finally, 
cyberneticians conceived of a theory of machine action that dealt, 
with all forms of [machine] behaviour in so far as they are regular, or  
determinate, or reproducible. The materiality is irrelevant, and  
so is the holding or not of the ordinary laws of physics…  
The truths of cybernetics are not conditional on their being derived from 
some other branch of science. Cybernetics has its own foundations.22  
 
                                                
22 W. Ross Ashby, An Introduction to Cybernetics (London: Chapman & Hall, 1956), 1. 
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While this audacity of theory was most certainly part of cybernetics’ over-
ambition, it also gestured to a figure in Gilles Deleuze’s work that would be 
picked up by posthumanist and affect studies alike—the virtual. The affective 
powers of machines in cybernetics were not limited to the actual machines that 
existed nor the scale of human understanding that continued to diminish 
machines compare to the figure of “Man.” Like the threads of physiology and 
cybernetics which preceded it, ergonomics and its radical conception of humans 
and machines provided the possibility for multiple, intense re-articulations of a 
humanist-human figure back into its technological systems. All of this produced, 
as I argue in chapter 2, a feedback mechanism whereby the radical nature of 
cybernetics and systems theories produced the humanist desire for an ethical 
reframing of technologies.  
With General System Theory Ludvig Von Bertalanffy put forth the idea that 
principles and forces in a biological system could be seen as “mirrored” in 
political and social (human) systems, as well as in purely physical systems 
devoid of any life whatsoever.23  His work on a psychology and sociology 
composed of systems not only informed Niklas Luhmann’s work on systems, but 
influenced myriad scientists and philosophers working in cybernetics, 
communication, information theory, and environmental/ecological thought. 
Inevitably these thinkers would reach ethical conclusions resulting from a 
systems approach. As Bertalanffy put it, the impetus for systems theory, “entailed 
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that of environmentalism or other-directedness,” because a subject’s behavior 
always fundamentally responds to its outside.24  Crucially for Bertalanffy, as it 
would be for those he would inspire with systems theory, neither large systems 
nor the organisms existing within them were closed. They were not predictable 
nor simplistically mechanical, that is, not devised of smaller, simpler parts as they 
reduced in scale. Biological systems and systems that could be applied to the 
social sciences were to Bertalanffy fundamentally open, that is, far from 
equilibrium or stasis. They were open not only to change but open to the kind of 
change that endangered a stable identity, where identity matters most to a 
human epistemological system based on representation, identity, and 
individualism. As I will illustrate the physiological, cybernetic, and ergonomic 
perspectives would embrace this openness that was both an expression of self-
communication and a threat of destruction for the individual organism or subject.  
 
Ergonomics, an Opening to Biotechnology  
 
Melinda Cooper defines biotechnological practice/science succinctly as 
the continual “concern with new ways of mobilizing life as a technological 
resource.”25 As for just what a biotechnology might be as a noun or object, 
biotechnology can be seen generally as the external manipulation of living matter 
with the aid of technological instruments or machines. Historian of Science 
Chunglin Kwa notes that the origins of biotechnology derive from the 
                                                
24 L. Von Bertalanffy, Robots, Men, and Minds (New York, George Braziller Inc., 1967), 7. 
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development of molecular biology in 1938. Along with molecular biology’s 
scientific and industrial development came a more general “molecular vision of 
life.” This is consistent with the biopolitical narrative that sees biological sciences 
and digital/computing sciences as intertwining poles enclosing the concept of life, 
simultaneously molecularizing and informationalizing it.26  
Back in 1979 Michel Foucault went on a tangent of sorts in his lecture on 
neoliberalism’s development of human capital as an inherent value. He 
apologized for the bit of “science fiction” but continued to muse about a future 
where the field of Genetics became a particular problematic of a population’s 
financial investment into their genetic makeup.27 This dystopic enframing of the 
future of biotechnological capital seems to make up the crux of sustained critical 
response to biotechnology in general. It also describes a much longer standing 
fear of human life that, since the introduction of a machine metaphor to describe 
its processes, has had the potential to be measured, predicted, and possibly 
reproduced in the future. Deleuze prophesized without irony that through digital 
technologies, identities and persons would wash away. “We're no longer dealing 
with a duality of mass and individual. Individuals become "dividuals," and masses 
become samples, data, markets, or ‘banks.’”28 It is again the immediate coupling 
of biotechnology with profit motive or capital flows that justifies the current 
                                                
26 Dillon, Michael, and Luis Lobo-Guerrero, "The Biopolitical Imaginary of Species-Being," 
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27 Michel Foucault, The Birth of Biopolitics Lectures: lectures at the College de France, trans. 
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critique of its alienating powers over humans. Biotechnology is the most 
advanced form of control, both in the cybernetic as well as the political sense of 
control, and is inherently instrumental(ist) because it resides more and more in 
the machines of molecular sciences. In their theory of networks, Alexander 
Galloway and Eugene Thacker define biotechnology as the “instrumental 
enframing” of biological networks, on the cellular level,  
Harnessing the “natural” or biological processes of cells, proteins and 
genes to manufacture drugs, therapies, “model organisms” for lab testing, 
and so forth.29 
 
As Rosi Braidotti argues,  
Advanced capitalism and its biogenetic technologies engender a perverse 
form of the posthuman. At its core there is a radical disruption of the 
human-animal interaction, but all living species are caught in the spinning 
machine of the global economy. The genetic code of living matter…is the 
main capital.30 
 
Biotechnology has become for many critical thinkers the cutting edge of biopower 
where the development of powerful computing technologies coupled with 
biochemical technologies seem to fold in on older totalitarian and racist 
ideologies, resulting in a regime of neoliberal eugenics. The consequences for 
privacy, freedom, and public access to the life altering powers of biotechnology 
has caused more traditionally politically informed critics to speak in a biopolitical 
register. Jurgen Habermas, for example, objects to the idea of “genetic 
programming” because the artificially enhanced individual will irreparably alter 
free societies. The public sphere and social contract of democracy, dependent on 
                                                
29 Alexander R. Galloway, and Eugene Thacker, The Exploit (Minneapolis: University of 
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the connection between “fee and equal human beings” would disintegrate as the 
“development of some individuals becomes unhinged from their free and 
unhindered growth.”31 Roberto Esposito understands a response like this from 
Habermas because it is based on the very same humanist assumption of the 
given-ness of individual identity and of the “naturalness” of community that leads 
the repetition of the immunitary paradigm. We must continually remake ourselves 
as definable and politically viable individuals in the face of identity’s erasure by 
what is improper, and it is not just human beings and animals but also 
technological objects that may fall into the improper category.  
 Very quickly the fear over improper artificial identities in the polis shifts to 
economic uncertainty as the “genetic code of living matter” as Braidotti puts it, 
translates into the question of what kinds of bodies can produce capital. Our 
posthuman condition is merely the beginning of the aforementioned musing by 
Foucault, of an imagined neoliberal genetic market. This is the point where the 
traditionally held sense of biotechnology as the manipulation of genetic materials, 
ostensibly by humans who know how and who have access, is butting up against 
another significant characteristic of technology that alters the conditions of 
human agency, automation. 
Immunity has become one of the major problematics within biopolitical 
theory, what Cary Wolfe calls a mechanism of framing life in neoliberalism. It is 
not merely, “a logical or epistemological problem but a social and material one, 
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with consequences.”32 The importance of immunization is how its ancient 
etymological roots intersect with the hyper-individualism of neoliberal modernity. 
Roberto Esposito defines immunity as a subject within a given community who 
immunizes themselves, through property, prestige, and violence, to the common 
burden shared by other citizens. This immunization results not only in the 
marginalization of those unable to similarly immunize themselves but also 
destroys the very possibility for anything other than an illusion of a community—a 
true community is one where individual identity is always superseded by its 
obligation to give. As Esposito observes, it is never the object, the thing earned 
or given that actually matters. Instead it is the relationality between an individual 
in respect to the other(s) he is obliged to.33 The Immunity paradigm is 
fundamentally a problem of communication. Esposito describes the obligation of 
community as a form of giving that destroys both the meaningfulness of the 
rational transaction as well as the instrumental one to one correspondence of a 
transmission model of communication. 
this is the gift that one gives because one must give and because one 
cannot not give. It has a tone so clearly of being obliged [doverosita] as to 
modify or even to interrupt the one-to-one correspondence of the relation 
between the gift giver [donatore] and the recipient [donatario]. Although 
produced by a benefit that was previously received, the munus indicates 
only the gift that one gives, not what one receives.34 
 
The problem in communication for the immunitary paradigm translates as a 
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problem between individual and larger system. On the other hand the figure of 
community can be translated into the problem of how different individuals within a 
system, and of differing capacities, can communicate with one another without 
retreating into their identities. In fact, these are the problems that have concerned 
the thinkers I will discuss, and for all of them the discussion leads beyond human 
identity and language, to the imagining of new ethical possibilities for human 
communication. As I will discuss in Ch. 1, “Physiology,” arguments like Esposito’s 
that break out of the above trappings of the individual do so with a turn to the 
impersonal register of life, what Wolfe describes as a biocentrism or neo-vitalistic 
philosophy.35 The main critique being that there is an ethical consequence, or 
danger inherent in embracing the concept of impersonal life over personal lives. 
Again, this has to do with a systematic undoing of human identity characteristic of 
a swath of theories within this dissertation that exist under the umbrella of 
posthumanism. Gilles Deleuze’s work is implicated in this critique and identified 
danger when he claimed that, “[i]t’s organisms that die, not life.”36 Life, in this 
instance is being treating as the new materialists treat matter—as something 
unwieldy, out of human control. Thus the conception or rather the imagination of 
changing, nonhuman systems, when allowed into those thoroughly human 
systems, language, government, thought, and ethics—become tantamount to 
death on an individual level and extinction on a species level. The figure of the 
machine looms large in this threat, either as a system of human language, 
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memory, or the physical objects that extend our bodies’ capabilities. Machine is 
techne, the artifice of human creativity—the thing neither existing of nature or of 
human kind. I will explain this status of machine as techne and as pharmakon, or 
what is simultaneously curative and poisonous to the human, in subsequent 
chapters. However, I want to emphasize here the role of the machine in the 
death of humanity when it is a nonhuman system “let in” to either our conceptions 
of nature or what we consider human life. This status of death for machines, what 
Jacques Derrida describes as a “machinalite,” or a, “cutting off from or 
independence from any living subject,”37 what Wolfe notes as simply, “dead,”38 
does not stop with the death of the Human. As Claire Colebrook recently noted, 
the death of the figure of man that so prominently represents rationality, 
representation, anthropocentrism and androcentrism—a death that leads to 
posthumanism—then immediately is followed by the death of the posthuman. For 
Colebrook this is because of a collective apprehension of loss of self, of a falling 
away from the practice of human reason and all of its anthropocentric trappings, 
because, “own creations, technologies and desires,” become, “the very 
mechanisms that preclude us from being most properly ourselves…”39 Such an 
apprehension of the mechanisms or machines of self-loss will lead either to 
laments over the loss of uniqueness and distinction in human thought and 
activity, or, on the other hand, to a kind of posthuman celebration, “that there is 
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no such thing as ‘man’ and that we are really always already at one with one web 
of life.”40 Colebrook’s insight is important in that it reveals the dualistic register of 
eschatological thought in the west that persists with things that are machines, 
machinic, artificial, and inorganic. For the purposes of my research the 
dissertation takes a slightly different path than hers in order to break out of the 
dichotomy within the death of the human subject. While Colebrook does turn to a 
productive new concept of subject that she calls the “inhuman,” she also calls for 
a strong return to Theory in a humanities existing “after theory.”41 What results 
from this call is an implicit retrenchment into an identifiable and proper 
humanistic scholarship as well as a discouragement of a humanities too open to 
integrating scientific thought to the detriment of its humanistic qualities. The 
benefit of a communication orientation, the importance of the field of American 
communication research is that it is not stymied by the same disciplinary 
concerns vis a vis its openness to scientific theory. However, history is crucial 
here, and in specifically extending and complicating the history of the posthuman 
through machine theories to the 18th and 19th centuries, my project suggests that 
there may not be such a moment of crisis in subject, thought, and action today, a 
moment that is marked only by extinction and death. This is precisely because 
the seeds of a particular posthumanism, one that I refer to as nonhuman life, 
exist prior to anything like the linguistic turn, posthumanism, or the anthropocene. 
Instead of focusing on the eschatology of subjects where there can only be an 
                                                40	  Claire Colebrook, Death of the Posthuman, 20.	  41	  Ibid. 40.	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end of subject and a beginning of a subject, my dissertation takes the moment of 
“crisis,” not the subject, as a highly productive for analysis. In what follows, the 
line of thought I pursue takes a cue from Manuel DeLanda a la Deleuze, who, 
integrates the very particular works of thinkers/experimenters whose objects are 
systems and organisms “poised at the edge,” of a phase transition, or at the edge 
of chaos.42  
 
Contribution of the Dissertation 
New Materialism 
My research foregrounds the bodies both human and mechanic within 
technological systems to focus on the hardware of media systems as organisms 
within an ecosystem. In this sense my project is in line with the thread of 
communication scholarship that refocus media studies to new materialist 
approaches. As Jeremy Packer and Stephen B. Crofts Wiley noted in 
Communication Matters: Materialist approaches to Media, Mobility, and 
Networks, there are important stakes to rhetorical and media scholarship and 
much that they could contribute to embodied, physical, and 
nonsemantic/discursive registers of communication.43 They recognize as well 
that the term “new materialism” refers to a much larger multi-disciplinary 
movement towards a realist perspective that includes much feminist, affective, 
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environmental, and posthuman scholars. My research here utilizes many of the 
theorists that share in this materialist, embodied, and realist perspective. 
In joining this theoretical shift my dissertation pays attention to the shift 
away from the human (its senses, language, experience, and culture) as the 
central analytic category in the analysis of life and matter. Such a move aligns 
critical thought closer to the empiricism of various scientific thought but also, I will 
argue, gives us opportunity to further investigate the sciences that have most 
significantly attempted to conceive of technologies, specifically machines, as 
communicative agents.  
From a communication perspective, this means that language, meaning, 
and the construction of the symbolic are put into precarity by the analytic focus 
on technology as a fundamentally communicative organism. As Packer and 
Wiley also argue, if human language and body are considered technologies (a 
premise which much Foucauldian and Materialist approaches have done work to 
show in media studies) then “communication always manifests through 
technology.”44 In addition, historical focus on the representational in media 
studies obfuscates the “attention to media infrastructure-its technical capacities, 
temporalities, and spatial distributions.”45  
Adding to Packer’s above call for a non-representational analysis of 
technology as communication, Jussi Parikka claims that new materialism, object 
oriented ontology, and speculative realism—the modes of thought that have most 
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radically decentered the human subject—all deal with “mediatic” phenomena.46  
Media technologies and humans become mediators for one another when the 
capacity to communicate is not defined by being human but rather by being a 
particular technology that communicates in a particular range, whether 
physically, symbolically, or affectively.  Parikka observes that new materialities 
necessitate shifts towards corpuses of knowledge, which have closely followed 
the physical and energetic flows, and facts of matter. 
Instead of philosophical traditions, let us read modern physics, 
engineering, and communications technology as mapping the terrain of 
new materialism: the basis for signal-processing, use of electromagnetic 
fields for communication, and the various non-human temporalities of 
vibrations and rhythmics-of for instance, computing and networks-are 
based in non-solids.47  
 
In doing so he gestures towards a kind of project that I attempt in following the 
trajectory of ergonomics. This field puts human and machine matter together as a 
holistic system worthy of empirical observation. 
 
Affect 
 
While my dissertation gestures to many of the issues in a new materialist 
framework, its concerns land firmly within the larger questions of Affect Studies.  
Looking forward to ergonomics today, to claim that ergonomics is the exemplary 
study of affection is to give a response to many who have been interrogating the 
“posthuman” condition specifically through what has been deemed an “affective 
turn.” Recently, Patricia Ticineto Clough has identified such a turn as an 
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intensification of interest in the line of affect theory spanning through Gilles 
Deleuze and Felix Guattari from Henri Bergson, and originally from Baruch 
Spinoza. In borrowing from Brian Massumi she describes the conception of affect 
that is of interest at the moment as,  
Bodily capacities to affect and be affected or the augmentation or 
diminution of a body’s capacity to act, to engage, and to connect, such 
that autoaffection is linked to the self-feeling of being alive—that is, 
aliveness or vitality.48 
Autoaffection, which had been Ticineto-Clough’s earlier research interest, 
describes the nonconscious register of life, living, and feeling alive in which affect 
many times works and that the human subject works to refuse or suppress. 
Pertaining specifically to the technological and the nonhuman autoaffection was, 
“crucial to any refusal of an intimacy between the body and the machine, nature 
and technology, the virtual and the real, the living and the inert.”49  
This crucially brings the contradictory role of technology into affect theory 
as a nonhuman element through which humans feel varying levels of affection. 
Mark B. Hansen, who Ticineto-Clough also borrows from in the above 
description, puts a fine point on the contradiction in technology from the affective 
standpoint.  
We will find ourselves in a position to fathom the apparent paradox of 
contemporary subjectivity: the fact that technical expansion of self-
affection allows for a fuller and more intense experience of subjectivity, 
that, in short, technology allows for a closer relationship to ourselves, for a 
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more intimate experience of the very vitality that forms the core of our 
being…50 
 
Where Ticineto-Clough’s early work on autoaffection foregrounded thought, the 
newer affective turn emphasizes new configurations of “bodies, technology, and 
matter.” Two of Ticineto-Clough’s claims in particular bring the intersection of 
affect and ergonomics into clearer view. First, that there is an “affective turn” in 
critical thought means that our seeking greater understanding in affection, the 
very intimacies and transmissions between body and technology, nature and 
technology is, “necessary to theorize the social.”51 Second, as Ticineto-Clough 
points out, a fundamental difference by which our critical frameworks have to 
shift is in our recognition of what Manuel DeLanda calls nonorganic life.52  
 It is DeLanda’s work in particular that both possesses the most radical 
insight for an affective turn as a recognition of machines as something like 
affective agents, but also (for this same reason) may be pushed to the margins of 
its discourse. This is not to imply at all that he is unknown, nor that his work is not 
referenced or respected—the fact is that the turn to increased interest in affection 
has led to greater intrigue in his framing of Gilles Deleuze and his work on 
scientific knowledge.  
Though much of his work is historical in nature and he has theorized 
assemblage theory as a new paradigm for Sociology, he has explicitly claimed 
that,  
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It is always better to start with the non-human. Else we trap ourselves 
within the little provincial space defined by the drives and interests of a 
single species.53 
 
By virtue of this theoretical standpoint he allows for the possibility that affection is 
limited neither to human action nor human apprehension of just how nonorganic 
life forms affect them. Further, and this is his crucial contribution to affect studies, 
the kind of nonhuman affect we may theorize need not be similar or related in 
any way to the kinds of affect that we now find ourselves familiar with in 
machines, animals, or any other nonorganic life.  
DeLanda argues that on the most general level of existence, the 
capacities to affect and be affected as well as the tendencies for organisms and 
objects to do so in the world—need not be actual to be real.54 That is, the 
capacity for a machine to affect a human being in a particular way is not 
diminished because it has not yet done so. Likewise, the list of possibilities for a 
machine’s becoming self conscious, ethical, or self-reproducing, need not have 
already occurred in order to explore this space of capabilities. This powerful 
claim is at the heart of my project and guides my conception and use of affect as 
it pertains to the capacities of machines, human bodies, and systems of thought. 
It is in this sense that the objects I discuss, Warren McCulloch’s theoretical 
ethical robots, need not have been actually constructed for them to have 
produced intensities that pushed his and other cybernetician’s thought and 
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behavior. Likewise, a computer, mechanical arm, or android robot need not 
currently exist that fulfills criteria of consciousness or emotion in order for us to 
speak of them as “nonorganic life.” This provides an interesting way to explore 
qualities of affect that, as Brian Massumi describes, unlike emotion, are non-
subjective, non-narrative, and existing as “unqualified intensities.”55  
In using DeLanda’s claim that bodies, agencies, tendencies themselves 
can have reality without their actualizations, I understand machines as affecting 
and being affected similarly to the ways that humans are.  Various scholars have 
theorized this as the “non-conscious”56 register in which affects act, and this 
register works comfortably in each of the fields I explore (physiology, cybernetics, 
ergonomics). Here the observation of human machine interaction begins first with 
the suspension or bracketing of questions concerning consciousness, inner 
states, or identities in the interactions of those bodies. Given the dual movements 
in scholarship toward new materialism, empiricism, and object-centered 
analyses57 as well as to study of affection, my dissertation begins from asking 
one question that at once touches epistemological, ethical, and political valences. 
What if ergonomics represents the most systematic and radical way of knowing 
nonhuman otherness within what is taken to be our posthuman condition of 
global biotechnological economies?  
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Chapter Outline: Epistemology, Ethics, Affection 
 
The following chapters, in attempting to explore and expand empirical 
concepts similarly to Deleuze, supply “a retrospective analysis on the basis of an 
alternative.”58 Specifically, I highlight particular theories of life that have emerged 
from Physiology, Cybernetics, and Ergonomics, as those fields have conceived 
human life through the machine. These theories, whether long forgotten by 
contemporary bio-technological sciences, or whether shown to be foundational in 
certain ways, push back against the grain of the hegemony of rationalist, 
mechanistic, and reductionist based thought. They produce instead a conception 
of what I call vital machines—a theory of technology that simultaneously puts the 
machine into the realm of human life while acknowledging an incalculability and 
irreducibility to its agential features.  
In the First Chapter, “Physiology, or Epistemology” I provide a sketch of 
physiological thought as it developed alongside enlightenment philosophies and 
a general mechanization and reductionism informed by the concept of the 
modern machine. I will show that beginning most importantly with Renee 
Descartes, the mechanistic-reductionist figure of the machine gets pushed 
through rationalist sciences to be seen at the important moments of the 
development of modern machines. Drawing on Georges Canguilhelm’s as well 
as Michel Foucault’s studies of physiology in the 18th and 19th centuries, I 
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illustrate a counter narrative reductionist-mechanistic ideology, one that will be 
carried through into cybernetics and ergonomics between the two World Wars.  
The early 20th century saw the emergence of behaviorist theories and 
industrial psychology aimed at reducing motivation and decision-making 
processes in humans to machinic (i.e. simplistic, predictable, reproducible 
elements). Again, in the early-mid 20th century, when automation was the key 
design problem for early computer machines as well as for human labor in 
industrial and military contexts, the development of information, systems, and 
cybernetic theories tended to rely on such mechanistic reductions—in the form of 
the theoretical black box, for example. Cybernetician Gregory Bateson would 
take both American Engineers as well as computer science to task for their 
instrumentalist and simplistic view of what a system was. The black box was 
what those researchers blacked out or saw as irrelevant in relation to their 
observation of simple predictable and repeatable behavior. Systems were not 
about input-output because that neglected the important communicative between 
parts as a whole where, “essentially your ecosystem, your organism-plus-
environment, is to be considered as a single circuit.”59 
However, I acknowledge this particular hegemony of mechanistic 
reduction in order to show that, when our current investment in technoscientific 
thought is viewed as one moment in a centuries long struggle to empirically 
discover and define the processes of life, we begin to see the persistent 
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emergence of the mechanistic machine’s other—that is, a conception of a 
machine that is neither mechanical nor reducible to its parts, or again, a vital 
machine. I envision physiology as the first component of the ergonomic science 
to come, as an epistemology of nonhuman-humanity. The sketch I provide 
illustrates a line of thought that, at various proximities to the metaphor of the 
machine, radically reconceived of human life as early as the 17th century.  
Chapter 2, “Cybernetics, or Ethics” will build on the first chapter by 
illustrating the epistemological bridge from physiology to human machine 
relations in the form of Cybernetics. I illustrate that as the second radical 
component of ergonomics, cybernetics illustrates a theory of the machine subject 
as a nonhuman ethics. Cybernetic thought is generally understood by historians 
of science and technology to be a foundational nexus for a host of developments 
in the 20th century, from the history of computers as well as of the digital as a 
figure of thought and culture,60 to the biotechnological economy of distributed 
networks and the control society.61  My chapter will work to a different path for 
cybernetics. Pertaining specifically to the vitalist, non-reductionist, and non-
mechanistic theories of life from the physiology chapter, Cybernetics will be seen 
as contributing to and expanded on critical-vitalist view of machine agency. I thus 
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argue in the chapter that where physiology provided an epistemology that 
ergonomics could draw on for its human machine systems, cybernetics provided 
an ethical framework that informed it at the level of valuing machine subjects. I 
take two of the more famous proponents of cybernetics at mid 20th century, 
Norbert Wiener and Warren McCulloch, as individuals who were exemplary of a 
line of cyberneticians from the 19th century to the present who strongly observe 
ethics in their study of machines. I then reconsider cybernetics based on many of 
its critics, as being a “failure” in its attempts to become a meta-theory and 
common language among all sciences. I briefly reconsider also the claims that 
cybernetics was a field dependent on command-control-communication-
intelligence (C3I) from U.S. military operations as well as distinguish this 
cybernetic ethic from cybernetic thought that is perceived to emerge with digital 
culture. In the next part I discuss primarily Margaret Mead and Gregory Bateson 
in their attempts to bring cybernetics to the human sciences. Finally, I conclude 
with Michel Foucault’s genealogy of ethics of ancient Greco-Roman subjectivity. I 
argue that in the process of discovering a subjectivity that is distinct from both a 
Christian and a Modern(ist) mode of caring for oneself, he describes a 
technology of self that is foundationally cybernetic or a machine ethic. 
In Chapter 3, “Ergonomics, or Affection” I provide the historical context for 
human machine interaction within the field of Human Factors and Ergonomics 
engineering. My source materials will be composed primarily of 
documents/media found either in the “Human Factors” or “Ergonomics” journals, 
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or the writings of Hywell Murrell, the founder of Ergonomics, as well as other 
foundational writings on the field.  
Two, I attempt to understand how ergonomics continued to theorize and 
design experiments reliant on material and affective arrangements while much of 
computer engineering began to focus on microprocessing, software, and the 
psychology of computing. My project seeks to understand the different path that 
such a commitment to the bodies of machines and humans led to human-
machine communication in ergonomics.  In fact, as my final chapter on 
ergonomic theory and practice will conclude, I gesture towards the field as one of 
the most significant and possibly productive empirical studies of affection going 
into the 21st century of human machine interaction. The notion of affect that has 
migrated from psychology into ergonomics is nothing like the above theorized 
concept in that it is characterized by its qualification through narrative, emotion, 
and the individual. However, the continued reliance in the field on systems and 
cybernetic theories prevents it from remaining so for very long. The empirical 
understanding is then that affect is material, like other forms of bio-feedback, and 
must be considered today as part of a complex ecology in which human senses 
meet machines. Additionally, I discuss the expanse of ergonomic practice 
beyond best practices for consumer goods designed for individual consumers—
the ergonomics of highway systems and urban sprawl, or the ergonomics of 
honeybee and ant colonies. It is an expansion that sets the ergonomic study of 
affection beyond the scales of both market economy and human bodies, and is in 
   36 
 
need of a greater understanding in relation to the original humanistic premise of 
ergonomics’ development.  
I then provide a brief history of ergonomics as it is relevant to humanistic 
and posthumanistic thought. I show how in its relationships to both psychology 
and the scientific management of work, namely through Taylorism, that 
ergonomics is a subjugated science of work. Then I discuss how ergonomics has 
simultaneously and in a complimentary form introduced humanistic progressive 
ethics as well as radical theories such as cybernetics and system theory into its 
science. In the next section of the chapter I discuss ergonomics as a putting into 
practice of both the epistemology (physiology) and ethics (cybernetics) of 
machines. In order to do so I highlight two of ergonomics precursors, Wojeiech 
Jastrzebowski who coined the term ergonomics in 1864, and Lillian Gilbreth who 
shifted the object of work science from the factory to the home and from the 
Fordist subject characterized as an abled body male laborer, to that of differently 
enabled individuals and to female domestic laborers.  
Jastrzebowski combined a metaphysical notion of labor as a fundamental 
human condition and an ultimate good rather than a means to production—with a 
Spinozist-like physics of bodies in motion. Gilbreth not only provided 
progressivist and feminist sensibilities to the study of labor during the 20th century 
but also provided a radical conception that the pairing of a human and machine 
could constitute a worker as a subject and citizen of rights. Finally, I discuss the 
Vitruvian Machine as a subject produced by ergonomics. As a historical figure it 
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derives from Da Vinci’s Vitruvian Man as the exemplar of Humanism, 
Anthropocentrism, and Androcentrism. However, as an aesthetic and ethical 
figure the Vitruvian Machine has become antithetical to the above ideologies. I 
then discuss the Vitruvian Machine as a part of the useful mode of 
anthropomorphizing done in ergonomics as a way to translate the radical notion 
of machine life into human terms. I conclude the chapter by discussing 
ergonomics as potentially being a programmatic, ethical, as well as critical study 
of affection between humans and machines.  
Finally, my dissertation concludes by way of speculation for further 
research into ergonomics. The number of scholastic and industrial papers being 
produced about the study of our interactions with robots has greatly increased, 
and this is no doubt connected to the annual increases in robotics sold both in 
the Americas—20% growth in units sold year 2012, and globally an average of 
12% growth annually from 2010 to 2013. I discuss the entrance into new sectors 
of labor for the human modeled robot or what has been known in science fiction 
as the “android robot.” Given the obvious verisimilitude of the android I draw 
connections that the android may form with other kinds of human capital currently 
being exploited. I then speculate on the significance of an even more nascent 
and possibly radical form of machine, that of programmable matter which may be 
any proportion of synthetic inorganic and/or synthetic biological matter. I end by 
suggesting the strong possibility that machines may need to be considered within 
the frameworks of biopolitics and biopower respectively—as Zoe or bare life—
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when these individual specimens evolve to the level of a population of bodies at 
work in society at large.  
As this dissertation is fundamentally a discussion of the limits and 
possibilities of communication between human and nonhuman actors, I begin 
with a chapter on physiology. Physiology, or the study of functional life processes 
in organisms, has a strong element of anti-modern thought within it.  
 
Ch. 2: Physiology or Nonhuman Epistemology 
Physiologists like many of scientists, tend to point out the “ancient” history 
of their profession. Galen and Aristotle before him are portrayed as asking 
questions about living organisms that were formative and continue to concern 
modern physiologists. It seems that, when faced with the looming threat of a 
modern or emerging problem, it can be productive to look outside of the modern 
to the distant past. When writing about media networks Alexander Galloway 
began his essay with the “networks” of Aeschylus’ Greek tragedy Agamemnon. 
One was an actual, material communication network of fire beacons used to 
warn of the fall of Troy from hundreds of miles away.62 The other was an 
imagined, immaterial network that invoked fear of utter destruction, a, “web of 
ruin.”63 Both, “unknowable in quality and innumerable in form,”64 this network’s 
entire purpose was to dissolve all forms of order or organization including 
                                                
62 Alexander R. Galloway, “Networks,” in Critical Terms for Media Studies, ed. W.J.T. Mitchell and 
Mark B.N. Hansen (Chicago, University of Chicago Press), 280.  
63 Galloway, “Networks,” 281. 
64 Ibid., 281. 
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communication and life itself. Galloway argued that he chose to look to the 
classics in order to show that non-modern knowledge can tell us something 
about the problem of communication both then and now. He continued that his 
purpose was,  
to put in question, at the outset, the assumption that networks are 
exclusively endemic to the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries, 
and more pointedly, that networks are somehow synonymous with the 
technologies of modernity and postmodernity…65 
 
Galloway’s ancient network examples show that for the Greek’s and their modern 
Western descendants alike, the network was a Janus face of promise and peril. It 
is a longstanding fear based on organization, freedom, and chaos. For the 
promise of the modern network is that it could lead to decentralized, distributed, 
and non-hierarchical forms of communication. Put differently, the network is one 
way of looking at the relationship between an individual, its desire for 
autonomous action, and its larger relationship to the system that governs it.  
There is good reason to trace back the ancient survey that physiologists 
take to describe the major problem of their field, the functional definition of life. 
Again, the distinction between life and inert matter rests on the conceptual rift 
between organization of matter such that it lives, vs. dissolution of its 
organization such that fails to meet life’s criteria. In making the distinction 
between life and matter physiologists assume a very particular theory of 
communication.  
One of the most pregnant insights into the uniqueness of living beings was 
Aristotle’s observation that living matter possesses a special form, or 
                                                
65 Ibid. 282. 
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organization, which is uniquely able to communicate itself to other suitable 
matter. It is just this capacity to communicate form that permits the living 
organism to replace what it loses through displacement, and to grow, and 
to reproduce.66 
 
This passage points to the important and ancient idea of self-expression as a 
form of communication that is integral to the persistence of organisms. Aristotle 
claimed this was an act of self-motion in the universe that was peculiar to the 
living, where inert matter must derive its motion from an outside mover.67 The 
freedom to move oneself was tantamount to a freedom of self-expression or the 
continual communication of individual form and, in the event of death, the ability 
to continue that form through the process of reproduction of life. Finally, Aristotle 
claimed that self-expression or the movement of living things was always done 
purposefully. Along with communication as self-movement and purpose the 
category of life offered another crucial feature. Aristotle claimed that, merely by 
association with a living organism, constituent matter, an organ or body fluids like 
the blood, for example, was itself, “a kind of living creature.”68 The matter 
constituting organisms was itself alive and formed a living whole that was 
irreducible to matter in its living processes.  Thus the organizing principles of life 
were that it could self-move/communicate, that all of its movements were 
purposeful, and that while it lived it was more than the sum of its material parts.  
                                                
66 Thomas S. Hall, Ideas of Life and Matter: Studies in the History of General Physiology 600 
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67Aristotle, “Physics,” in The Complete Works of Aristotle, ed. Jonathan Barnes (New Jersey, 
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68 Aristotle, “Movement of Animals,” in The Complete Works of Aristotle, ed. Jonathan Barnes 
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 Aristotle already recognized the risks of holding life as a special category 
of matter. He named that object “automaton” that behaved in a way that seemed 
to have purpose but must, because it was not naturally alive, have happened due 
to chance or spontaneity.69 He also tenuously opened up the possibility that a 
human being could be composed of something other than flesh and blood, of 
inorganic matter, but did not follow this line of reasoning for long before 
dismissing it.70 Even in antiquity the prospect of an “artificial” or nonorganic 
object exhibiting life-like behaviors was an “imaginary” danger to the sanctity of 
the principles of living matter. From that point on the idea of an agent so unlike 
humans but with the powers to communicate its form would continue to persist. 
The ancient idea of the power of life was as a literal communication of self to 
others with purpose. Could a body move in space and time with intention, 
affecting other bodies, and regenerate, grow, and reproduce itself? 
 This distinction of life as fundamentally communicative would eventually 
wane in the face of the development of modern knowledge. The predominance of 
the physical sciences, particularly Sr. Isaac Newton’s Mechanics, pushed the 
study of life as a communicative agency to the margins. Ironically, though 
rationality, mathematics, and matter were the chief tools of modernity, the 
imagined criteria for a nonhuman agent became less material or physical. The 
power of the living in modernity was much more specifically human, it was 
representational and a power of the mind. Could a thing alien to human resemble 
                                                
69 Aristotle, The Complete Works of Aristotle, 29. 
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human intelligence? Could it become self-aware, that is, conscious, and identify? 
The older idea of self-communicating life would endure thanks to scientific 
thought that continued to concern itself with the philosophical possibilities of life 
and matter. In 1900 Nicola Tesla was already concerned with the ecological 
existence of human beings. He wrote an essay that discussed the limited 
resources at the population’s disposal as well as the productive ways that 
humans could continue to increase their resources of energy as their numbers 
steadily grew. In that same essay he proposed a radically novel description of 
what life was and how humans could re-conceive it:  
In a crystal we have the clear evidence of the existence of a formative life-
principle, and though we cannot understand the life of a crystal, it is none 
the less a living being. There may be, besides crystals, other such 
individualized, material systems of beings, perhaps of gaseous 
constitution, or composed of substance still more tenuous. In view of this 
possibility,—nay, probability, we cannot apodictically deny the existence of 
organized beings on a planet merely because the conditions on the same 
are unsuitable for the existence of life as we conceive it. We cannot even, 
with positive assurance, assert that some of them might not be present 
here, in this our world, in the very midst of us, for their constitution and life-
manifestation may be such that we are unable to perceive them.71 
   
A century later Manuel DeLanda, who closely followed Gilles Deleuze’s work on 
the virtual, and who was not concerned whatsoever with the human mind as the 
seat of communication, would echo this passage with eerie similarity. 
 We owe it to Gilles Deleuze to have equipped us with the tools to 
break from the idea that all expression is ultimately linguistic, and hence 
anthropocentric: objective spaces themselves are expressive. For 
example, before living creatures populated this planet crystals were 
already expressive. But to whom were they expressing themselves? To no 
                                                71	  Nikola	  Tesla,	  "The	  Problem	  of	  Increasing	  Human	  Energy-­‐Through	  Use	  of	  the	  Sun's	  Energy."	  The	  
Century	  Illustrated	  Magazine	  (1956).	  
   43 
 
one, they simply expressed their identity through their three dimensional 
geometry.72  
 
With this idea DeLanda drew a line extended from Hellenistic period 
through modernity and into our current philosophical landscape that is 
alternatively characterized as post-modern and posthuman. The ancient ideas of 
mass, movement, and energy link up with a still forming canon in critical 
communication studies today—the study of affect.  
This chapter will demonstrate that there are important historical 
connections between physiology and the ergonomics research that would 
emerge around human-machine relationships. Additionally it will show that those 
connections were crucial to the “denaturing” effects that ergonomics had on 
scientific and popular conceptions of human life. Physiology is important to the 
development of ergonomics because of three theoretical assumptions in 
ergonomics that were actually adopted from physiology. First, a physiological 
perspective continued a commitment to life as an empirical category while 
resisting the tendency to hierarchize kinds of life based on complexity or 
proximity to human life. Second, in his treatise on ergonomics Hywel Murrell 
discussed the fundamental importance of the physical basis of its methods of 
observation and the extent to which ergonomics pursued basic physical elements 
of the human body—its structure, function, and capabilities.73  
                                                72	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Part 2: Critical Histories of the Life Sciences 
 
Fatigue 
The conditions that would provide the emergence of ergonomics—
industrialization, automation, and the scientific study of work—also marks the 
decline of Physiology as a predominately valued scientific knowledge. Perhaps 
the most significant epistemological/experimental problem for early 20th century 
physiology was the human condition of fatigue. It was no coincident that in the 
reconstruction of industrial infrastructure after World War I fatigue study, and the 
study of laborers generally, became a priority for managers, owners, and the 
burgeoning scientific field called experimental psychology. Together, the 
intensified industrial concern for productivity and the psychological imperative to 
interrogate inner states of the mind and passions had the effect of marginalizing 
the physiological work that had been done on the materiality of bodies, their 
affects, and relationships to factory machines.  
The study of human fatigue, which began at least as early as the 17th 
century in the form of experiment with electricity and animal muscle stimulation 
was transformed in the 19th century into a “correctible” program. This program 
sought to address the condition of waste of human movement and potential, in a 
larger shift to imagining the human body as both a social and physical engine.  
The ability of fatigue to move fluently between science and literature 
reveals the tendency of nineteenth-century thinkers to equate the 
psychological with the physical and to locate the body as the site where 
sociaJ deformations and dislocations can be most easily observed…  
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As a tangible and ever-present mental and physical disorder, fatigue 
could, however, be distinguished from emotional states, for example-
melancholy, ennui, and listlessness which were its subjective 
manifestations. The physical symptoms of fatigue were regarded as mere 
"representations" of more profound conditions.74  
 
The above argues that because of the symbolic uses of the body during 
industrialization, that the somatic processes of the body as necessary indicators 
for mental, emotional, and class disease did not have strong meaning as physical 
processes, which is precisely what physiologists were interested in. The fact of 
the matter was that physiologists, in their general desire to redesign inefficient or 
strenuous work places and machines around human workers, were simply not 
equipped, according to factory owners and industrialist investors to solve the 
fatigue problem. Psychologists, on the other hand, were keen on shaping human 
labor through profiling and psychological manipulation to the demands of the 
factory and workspace.75  
And yet this claim is not entirely accurate, as physiological research 
continued, though subdued in the strength or influence of its results, in all of the 
above. The Gilbreths, who were not only at the forefront of the science 
management and industrial psychology movements, but are cited frequently as 
one of the most influential precursors to modern ergonomics, derived their 
studies explicitly from physiological experimentation known as Motion Studies. 
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Hywel Murrell, who coined the name Ergonomics and was instrumental in the 
networking of scientists both in England and the U.S. to continue its research, 
identified wholly as a psychologist of sorts. And yet to look at his major work on 
ergonomics, “Human Performance in Industry”76 is to parse the basic structure of 
a physiology textbook. Physiology has always been included in the panoply of 
fields that ergonomics makes use of. Ultimately, physiology took a back seat to 
psychology in the factories as an effective influence on human labor, given its 
predilections for weighing healthy integrated function of a human body over a 
singular successful exertion such as a repetitive motion of the hand.  
It is not that physiology was incapable of producing knowledge about 
efficiency of labor or production for it often did. It was simply that, as the 
trajectory of the life sciences had shown since the 18th century, the physiological 
would give way to the psychological, and the concept of vital processes or 
activity (in labor for example) would make way for a mechanistic study of bodies. 
The key discipline that would supplant physiology as the key study of fatigue was 
the branch of experimental psychology that came to be associated with work 
science or scientific management that thrived at the turn of the 20th century. 
Perhaps the most famous public attackers of human fatigue in labor, Frederick 
Taylor, met before a Special House committee in 1912 in order to investigate the 
state of the “Taylor system” as a monopoly in American scientific management. 
In testimony given to inform the committee of the essence of scientific 
                                                
76 This was the U.S. title for the book first published in Britain as “Ergonomics: man in his working 
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management, Taylor stated that scientific management is concerned only with 
those “sentiments” which surround those on the side of management and those 
on the side of workers. He went on to list all of those things that his system was 
not: 
Scientific management is not any efficiency device…It is not a system of 
figuring costs; it is not a new scheme of paying men; it is not a piecework 
system…it is not holding a stop watch on a man and writing things down 
about him…77 
 
Taylor was simply not interested in material, embodied, or physiological 
discoveries, and this is key because the Work of Gilbert and Lillian Gilbreth, who 
pioneered both time and motion studies and were seminal to early ergonomics—
was precisely concerned with human and machine bodies. On the other hand, 
Taylorism was “not motion study nor an analysis of the movements of men…”78 
Instead the essence of Taylor’s system was tantamount to an entire 
“psychological revolution.”79 The idea that the industry of scientific management 
marked a “revolution” and not the instrumental manipulation of individual’s 
psychology at work was hugely influential. For a time in the 20th century it would 
solidify the beneficial relationship that industrial psychological research had with 
military and industrial fields. The psychology of efficiency would become known 
through the popularity of surveys, diagnostic and aptitude exams and the 
Rorschach test, among other psychologist tools. It was also the reason that from 
its beginnings in 1949 ergonomics was considered a social science and the 
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employ of the psychologist, though the language and object of the physiologist—
the processes of the human body in action, would remain with it. 
 
George Canguilhem and Foucault on Physiology 
I briefly go over the work of Michel Foucault and Georges Canguilhem 
with attention to how their works describe physiology in the 18th and 19th 
centuries. I do so in order to highlight how my project resonates with the general 
biopolitical register of these accounts. The chapter then moves to histories of 
science that have dealt specifically with physiological thought, where I suggest 
that for physiology, just as Michel Foucault says of History, “things weren’t 
necessary as all that.”80  
While acknowledging that scientists participate in particular rationalities or 
ideological discourses, I use Foucault’s historical method in order to pinpoint 
particular epistemological breaks from those dominant discourses. These breaks 
which occur particularly within physiology as a repetition of a problem space, or 
an indetermination over human life, results in an indecision towards life and 
matter that short-circuits instrumentalist thought and provides an openness to 
what we know as a post-human perspective. I move on to particular moments of 
these instances from physiology: first in its infancy in the 19th century, then at the 
turn of the 20th century to trace the effect of science management and industrial 
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psychology on physiological thought, and then at mid 20th century when the 
emergence of ergonomics would again mark physiology’s trajectory.  
Georges Canguilhem used “scientific ideology” in order to distinguish 
between the discourses of what he called Science and Non-Science. He traced 
the rise of a “modern” autonomous physiology as a product of the 19th century 
with little epistemological difference from any of the life sciences in its 
subservience to that ideology. Of the three phenomena that produced significant 
change to European medicine at turn of the 19th century,  
…physiology gradually liberated itself from its subservience to classical 
anatomy and became an independent medical discipline, which at first 
focused on disease at the tissue level, as yet unaware that eventually it 
would come to focus even more sharply on the cell. And physiologists 
looked to physics and chemistry for examples as well as tools”81   
 
Canguilhem highlighted a hegemony of thought in the life sciences devoted to 
the pathological, with the birth of an autonomous Physiology as seemingly no 
different. This prompts his characterization of the emergence of the field as just 
one more approach to the study of the mortified/dead to understand the living. 
However, unlike the medical practitioners who felt a preexisting “need to know 
the dead in order to understand the living”82 in the 19th century, physiologists did 
chaff against the mortification of life science discovery. “Dead nature cannot help 
us, but living nature provides us with acceptable terms of comparison.”83 This 
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was the epistemological push back against the ideology of mortification that 
Foucault and Canguilhem identified. 
We can see that physiology, not unlike the other sciences, was rife with 
divergences and conflicting thoughts about how to theorize living organisms.  It 
developed against the emergence of its twin pathological medicine, just as it 
would develop contra reductionist and mechanistic sciences. Physiology 
continued, as natural philosophy had done prior to the 18th century, to explore the 
possibilities of a vitalism in organisms as opposed to a mechanism that simplified 
and vivified living bodies in attempts to reduce life to its simplest constituent 
parts.  
 Before the 18th century physiology or “all of natural philosophy” was 
concerned with questions of life and matter in the universe, our access to them, 
and their unified relationship. Beginning in the 1700’s physiology came to define 
“the study of the nature, powers and functions of human beings.”84 Beyond the 
designation of “human” physiology, the function of the science had now become 
the study of the normal functions of organisms and living systems. The term 
normal, especially as it pertains to human life is well articulated by Michel 
Foucault as an example of the rise of modern scientific discourse as well as its 
inclusion in governing of a citizenry. It is through the abnormal, Foucault 
observed, that scientific discovery in the 19th century gets transposed to both a 
medical treatment and a pedagogical problem for normal human bodily function. 
We are struck immediately with the implications for a science whose definition 
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includes such a normative criteria of proper life in the concept of normal—to 
become a “moral physiology” regulating sin, monstrosity, and perversion through 
the more modern “discipline of the useful body”.85  
Consequently, this notion of condition has a formidable capacity for integ- 
gration: It refers to nonhealth, but it can also bring into its field any 
conduct whatsoever as soon as it is physiologically, psychologically, 
sociologically, morally, and even legally deviant. The notion's capacity 
for integration in this pathology, in this medicalization of the abnormal, 
is clearly marvelous. At the same time, the second big advantage 
is that the notion of condition makes possible the rediscovery of a 
physiological model.86 
 
Understanding what Foucault’s concerns on the abnormal bring to the history of 
physiology, we can use his historiographic method in order to illuminate 
physiology beyond its significant normativizing effects. Using an archaeological 
method reveals what Foucault called the positivities of knowledge, a “positive 
unconscious of knowledge: a level that eludes the consciousness of the scientist 
and yet is part of scientific discourse.”87 As Foucault stated, the finding of 
positivities distinguished his history from those that attempt to dispute science’s 
validity or “diminish its scientific nature.”88 Archaeology, on the other hand, 
through the positivity of the ground of knowledge finds the episteme in which 
“diverse forms of empirical science” appear.89  
 That is to say, archaeological perspective on the sciences illuminates to 
us that “knowledge succeeds in engendering knowledge, ideas in transforming 
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themselves and actively modifying one another”90 without and despite the 
intentions of human intentions. Finally, in taking Foucault’s archaeology seriously 
for the history of physiology this chapter attempts to illustrate the diverse and 
denaturing qualities of particular physiological theories within a larger perceived 
hegemony of thought—what Foucault describes as an “eventalisation.” 
[Eventalisation] means making visible a singularity at places where there 
is a temptation to invoke a historical constant, an immediate 
anthropological trait or an obviousness that imposes itself uniformly on all. 
To show that things weren’t ‘necessary as all that’ . . .91  
 
The positivity that appears from beginning an archaeology of physiology is the 
marginalized yet persistent idea that, as Canguilhem argued, knowledge and life, 
the former of human beings and the latter of nature, rather than being opposed 
are coconstitutive of one another.92 Further, if there was an inequality in the 
relationship between knowledge and life, from the perspective of physiology it 
was not that life could be mastered by the ingenuity of human knowledge, but 
conversely the case of  “the inadequacy of analytical thought to any biological 
object.”93 
In proposing that physiological thought was not “necessary as all that” is to 
say two things from the outset about its definition. First, the concept of “normal” 
in defining physiology’s concern is actually nonessential to the study of living 
organisms and has been substituted with other concepts such as optimal, or 
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regulated, for example, and the ideological power of normal and its other 
abnormal in particular cases produced nonconforming conceptions of organism. 
Second, what this method attempts to bring out is another, more persistent if less 
obvious imperative within physiological thought that was present at 19th century. 
What began to distinguish Physiology as it gained autonomy in the 19th century 
from the rest of the life sciences was its historical fascination not with the 
relationship between life and death but between life and the lifeless.94  That life-
matter relations are inextricable to physiology can be more easily understood by 
the proposition that on some level of reduction human beings are composed of 
lifeless materials. Physiological thought has historically shown this tendency and 
experimented with the shared limit-threshold between what can empirically be 
concluded as living tissue vs. what is inert matter. This is why it has historically 
vacillated between a vitalist and mechanistic tendency. 
    Siegfried Zielinski noted that, deriving from the ancient discourse of 
“natural philosophy” physiology was important because its aim of understanding 
encompassed everything that concerned philosophical thought in the West. 
   Observations of nature, mind, and the soul, as well as the mathematical    
   calculations made by the early philosophers, cannot be separated. Their   
   conception of physiology encompassed it all.95 
 
This conception of physiology provides a notion that is no longer agreeable to 
much of scientific as well as humanistic scholarship that has become so 
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specialized. It is the idea of integration or holism, and physiology, as a subset of 
biological science, has to various extents continued to theorize life in this non-
mechanistic, non-reductionist manner.  
Additionally, Zielinski made the most explicit connection between physiology 
and media theory. Like Galloway with media networks, Zielinski believed that 
ancient thought had much to offer contemporary media. 
What I have tried to show is how one can arrange some of the extant text    
particles of Empedocles and Democritus on perception to extract ideas and  
statements that have some bearing upon the frenetic contemporary sphere of 
activity that is theory and praxis of media: the interface between the one and 
the other, which can be defined as the interface between media people and 
media machines.96  
 
The above supports two major points of this chapter. First, that the rigorously 
studied technical concepts within physiology, such as “perception” or “sensation”, 
“movement” or “energy,” can be imported into media studies with many 
productive results. In this sense a physiological media studies intersects with 
work in the areas of new materialisms and affect studies that engage in a 
“technical”97 turn in their thought. It is my hope that my study contributes to these 
areas, particularly the historic-theoretical bent of new materialism as well as the 
ethical openness to otherness possessed by affect studies. I have discussed 
earlier my dissertation’s connections to these other projects.  However, I am 
arguing that Zielinski’s use of media people/media machines expresses the same 
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vitalist tendency as Canguilhem and puts together the technological with the 
organic in a way that doesn’t privilege one over the other.  
 
Georges Canguilhem and the Vitalistic Tendency 
In its educational web site the Physiological Society defines physiology as,  
the science of life. It is a broad science which aims to understand the 
mechanisms of living, from the molecular basis of cell function to the 
integrated behaviour of the whole body.98 
 
The running distinction between biology and physiology since the 19th century 
has been that, where biologists look for the most basic structures or 
organizations underlying organisms, physiologists study the functions of 
organisms. The structure/function distinction accounts for why biology historically 
developed towards microscopic, molecular, and genetic levels. On the other 
hand for physiology the question of function or purpose for a particular living 
thing, be it an organism, organ, or cell, was dependent on its relation to its 
complimentary living things. None of the three aforementioned live in isolation, 
nor would understanding them isolated provide meaningful knowledge. As 
Georges Canguilhem observed of the physiological approach,  
The difficulty, if not the obstacle, lies in approaching through analysis a 
being that is neither a part or segment nor a sum of parts or segments, a 
being that only lives by living as one, that is to say, as a whole:99 
 
This holistic approach was and is a very specific outlook on physiology or 
science in general for that matter. In fact, this holistic physiology, especially after 
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the 18th century, saw its work and status increasingly marginalized in favor of life 
sciences that were willing to model themselves after the reductionist and 
mechanistic principles from enlightenment physics. This chapter will trace a few 
examples of physiological thought that takes its objects as whole, integrated, and 
connected to larger systems. In order to do so it utilizes George Canguilhem’s 
work on the life sciences and their underlying philosophies of what life was. 
Canguilhem, a historian, scientist, and philosopher was highly influential to post-
1960’s French theory. Michel Foucault claimed that without him “we” would lack 
key understandings of French Marxism, French Sociology, Lacanian 
Psychoanalysis, and that,  
Further, in the entire discussion of ideas which preceded or followed the 
movement of '68, it is easy to find the place of those who, from near or 
from afar, had been trained by Canguilhem.100 
 
Additionally, Canguilhem represents a reconsideration of the usefulness of the 
philosophy of Vitalism. In particular, as my dissertation owes much to the works 
of Michel Foucault and Gilles Deleuze, Georges Canguilhem stands as a key 
thought in the development they would continue. Canguilhem brought the life 
sciences to the forefront of historical and philosophical understandings. Foucault 
and Deleuze would continue, with Biopolitical theory and philosophy of 
Becoming, respectively, as thinking that was fundamentally concerned with the 
powers of Life. As I discuss in the next chapter both Foucault and Deleuze would 
explicitly ponder Life in general in their last published essays. Canguilhem, on 
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the other hand, worked on the problems of understanding it throughout his career 
and began his own argument that “Life cannot be grasped by logic,”101 with a 
review of the mechanist vitalist debate.  
He showed the mechanist’s derision towards the life sciences as 
encapsulated in one of their most prominent critics, Jacques Monod, who also 
happened to be a nobel prize winning biologist.  
Biology is marginal because—the living world constituting but a tiny and 
very “special” part of the universe—it does not seem likely that the study 
of living things will ever uncover general laws applicable outside the 
biosphere. (emphasis added)102 
 
 The vitalistic strand of physiology did not result in a solipsistic skepticism that we 
could never truly distinguish life from the nonliving. Rather,  
The phenomenological experience of life is indisputable. We are aware of 
ourselves as living creatures and as sharing the attribute of life with other 
creatures which are patently distinguishable from inanimate objects. The 
crassest of mechanists is ready to acknowledge a discernible difference 
between the living and the nonliving. His disagreement with the vitalist is 
over the explanation of this phenomenon, not over its occurrence.103 
 
According to Monod and other mechanists the explanation for the phenomenon 
of life was merely chance or probabilistic occurrence. 
 That the physiological view of human life since the 17th century had 
vacillated so greatly between machinic and a powerful and mysterious vitalism 
resulted in a hybrid and highly complicated conception of living things. I argue 
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that this complication is one of the strongest epistemological influences on 
ergonomics that has until now gone unrecognized. Ergonomics provides a 
picture of the study of life that has both elements of mechanistic and vitalist 
thought, but cannot be reduced to either. Physiology is important as a precursor 
because it shows that the persistence of a vitalist scientific/philosophical 
perspective is, even today, far from an “antiquarian interest,” nor a “closed case 
history.”104  
The physiological perspective, highly influenced by vitalism, gave the insight 
that, “nothing is more human than a machine, if it is true that man distinguishes 
himself from animals through the construction of tools and machines.”105 
Hegemonic science was modeling its understandings of the “problem” of the 
relationships between machine and organism,  
only in one direction: almost always, the attempt has been to explain the 
structure and function of the organism on the basis of the structure and 
function of an already-constructed machine.106 
 
However, there were scientists and philosophers who continued to see humanity 
constructed within machines and engaged in that rare reversal of hegemony, 
seeking to, “understand the very construction of the machine on the basis of the 
structure and function of the organism.”107 The machine was not the simple 
model by which more complex organisms’ functions could be reduced and 
simplified for explanation. It was instead held to be like the organism, “a 
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repository of meanings and impredicativities.”108 We can trace in physiology a 
thread that will pull together the later developments of cybernetics and 
ergonomics. The concept of the machine is held up to and intertwined with that of 
organism, in the process the machine is taken out of its immediate mathematical 
and scientific contexts. As Canguilhem argued, the vitalist tendency produces 
the, “problem of the originality of the technical phenomenon,” the machine, “in 
relation to the scientific phenomenon.”109 The machine is not, from the 
physiological perspective, a product of human thought so much as it is, I suggest, 
an emergent phenomenon like the organism. Canguilhem’s contribution to 
posthuman media theory is expressed strongly in his conclusion to his defense of 
Vitalism: 
 by considering technique to be a universal biological phenomenon 
and no longer only an intellectual operation of man, one is led, first, 
to affirm the creative autonomy of arts and crafts from any knowledge 
capable of appropriating them so as to apply itself to them or informing 
them so as to multiply their effects. Second, in consequence, one is led to 
inscribe the mechanical within the organic.110 
 
In the above, Canguilhem rearticulated humans and technology (technique) to 
Life in general or the category of Nature. This category was the epistemological 
outside to all that was human, (Language, Culture, Technology) within the 
Human/Nature binary. In addition, “arts and crafts” or human technology was 
now conceived of as an autonomous “biological phenomenon,” thus de-
emphasizing the uniqueness of human thought and invention. Finally, in 
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inscribing the “mechanical within the organic,” Canguilhem broke down the 
distinction and hierarchy implicit in the life/matter binary. In doing so he 
contributed to the more general project of saving the technical object by way of a 
physiological perspective—by allowing it into the conversation of life.  
 
Vitalism vs. Mechanism and Emergence 
Chemist, philosopher, and doctor Georg Ernst Stahl provided one of the 
first examples of a vitalistic principle in science. He claimed that all living matter 
was pervaded by and presided over by its “anima sensitive,” a sensitive or 
sensational soul.111 Living matter possessed a vital force that by definition made 
it alive, as opposed to inert matter that necessarily lacked this force. Life was 
imbued with an immaterial force such that,  
 the reactions in living organisms are not completely explicable in terms of 
physics and chemistry; that there is some supernatural or ultranatural 
element in these processes which puts them beyond the range of 
jurisdiction of so-called natural laws.112 
  
On the other hand, mechanistic thought posited that life and all of its processes 
were no different than nonliving, physical, material processes. To quote one of 
mechanistic sciences’ notable 20th century proponents Edwin Goodrich, 
 The metabolic process in living matter draws in inorganic substance and 
force at one end, and parts with it at the other; it is inconceivable that 
these should, as it were, pass outside the boundaries of the physico-
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chemical world, out of range of the so-called physico-chemical laws, at 
one point to reenter them at another.113 
 
Where vitalism saw in living matter a distinct and separate category of matter the 
mechanistic view believed that there was no distinction to be made singling out 
any kind of matter out from another.  
Vitalism and Mechanism are scientific and philosophical worldviews 
described as coming together in controversy, debate, and war. The battle is 
generally viewed between the biological and physical sciences (reduced to 
Physics) over the primacy either of matter over life or vice versa as the most valid 
scientific object of study. As Georges Canguilhem noted, from the scientist’s 
point of view, the term vitalism is appropriate for any biology careful to maintain 
its independence from the annexationist ambitions of the sciences of matter.”114 
In other words, there is a strong disciplinary component to the debate that leads 
to the legitimacy of certain sciences over others. From the perspective of the 
historian of biology the progress of classical and modern mechanics have thrived 
in direct correlation to the perceived waning of the study of life. This is not to say 
that the biological sciences have not continued to grow in size and complexity or 
stay timely and well supported—they have. Rather, I point out that, especially 
through the influence of Isaac Newton and Renee Descartes in the 17th century, 
the biological sciences would emulate the study of material objects such as 
astronomical objects, chemical substances, and of course mechanical machines. 
                                                
113 Edwin Stephen Goodrich, Living Organisms: an account of their origin & evolution (The 
Clarendon Press, 1924), 21-22. 
114 Georges Canguilhem, Knowledge of Life, 60. 
   62 
 
There exists an epistemological bias found in the mechanistic worldview that 
matter seems to be a stronger empirical object of study than life115, or as 
Biologist Robert Rosen observed, “one must never, ever, claim to learn anything 
new about matter from a study of organisms.”116  
The so-called “molecular revolution,” can be traced back to Warren 
Weaver’s coining the term molecular biology at the Rockefeller Foundation in 
1938. This marked the beginning of a new vision in American (government 
funded) science that historians of science have called the, “molecular vision of 
life.”117 It is no coincidence that a decade later Weaver would work to popularize 
Claude Shannon’s mathematical model of communication, known widely as the 
beginning of Information Theory. After the emergence of the fields of molecular 
biology and information sciences there was a large scale importation of the 
language of information theory (not to mention cybernetics) into biological 
sciences pertaining to microscopic/cellular structures. Thus RNA and other 
genes began to be described as “controlling,” “expressing,” and “transferring” 
biological information. Interestingly this terminological shift can be seen as similar 
to Friedrich Kittler’s idea of discourse networks whereby large scale shifts in 
language, imagery, and thought occur because of shifts in a society’s 
predominate media forms. In this case the language of information is inextricably 
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linked to the digital medium, and this had a profound effect on how biological 
science made meaning of genetics and cellular reproduction. As Hans Jorg 
Rheinberger argues molecular genetics developed discursively as scientific 
discourse historically always has:  
It operates in a framework established by the technical means and media 
available for the development and realization of experimental systems to 
which it refers and that lend it its force.118 
 
While the history of molecular sciences is fascinating in showing the intimately 
“linked histories of molecular biology, cognitive science, and computer 
science,”119 the prominence of information and molecularization did little to 
change the historical dominance of matter over life. From a biopolitical 
perspective the creative powers of Life are discursively and materially effaced 
when modern neoliberal biotechnologies simultaneously informationalize it and 
reduce it to its most basic parts.120 In addition, molecular science has rarely been 
funded for the “pure” research that many scientists hope exist. Instead its 
encouragement and nurture have generally been tied to material products, 
patents, and weapons. Also, as Rheinberger observed, this “new biology,”  
..takes its place alongside long-standing attempts to reduce the 
phenomena of the material world to their physical and chemical 
foundations: attempts at making such reductions have characterized the 
modern sciences in the West for a good three hundred years.121 
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The molecular revolution was on a most general level a continuation of the 
dominance of matter over life in scientific rationality. 
And yet the controversy of vitalism was that it would never simply admit 
defeat to mechanistic and reductionist science and die away. Even the most 
eminent physicists still held a fascination with life as a “special” category of 
matter. Albert Einstein commented on the ability of physics to explain the 
existence of organisms stated that, ““One can best feel in dealing with living 
things how primitive physics still is.”122 Erwin Schrodinger, “concluded that 
organisms were repositories of what he called new physics.”123 Similarly, many 
strong proponents of quantum physics (itself concerned with complexity, chaos, 
and uncertainty) believed it was important because its insight into the “innermost 
secrets of matter” would in the end also yield the “secrets of life” itself.124  
From Stahl’s anima sensitiva in the 18th century would follow numerous 
vitalist principles contributed by both scientists and philosophers. Importantly this 
would include the contributions in the early 20th century of Henri Bergson’s “élan 
vital” (vital force), philosopher and biologist Hans Driesch’s “entelechy” (or a 
perfecting principle within life). These two in particular would represent a break 
from a mystical or religious element within vitalism and would form instead a 
“critical” vitalism.125  
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Whereas naïve vitalism had posited a substance (archeus, vital fluid) in 
order to fit the evidence of a materialist ontology, critical vitalism focused 
on process and dynamic impulse in the context of an ontology of energy 
and idea…126 
 
In place of substance was process and in place of object there was relationality—
between matter and life and between what was alive and the processes that 
maintained its living. The conception of vitality—or capacity for purpose and 
action—was expanded through critical vitalism. As Jane Bennett observes in her 
essay on Hans Driesch, 
the scope of critical vitalism was not restricted to biology, for the same 
vital principle was also thought to be responsible for the progressive 
development of personality and history: insofar as seeds, embryos, 
personalities, and cultures were all organic wholes, there was an 
isomorphism between physical, psychological, and civilizational orders.127 
 
Vitalism opened up conception of life that does not rest upon the active life/inert 
matter dichotomy in order to “favor” the living. Instead it begins its observation of 
phenomena in the universe with an inversion of hegemonic mechanistic thought. 
Critical Vitalism shifts away from questions about identity or what things are 
made of and how they are structured, toward questions of function or what things 
do, how things interact with one another. Most importantly was how this vitalism 
dis-inherited anthropomorphism.  By upsetting the life/matter distinction it left 
behind the hierarchized levels of complexity of organism ranked from single cell 
organisms to human beings’ privileged position at the top. 
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 Critical Vitalism at once inherited the anti-modernist bent of physiology 
that practiced a holistic and integrative study of the natural environment with no 
distinctions made for humanity, culture, language, or human made technology. 
For example, critical vitalism inherited and further developed the ideas of the 
German naturalist, physiologist, and anti-rationalist philosopher Raoul Heinrich 
France.  
For France, “the Law of the World ensures that, in the end, the technology 
of the organic and the technology of humans, are identical.”…if human 
technology is a subset of organic technology, then it is not something 
foreign to or necessarilty destructive to ecosystems. Just as we stand to 
profit from observing the working of biozonose [ecosystems] in nature, we 
stand to benefit from our observation of naturally occurring 
technologies.128  
 
France’s bringing together of machine and organism in dissolution of the human 
vs. nature distinction has all of the key components of critical vitalism.  His 
passage is telling as well since France’s passage was in part a response to a, 
“critique of rampant urbanization, industrialization, internationalization, and the 
instrumentalist view of nature,”129 in the European Neo-Romanticism movement. 
While France passed on a sort of naturalistic holism in his worldview he stopped 
short of scapegoating the material objects of modernity. His response is 
important because it expresses not pessimism towards the technologies thought 
to produce such modernizing effects, but rather a call to reconceive of their 
relationship to human life. As well as bridging earlier naturalist responses to the 
rationalism and mechanism in modernity, France presages much later work such 
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as Donna Haraway’s, with cyborgs and species-companions. Generations before 
she theorized the epistemological and ethical benefits of becoming cyborg, 
France proposed that humans could learn from all the naturally occurring 
technologies:  
Technologies of all kinds, including non-human ones, and our ability to 
learn from them, France termed Biotechnik, a predecessor of today’s 
“bionics” or “biotechnology.”130 
 
The inscribing of the technological object into life was the most important 
component of the development of vitalism as an inroad into radical continental 
philosophy and social theory. Before Haraway it was Gilles Deleuze who 
proposed a critically vitalistic view of subjectivity, action, and life. John Marks 
argues that Deleuze’s entire approach to philosophy is built upon vitalism, and 
observes that to Deleuze just like the above critical vitalists, Bergson in particular 
who he is so influenced by, “the distinction between the organism and the 
mechanism is redundant: both are machines.”131   
It's organisms that die, not life. Any work of art points a way through for 
life, finds a way through the cracks. Everything I've written is vitalistic, at 
least I hope it is, and amounts to a theory of signs and events.132 
 
We can see here that Deleuze uses vitalism in order to get to a point of 
observation where, as Robert Rosen argues, life ceases to be an action or 
adjective and becomes more like a noun, a thing, a being in itself, and a 
“legitimate object of scientific scrutiny,” in its own right without referral to 
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matter.133 It also quickly becomes clear that the legitimation of life as an object 
traversing organic and inorganic matter results in a rejection of traditional human 
categories, as Deleuze demonstrated: 
It's not a question of being this or that sort of human, but of becoming 
inhuman, of a universal animal becoming - not seeing yourself as some 
dumb animal, but unraveling your body's organization, exploring this or 
that zone of bodily intensity, with everyone discovering their own particular 
zones, and the groups, populations, species that inhabit them.134 
 
The serious treatment of life in general or what Deleuze referred to as an 
impersonal, subject-less life carries with it the very same dangers to ethics and 
politics as much of vitalist philosophy. Among the critics of vitalism are 
philosophers as well as cultural critics in the humanities. Deleuze himself was 
charged with having the metaphysics of a serial killer.135  
 Carey Wolfe has argued that the insistence on vitalism results in the 
radically dedifferentiating discourse of “ life” which is unworkable both 
philosophically and pragmatically.”136 Not only that, but in terms of biopolitical 
theory vitalism such as the one present in Esposito’s affirmative biopolitics, 
“simply reinstates the very autoimmunitary, thanatological movement,” that it 
sought to escape, at least as human individuals and populations are 
concerned.137 Wolfe went on to argue that such a holding of vitalism in the 
contemporary moment fits in easily with the obsession over Life in U.S. political 
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culture in terms of the pro-choice/life war. More importantly, he observed, 
“neovitalism” now is rehashing the ethical problems of vitalism in the Deep 
Ecology and other environmental movements in the 1970’s and 80’s. 
As Tim Luke notes, if all forms of life are given equal value, then we face 
questions such as the following: “Will we allow anthrax or cholera 
microbes to attain self-realization in wiping out sheep herds or human 
kindergartens? Will we continue to deny salmonella or botulism micro-
organisms 
their equal rights when we process the dead carcasses of animals and 
plants that we eat?”138 
 
To the staunch vitalist or her modern equivalents the biocentrist or the bio-
diversity activist, Wolfe responded that for those 
who would argue that, yes, all forms of life should be equally allowed to 
take their course, even if it means massive die-off of the species Homo 
sapiens. But biopolitically speaking, that hardly solves the problem, of 
course, because when we ask what the demographic distribution of such 
an event would likely be, we realize that the brunt would surely be 
absorbed by largely black and brown poor populations of the south, while 
those in the “ rich North Atlantic democracies” (to use Richard Rorty’s no-
nonsense phrase) who could afford to protect themselves would surely do 
so.139 
 
Wolfe’s argument here is compelling and in grounding the philosophical problem 
in the political it shows how vitalism arrests its own usefulness. The problem for a 
vitalist mode of thought then becomes how to release it from what Eugene 
Thacker called its “hovering, wavering space between an onto-theology and an 
onto-biology.”140 Or, as Claire Colebrook argued, how we may propose a “queer 
vitalism” such that the Life being held up does not represent an undifferentiated 
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“universal humanity” but rather, “life as a multiple and differentiating field of 
powers that expresses itself in various manners.”141 Colebrook insisted that in 
such a vitalism Life must be thought of as virtual but real. This brings Deleuze 
front and center into the discussion of vitalism but also introduces another 
concept that has moved vitalism forward beyond its biopolitical consequences in 
physiological thought—that of emergence.  
 
Emergence 
Where vitalism quite literally to the matter vs. life distinction, emergence 
had no need for such a distinction in order to describe and understand the 
emergence of novel organization. It was not that either life or matter was 
foundational to the other but instead what happened in between the two that 
mattered in emergence theory. All sorts of arrangements could be explored when 
the theorist set out 
to catch things where they were at work, in the middle: breaking things 
open, breaking words open…for new things being formed, the emergence 
of what Foucault calls "actuality." 
 
The theory of emergence is foundational to both cybernetics and 
ergonomics, and its roots can be seen in the vitalist tendency. What they all have 
in common is, again, a holistic, non-reductive perspective on the organization of 
matter. 
 In simplest terms Emergence refers not to life but rather, refers to 
 the arising of novel and coherent structures, patterns, 
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and properties during the process of self-organization 
in complex systems. Emergent phenomena are conceptualized 
as occurring on the macro level, in contrast to the 
micro-level components and processes out of which they arise.142 
Immediately we can point to the “macro” quality of emergence as a kind of holism 
that interests a series of radical theories including cybernetics, systems theory, 
as well as ergonomics and the field of scholarship that the following chapters will 
continually gesture towards, Affect theory. Whether dealing with a chemical 
compound, a weather system, a group identity or a society, the focus is away 
from constituent individuality and towards a connected whole. Patricial Ticineto 
Clough and colleagues speaks to this holism when she formulates an argument 
shifting from the specificity of affective labor to the study of “affect-itself.”143 The 
authors recognize that the deployment of affect into social theory requires 
engagement with the scientific foundations that characterize affect, key among 
them emergence. 
the scientific conceptualization of affect has led social criticism to rethink 
matter, energy, measurability, value and information on one hand, and on 
the other, labor power, capitalist productivity and governance.144 
 
They go on to note how governance and productivity in the human and 
specifically neoliberal sense is interconnected with the scientific conceptions of 
“control on the one hand and indeterminate emergence on the other.”145 Key to 
                                                
142 Jeffrey Goldstein, "Emergence as a construct: History and issues," Emergence 1, no. 1, 1999, 
49. 
143 Patricia Ticineto Clough, Greg Goldberg, Rachel Schiff, Aaron Weeks, and Craig Willse, 
"Notes Towards a Theory of Affect-Itself," Ephemera: Theory and politics in organization 7, no. 1 
(2007): 60-77. 
144 Ticineto-Clough et al., “Affect-Itself,” 63. 
145 Ibid. 63. 
   72 
 
Ticineto-Clough’s et al. argument and the linking of the virtual to emergence is 
the shift in social theory to thinking about modeling and simulation.  
We will propose that governance is now a matter of pre-emption, but not 
only to anticipate and control the emergent but rather to precipitate 
emergence and thereby act on a future that has not yet and may not ever 
arrive.146 
 
The way to precipitate (as opposed to predict or control) emergence is to better 
understand the “historically contingent identity” of any whole, in other words to 
understand how things that emerge have tendencies and capacities towards 
certain behaviors given certain conditions.147 In desiring precipitation of 
emergence Ticineto-Clough strongly gestures towards Manuel DeLanda’s work 
on emergence. 
The theory of Emergence began, as Manuel DeLanda notes, as an 
attempt by realist philosophers in the 19th century to, “eliminate from biology 
mystifying entities like a ‘life force’ or the ‘elan vital.’”148 What is different in 
today’s (or his) theory of emergence is the epistemological status of emergence. 
Like earlier vitalists, earlier emergence theorists stopped investigation at the 
claim that emergence was ultimately un-explainable. With DeLanda’s 
emergence, “it does not have to be accepted as a brute fact but can be explained 
without fearing that it will be explained away.”149 In other words we neither have 
to reify emergence or classify and differentiate different general kinds of 
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emergence, categories like “Life,” “Mind,” or “Deity,” in order to empirically study 
emergence. Though what has remained the same is the ontological status of 
emergence as something “objectively irreducible,”150 the emergent theorist does 
not have to ask why that is in order for emergence to be useful. DeLanda 
stresses that studying emergence is tantamount to simulating emergence or 
recreating emergence or even practicing emergence. 
Simulations are partly responsible for the restoration of the legitimacy 
of the concept of emergence because they can stage interactions 
between virtual entities from which properties, tendencies, and 
capacities actually emerge.151 
 
His use of “actually” should be pointed out as DeLanda holds, because of his 
investment in Deleuze’s notion of the virtual, that a thing need not actually exist 
to be real, thus the importance and non-representational characteristic of the 
simulation in the case of emergence theory. Finally, it is clearly not science but 
rather philosophy for DeLanda, and what amounts to critical thinking in general, 
that is, 
the mechanism through which these insights can be synthesized into an 
emergent materialist world view that finally does justice to the creative 
powers of matter and energy.152  
 
The concept of emergence, based on its widespread use, is rich and versatile 
enough to be a crossroads for many different perspectives. It represents the 
event of historical change and creative, novel organization that captivates 
scientists and critical humanists alike. According to Patricia Ticineto Clough, the 
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stakes surrounding emergence in a socio-political context are no less than a war 
between neoliberal technologies seeking to control and prevent emergence—vs. 
affective and scientifically informed humanities attempting to precipitate the 
emergence of uncontrollable social arrangements at every turn.153 It is the 
recapitulation of the potential for order vs. chaos via technologies that can 
engender different forms of life. I will have more to say about emergence in the 
subsequent chapters. It suffices for now to suggest that emergence in its current 
form would not have occurred without the marginalization of holistic physiological 
thought and the critical vitalist tendency through the hegemony of Mechanistic 
thought. It is the beginnings of this hegemony that I turn to next.  
 
Part 3: Descartes or the Hegemony of Mechanism 
 
 Though Physiology’s official disciplinary history arguably begins in the 19th 
century154 it was the weight of Renee Descartes’ 17th century work that 
influenced and antagonized physiology for centuries, even if his work as a proper 
physiologist had been quickly dismissed. My epistemological thread thus begins 
with his ideas about human and animal organisms and how his metaphysics, his 
thought about mind and body pushed his theories of life functions.  
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 In his study of Descartes’ physiology, Spirits and Clocks: machine and 
organism in Descartes, Dennis Des Chene argues first that there is a dearth of 
study on his contribution to physiological thought compared to his physics or 
philosophy of mind. Second, he claims that ultimately in Descartes’ physiology 
there is no strong quality to distinguish living from nonliving in nature other than 
human beings. Nature is reduced to matter and space, and the heat of the animal 
heart is the same as the heat produced from a fire.155  
What Des Chene constructively points to is that Descartes produces the 
earliest mechanistic approach to human life processes, and a severely reductive 
and “austere” mode of thought, as such was also a highly peculiar mechanistic 
thinking. Descartes’ physiology is derived from his metaphysics, which produced 
the Cartesian cogito—thus the mind/body split is affixed or transposed to the 
problem of human verses nonhuman organisms. We can even formulate 
Descartes’ mind body distinction as containing a human/nonhuman distinction 
though it refers specifically to human mind and body. The body, its capacities, 
and organs could never be conceived of as exhibiting conscious-like behavior. 
The body is only ever controlled, acting in the service of the mind. This 
inconceivability of body/organ volition played out practically in a well-documented 
dispute between Descartes and physiologist William Harvey on the workings of 
the heart. Descartes simply could not accept that the musculature of the heart 
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moved without consciousness of the mind, where Harvey, on the other hand had 
no problem admitting the “unconscious active movement of the body.”156 
Only human beings have souls, and yet the soul or spirit or mind is 
completely disconnected from the vital operations of the body. Descartes 
describes bodies as body-machines, which do not live in any strong sense since 
they have no powers, only passive attributes.157 “The elimination of the souls of 
animals and plants is of a piece with the elimination of qualities generally from 
nature.”158 (1) Self motion, that ultimate quality along with autopoiesis/self-
generation, are the touchstones of the distinction of life from matter, and the 
fundamental problematics for those interested in creating intelligent machines.  
However, Descartes’ primary desire in his physiology was to account for 
generation and movement in (animal) life without “appealing to faculties or active 
powers.” In essence he mapped “the phenomena of life onto the behavior of 
“mechanical things’.”159 Without going too far into the intricacies of Descartes’ 
philosophy, this conflating of mind with life is one of the most significant 
epistemological fixtures of the modern human sciences which manifests as the 
assumption that we can extrapolate an inner state of thought from the 
observation of life processes. It is the significance of Descartes’ production of the 
cogito as a mind/body split, but also of his equally provocative “relegation of the 
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vital powers of the soul to the body alone,” as a physiological process, that 
contributed to the separation of psychology or the cognitive elements of human 
beings from their physiology.160  
In Descartes we see the most extreme form of reductionist philosophy as 
well as a disregard for origins, purpose, or any phenomena other than machinic 
organism behavior—leading to a philosophy of life that will encourage the 
development of behaviorism in science. I would like to point out that though 
Descartes’ provided a mechanistic view of life that observed it as so many 
machines, the power of reduction and explanation that is associated with such 
mechanistic thought becomes lost precisely because Descartes reintroduced the 
mystifying figure of a soul into his physiology, one that was always disconnected 
from body. Physiology then becomes useless to further description or 
explanation of human life, and so a metaphysical account is required to say 
anything more. Implicit in Descartes was a theory that precludes meaningfulness 
from material or vital processes, only representationalist, discursive means may 
communicate what is in or on the mind.  
Descartes’ mind over matter distinction translated into the life sciences.  
This resulted in the treatment of somatic or physiological in animals and humans 
as merely representations or symptoms of inner immaterial processes, stress, 
emotion, or ill health. Seen historically this way Descartes’ work marginalized 
physiology as a major scientific field two centuries before it even emerged in 
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universities and laboratories. It set up the conditions of possibility, as an enduring 
and predominate mode of human sciences, for the growing importance of 
psychological thought in research, industrial, and popular contexts, as well as our 
current moment of so called neuro-scientific revolution.  
Finally, Descartes’ physiology, like his metaphysics, strove to leave no 
room for a human soul/mind with any “suspect relation to matter”161 In doing so 
he not only provided a legacy of highly anthropocentric thought but also 
produced a methodologically “practical” science of physiology in particular which 
had absolutely no higher or loftier ends beyond the functional measure of 
normality and health in human beings. However, within a generation his vision of 
a purely mechanistic physiological explanation would already wane to the 
reemergence of vitalism, with its scientific disposition towards the uniqueness 
and je ne sais qua of life, and particularly of human life.  
Crucially physiology would continue to develop as if Descartes was at 
most a minor thinker in its history, if not an erroneous and uncomplicated 
physiologist. All the while his influence to enlightenment thinkers in other fields 
would continue to grow. As Des Chen concludes, Descartes did not just produce 
a highly reductive mechanistic physiology, but one that was also highly confused, 
lacking internal coherence. This was undoubtedly due to his fidelity to the first 
principles of deduction as opposed to experiment, and to the inner life of the 
mind that dictated in his physics that machines necessarily “operates solely on 
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mechanistic principles.”162 This is not necessarily the case with a conception of 
machines or nonhuman life forms.  
Though Descartes’ physiological findings would be dismissed in less than 
a generation and the likes of Gottfried Wilhelm Liebniz would respond to his 
reductionism and mechanism, ironically with a strong vitalism.163 Descartes’ 
absolute skepticism of the body and matter and assuredness of the mind’s 
representations would maintain, philosophically in a line leading through John 
Locke, Berkeley, Leibniz, Immanuel Kant, down to Bertrard Russell164, and 
arguably to modern American Analytic philosophy.  
It is generally held that the vitalism/mechanism dispute in physiological 
theory was resolved, to the general disavowal of the idea of a vital principle at 
work in organisms, in the 19th century, through the work of Claude Bernard. What 
developed during the 19th century as well was the overall medicalization of an 
entire side of government in Europe and America, as Michel Foucault observed. 
He described the complimentary poles of new regulation, the one a biopower that 
acted on the assumption of a human body as machine, the second, a macro 
scale biopolitics of regulation of population health and (self) production.165  
Canguilhem added to Foucault’s biopolitical insight, observing that the century 
before physiologists in particular, as they expunged support for vitalism, were 
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adopting wholeheartedly another concept based on mechanism—animal 
economy.  
Physiologists integrated Hippocrates ancient enduring claim of medicatrix 
naturae, translated as the healing powers of nature. Organisms left to their own 
physiological processes would heal themselves, which scientists described 
through the newly adopted concept of regulation, and the result was a conflation 
of political and economic theory of the day.166 For it was a large conceptual step 
from the idea that organisms did sometimes heal themselves of disease to the 
claim that human beings had physiological self-preserving powers, let alone a 
picture of nature as supplying a common good through “the autocracy of 
Nature.”167 It was then a short step for physiology’s commentators to extrapolate 
to society writ large, as Antoine Lavoisier did.  
The moral order, like the physical order, has its regulators: if it were 
otherwise, human societies would have ceased to exist long ago, or, 
rather, they never would have come into being.168  
 
It is residing in the thought of Thomas Robert Malthus, that Canguilhem finds the 
most potent allusion to physiological conception of animal economy on a social 
scale. 
The great vis medicatrix rei publicae, the desire to improve one’s lot and 
the fear of making it worse, has never ceased to guide men in the straight 
and narrow, despite all the arguments that would tend to make them 
abandon it. This powerful principle of health…”169 
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Along with the beginnings of a conception of a general health care was the 
medical definition of health or healthy life in individuals and populations.   
It was the very adoption of the concept of health, of healthy activities both 
literal and figurative, that demonstrates not only Foucault’s major recognition of a 
shift to biopolitical register in governance, but also importantly the continued 
inheritance of’ philosophical and scientific legacy. To be sure it was not 
Descartes alone who established the conditions of possibility for a health-
obsessed complex of medical sciences, government, and industry, but, as 
Foucault reiterated, the philosophical certainty that Descartes’ demanded, in the 
face of the mental ill-health of madness, for example—demanded the 
implementation of the Cartesian cogito onto the somatic; the mind intervening on 
the body.  
This absolute awakening, which dispatches the various forms of illusion 
one after another, was what Descartes had sought at the beginning of his 
Meditations, and which he had found, paradoxically, in the consciousness 
of dream, in the consciousness that consciousness was deceived. But in 
the case of the mad, it was up to medicine to operate the awakening, 
transforming the solitude of Cartesian courage into the authoritative 
intervention by a waking person sure of his or her wakefulness into the 
deceived wakefulness of the lunatic. This was a shortcut that dogmatically 
cut through Descartes’ long path to certainty.170 
 
The authority here, the doctor, the researcher, the life scientist, became the 
“cogito from the outside” with the aid of all her knowledge of healthy human 
function. As a final word on Descartes’ philosophico-medical legacy, it may not 
                                                
170 Michel Foucault, History of Madness ed. Jean Khalfa trans. Jonathan Murphy and Jean 
Khalfa (New York: Routledge, 2006). 
   82 
 
be exaggerating, from reading one of his clearest descriptions of his work and 
method, to claim that his ideas of physiology motivated all the rest of his thought.  
I perceived it to be possible to arrive at knowledge highly useful in 
life…and thus render ourselves the lords and possessors of nature…this 
is a result to be desired…especially for the preservation of health, which is 
without doubt, of all the blessings of this life, the first and fundamental 
one; for the mind is so intimately dependent upon the condition and 
relation of the organs of the body, that if any means can ever be found to 
render men wiser and more ingenious than hitherto, I believe that it is in 
medicine that they must be sought for…171 
 
The idea of health was central to his idea of a practical philosophy that yielded 
expedient material and physiological results. As this passage shows, there are 3 
express concepts in Descartes that are fundamental to his thinking, 
instrumentalism of thought, mastery of nature, and the regulation of health. This 
mode of thinking would continue, outside of its philosophical context and into the 
ideology of science. Particularly in the contexts of the military and in industry the 
Cartesian instrumental use of reason towards desired ends found a comfortable 
home. Finally, the above passage hints at the future emergence of biopower and 
biopolitics. The maintenance of individual health and the governance of a healthy 
population respectively would result from an underlying thought. The good life, 
whether spiritual, social, or economic, was always dependent on the basic 
healthy function of the human organism. As Claire Colebrook argued, the 
Cartesian “error,” meant that generations of humans had been produced 
continuing to believe they are an, “autonomous, disembodied, affectless and 
world-divorced subject,” and this is the measure of a healthy mind. Instead, to 
                                                
171 René Descartes, Discourse on Method, optics, geometry, and meteorology (Hackett 
Publishing, 2001), 50. 
   83 
 
push beyond the mechanistic Cartesian framework Colebrook claimed that we 
must put, “an end to human exceptionalism and cognition-oriented models,” and 
conceive of the human, “from one already integrated, dynamic and connected 
world.”172 Physiology’s journey out of the Cartesian error began through 
materialist philosophy with one of Descartes’ peers.  
 
Part 4: Beginnings of Machine without Mechanism 
 
La Mettrie 
 It was a polemic written in 1748 and published anonymously that would 
pose the greatest threat to the Cartesian cogito as well as the Christian influence 
that would support its schisms between man and beast, soul and body. The 
medical physician Julien Offray de la Mettrie wrote L’Homme Machine, Machine 
Man, with the fundamental aim of sketching a “thoroughgoing materialism” based 
precisely on his study of human medicine, and later claimed to do so, ironically, 
as an extension of Cartesianism. Claiming such an affinity had the effect of more 
publicity/circulation for Machine Man, no doubt, but also put scrutiny on the 
flawed mechanistic thought in Descartes that resulted in the spiritual and 
immaterial priority given to the status of humans. The generally accepted 
positioning of La Mettrie is as a contemporary advancing Descartes’ work on the 
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mechanism of life processes173, however, his singular desire to obliterate a 
meaningful soul as a feature of life altogether puts La Mettrie in direct 
contradistinction to Cartesian Metaphysics. La Mettrie proposed what Descartes’ 
“sleight of hand” dualism174, his followers, and society at large could not, that 
human beings animals, and matter generally, were all on equal footing as 
machines. Philosophically he produces a sustained materialism which destroys 
epistemological dualism by bestowing souls to all animals.175 This was the 
particular danger of physiological thought as it opened up serious comparison 
physically first but then by extrapolation socially and politically, between man and 
beast.  
 La Mettrie’s practical examples and empirical evidence, in short his entire 
method for producing materialism, was based on physiological discovery. He 
mentions the rudimentary divisions of brain and its functions by Thomas Willis, 
for example as evidencing that mind or thought176 are properties of matter. He 
uses the explanation by William Harvey, who is considered the founder of 
modern physiology, of the circulation of the blood and the heart as system of 
pump and tubing, and Italian physiologist Marcello Malpighi’s microscope 
discoveries—in doing so situating his philosophical machine-man within the 
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physiological and technological changes that allowed humans to view 
mechanism at work in their own bodies.  
 However, La Mettrie’s entire schema or mode of observation was 
constituted by the strong comparative nature of Physiology that was developing 
in the 18th century. Scaling from most basic to complex machine and from the 
largest (the 18th century astronomical galaxy) to the smallest, (the cell), the figure 
of man could be compared to and conceived of as anything else. A polyp, animal 
corpuscle, the inside of a clock, a furnace, or a plant, all of these could be used 
to think through human life and its constitution.  
  The underlying theoretical belief within La Mettrie’s work177 was that all 
matter contains sensitivity and motive force, which we observe as adaptation and 
motion in living organisms. This philosophical position that questions of mind or 
the “why” of life need not go beyond matter was one that was being worked 
through in physiology of the time in the work of Albrecht von Haller, who had 
developed his theory of irritability in muscular tissue and sensibility in nerve 
tissues. Haller’s theory amounted to a basic claim that force or volition was 
located in living matter instead of a mind, will, or soul. The extent to which La 
Mettrie was committed to provocation of man machine was called into question 
from the outset as he was not associated with mechanics/physics, and by the 
fact that he also published Man as a Plant, drawing strong lines of affinity with 
organic bodies. While displaying the metaphor of the machine writ large La 
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Mettrie “was inclined to see life in all things,” and, in line with the Spinozist 
philosophy he publically espoused, produced not a physicalism, but a panvitalism 
into physiology.178 The strongest refute of La Mettrie’s connection to Descartes’ 
mechanistic thought emerges when he wrote “’The author of Machine Man 
seems to have written the book to defend this sad truth’ (That the human being is 
an automaton).”179 
However, just as La Mettrie’s Machine Man and Haller’s theory that 
informed it were approaching an independent mechanistic way of understanding 
life, the question of immaterial causes quickly threatened its viability. The 
dilemma for La Mettrie was whether such force/sensitivity existed in the smallest 
isolated bits of living matter, or that it was the particular organization of some 
matter and not others that resulted in life. So, on the one hand the molecule was 
in some sense “alive” in the same way that the body it constitutes is. On the 
other, if particular organization of matter gives it life, then Machine Man fails on a 
basic explanatory level to tell us why, for example, the primary characteristic 
which compels humans to elevate themselves above inert matter and plant and 
animal life—thought—is acquired in brain matter. This is an ignorance La Mettrie 
“freely admits.”180   
 His conclusion that man was a machine was symptomatic of a larger 
scientific and philosophical position. La Mettrie theorized all life, based on his 
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observation of physiological processes that there was “in the whole universe only 
one diversely modified substance.”181 Where Cartesian physiology foreclosed on 
matter as an answer to life processes and human consciousness, La Mettrie 
concluded that those immaterial and representational aspects associated with 
organisms—thought, identity, and human or animal will, were all bound up in 
their physical machinery. In La Mettrie was a form of materialism that saw an 
affinity among human, animal, and plant bodies.  
 
Purkyne and the agency of Organs 
 The singular object of health is important to Zielinski’s understanding of 
physiological theory, and he provides a 19th century counterexample, in the work 
of Jan Evangelista Purkyne, to the hegemony of physiology at the time, as well 
as a fidelity to healthy functions in humans.  
 It was Zielinski’s precise observation that physiology, as it has pertained to 
human perceptions of their bodies and of machines, had been on a very different 
path even in the 16th century. The line of natural philosophy, that speculative 
practice taught in the university that Descartes sought to diverge from with his 
practical philosophy, bridged the ancient and the modern in Purkyne.  
From Empedocles to Lucretius to Porta in his Magia naturalis. All of these 
thinkers still viewed physiology as identical with “investigation of the 
phenomena, forces, and laws of nature in all its domains.”182 
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Zielinski found in Purkyne a contravening physiological standpoint, as Purkyne 
began each experiment with  
the assumption that each human sense is an “individual,” he ascribed to 
each sense organ a life of its own, both with regard to perception of 
external reality and its production of phenomena independent of external 
reality.183 
 
The first effect of Purkyne’s work, as Zielinski explained, is that of a complete 
decentralization of the working nervous system and with it the de-prioritizing of 
the brain/mind to the now separated and autonomous sense organs. The second 
was that the observation or experimentation with the physiological was to 
Purkyne a wholly material experience—without any reliance on a mechanistic 
one. The visual organ was not observed as a machine but rather as an “animal 
within the animal.”184 
 His work on the human visual faculty, for which he was most renown, 
observed the act of seeing as much more an auditory, vibrating, tactile event 
than a visual reflective and representational one. Against an entire tradition of 
Optics, Purkyne’s human eye was not a passive receptor of light, but rather an 
active organ of vibration. Producing Augenmusik or eye music, the eye works by 
sense of touch and also becomes the site where memory and imagination occur. 
Purkyne’s work on vision thus also de-centered the priority of the eye in science 
and popular culture as well. Media determine our situation, perhaps, in ways 
Friedrich Kittler did not intend. According to Purkyne, the visual apparatus did not 
work as a camera, camera obscura, or the moving image machine that was to 
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come—it was more akin to a stringed instrument or a drum that needed physical 
contact to in order to function or play.  
 As far removed from mechanistic physiology as Purkyne’s work was, it 
retained one shared characteristic: the nonhuman organism, whether an animal, 
plant, or organ was still treated as an object that could be isolated and studied 
objectively. This, again would have something to do with a particular theory of 
communication within physiology and scientific that was not available to him. A 
mode of communication between humans and nonhuman organisms that would 
allow the nonhuman to be a subject in the world had yet to be conceived.  
 
Goethe, Gestalt, and Communication between a Whole and Parts 
Johann Wolfgang Goethe, known much more for his prolific literary writing, 
was also a practitioner of botanical experiments and developed from it a general 
physiological theory. He claimed that, “the human being himself, to the extent 
that he makes sound use of his senses, is the most exact physical apparatus that 
can exist.” Goethe thus apprehended a concept of observation that would be 
developed similarly many years later in cybernetics.  
It is why he wrote an essay called “The Experiment as Mediator of Object 
and Subject” and argued for a mode of science that was primarily experiential or 
phenomenological in nature. In it he also suggested that on a basic level the 
scientist must be highly aware, “reflexive” if you will, of one’s own subject in the 
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role of observation.185 Like Purkyne, who had literally put the scientist into his 
study by experimenting on himself, Goethe described the scientist or observer as 
being a part of the experiment he observed. This was an important step away 
from an “objective” rational mind divorced from the world it observed. It also 
marks a strong precursor to the cyberneticians, spurred by Heinz Von Foerster 
who would over a hundred years later theorize reflexivity as the most important 
factor in scientific observation. 
 Goethe concludes, inimically to enlightenment conception, that any 
experiment, any object we encounter is first and foremost an individual entity not 
to be deduced from or extrapolated to another object, lest we fall into error. 
"We conceive of the individual animal as a small world, existing for its own 
sake, by its own means. Every creature is its own reason to be. All its 
parts have a direct effect on one another, a relationship to one another, 
thereby constantly renewing the circle of life; thus we are justified in 
considering every animal physiologically perfect. Viewed from within, no 
part of the animal—as so often thought—is a useless or arbitrary product 
of the formative impulse.186  
          
 
Friedrich Kittler took Goethe’s literature to be exemplary of the discourse network 
of 18th century and the writing medium that determined life and language of the 
time. Though perhaps Goethe’s physiological writings expressed something 
different, not human life that was coded through language and technical objects 
(media), but life, in general as technical object that produced and distributed itself 
through mediation. Finally, Goethe’s work culminates in a fundamental idea that 
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will be shared by physiologists, cyberneticians, and ermergence theorists alike—
the Gestalt. Gestalt, translated simplistically as shape or form, is popularly 
characterized as a complex form that is more than the sum of its parts. Goethe 
introduced it thusly, first for how it is generally use by Germans and then for the 
purposes of his scientific use. 
the complex of existence presented by a physical organism…With this 
expression they exclude what is changeable and assume that an 
interrelated whole is identified, defined, and fixed in character. But if we 
look at all these Gestalten, especially the organic ones, we will discover 
that nothing in them is permanent, nothing is at rest or defined---
everything is in a flux of continual motion.187 
 
With this description Goethe introduces a scientific study that is not so much 
about identifying shape or structure, as the terms gestalt and morphology, which 
is what he calls his method, would suggest. Instead it is about observing the 
constant flux of processes of creation or emergence. For Goethe, as it would be 
the case for systems theorists and cyberneticians generations later: the continual 
motion or behaviors within an organism, what might be called its contingent 
identity, was never fully defined by its constituent parts. At the same time the 
identities of its parts were never fully defined or fully controlled by the organic 
whole they were working within. In concluding on the question of life he said the 
following: 
 No living thing is unitary in nature; every such thing is a plurality. 
Even the organism which appears to us as individual exists as a collection 
of independent living entities. Although- alike in idea and predisposition, 
these entities, as they materialize, grow to become alike 
or similar, unalike or dissimilar.188 
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Within Goethe were all the elements needed to push forward to cybernetics and 
systems approaches to the study of humans and machines, where they could 
each be seen as autonomous “independent living entities.”  
 
Part 5: Conclusion:  
Uexkull, Physiology ushers in Environment, Systems and Cybernetics 
 It was not until the turn of the 20th century, when a young German scientist 
would begin his work based on the idea that biological science had it all wrong in 
modeling itself after physics and chemistry.189 What was necessary was a strong 
theorization of how the nonhuman communicates itself to human beings. Jacob 
Von Euxkull shared Purkyne’s characterization of nonhuman phenomena as 
subjective in their behavior. However, he further developed his physiology with 
two key concepts, Umwelt or “environment” of an organism, and purpose. He 
used Umwelt to mean the perceptual world, the space and time of any particular 
organism. On the description of an environment Uexkull states that,  
 The animal's environment, which we want to investigate 
now, is only a piece cut out of its surroundings, which we see 
stretching out on all sides around the animal—and these surroundings 
are nothing else but our own, human environment. 
The first task of research on such environments consists in seeking 
out the animal's perception signs and, with them, to construct 
the animal's environment.190 
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Uexkull is positing that fundamentally observation in science is neither objective, 
nor a passive apprehension of reality, but rather, constructive and active. His 
work will continue to posit that animals, in their own perceptual worlds, are 
similarly active and constructive in their sensations. Key to understanding living 
organisms is, for Uexkull, a matter of identifying two characteristics, its 
perceptual and its functional properties. An organism’s perceptual side is based 
on the perceptions it produces in the human who observes it, so, as he states, a 
bell would not produce a ringing sensation without a human to hear it even if it 
was moved by the wind. However, the function of the bell as a thing that meant to 
ring cannot be disputed as its functional quality.  
Purpose is key to his physiological understanding of what can be 
observed in the universe, as there is nothing living or nonliving matter that exists 
without a function built into its particular form. The importance of understanding 
purpose in terms of subjectivity will lead him to claim that “plan versus matter is 
the watchword of the new science of life.”191 Function exists for Uexkull as a 
harmony between matter and its form such that living and nonliving matter 
cohere in very particular configurations. He deliberately used harmony, and 
continually referenced the sonic/aural in his work, because Uexkull fundamentally 
understood the variety of sensations beyond the visible in nature as well as the 
recognition that the massive variety in temporal/spatial scales of environment 
exceeded the explanatory powers of visual metaphor.  
                                                
191 J. V Uexkull, "The New Concept of Umwelt: a link between science and the humanities," 
Semiotica 134, no. 1-4 (2001), 122. 
 
   94 
 
His physiology began with the perceptual sign as its most basic unit, a unit 
of perception marked with purpose. Within a tick’s environment and within a tick’s 
own body are ubiquitous perceptual signs being sense-read by said tick, its 
singular sense of smell, butyric acid, temperature, its host, etc. Additionally, 
beyond merely representational and formalist discourses, the scientist needed to 
identify these signs as the tick would recognize and react to them. Thus Uexkull’s 
purposeful environment would mark the beginning of bio-semiotics, the 
inscription within nature. These “perception-signs” Uexkull takes to be features of 
reality that can be counted on by the observer. We discover objects based on the 
four senses wrapped around us like four envelopes, or an island.192   
Although we are not familiar with the sensations of our 
fellow human beings, we do not doubt that they receive seeing 
signs by means of their eyes which we call colors, and we doubt 
just as little that they receive hearing signs by means of their 
ears which we call tones. By the same right, we ascribe to their 
noses the ability to awaken smelling tones, to their palate to 
awaken tasting signs, and to their skin to awaken touching 
signs, which, one and all, consist of self-tones. We summarize 
all these qualitatively different sense signs under the name 
"perception signs," which, transposed outward, become perception 
marks of things.193 
 
Organisms, objects, and environments were all capable of producing this 
perception signs. In fact, there was no choosing not to create signs within an 
environment. The simplest acts of living, growing, moving, and changing resulted 
in signs that could be experienced by another subject. Though Uexkull expected 
work of the life scientist to be free from anthropomorphizing the animal umwelt 
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and to maintain the rigor and accuracy expected from science,194 the radically 
subjective nature of the umwelt he proposed immediately problematized those 
goals. 
The kind of structure of the environments is also decided 
thereby, for every subject can only transform the perception 
signs that are at his disposition into the perception marks of 
his environment.195 
 
Though the scientist must construct an organism’s environment as if she were 
able to be in its environment as itself, she is limited to her human environment of 
senses.  
Uexkull deployed both environment and purpose to advance as much as he 
could the idea that nonhuman organisms are subjects that perceive their worlds 
where those worlds are as many as there are organisms, every single one 
differentiated from “our” human world.  
We comfort ourselves all too easily with the illusion that 
the relations of another kind of subject to the things of its environment 
play out in the same space and time as the relations 
that link us to the things of our human environment. This illusion 
is fed by the belief in the existence of one and only one 
world, in which all living beings are encased. From this arises 
the widely held conviction that there must be one and only one 
space and time for all living beings.196 
 
While his theory provided for both an empirical observing/experimenting of the 
senses it also acknowledged that based on its individuating subjectivism, that the 
human scientist would be made aware at every stage of observation that she is 
not a tick, that a tick does not even live in her world. What is implied in Uexkull’s 
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work is acknowledgement of the inescapability of our being human, of our 
making nonhuman things human, which Jane Bennett, in her laying out of a vital 
materialism, counts as a good thing when she claims that, “a chord is struck 
between person and thing. And I am no longer above or outside a nonhuman 
‘environment.’"197What is present in Uexkull’s physiology that is absent, to 
varying degrees, in all the above mentioned physiologists, is an attempt at 
understanding life processes, without hierarchical or reductionist observation, as 
a form of communication. His was the most fully realized physiological science 
that was both integrative (in that it saw organism with environment) rather than 
reductionist, and comparative rather than isolating. In addition, his theory of 
purposeful environments and organisms did not rely on Darwinian concepts of 
adaptability and species success, in fact Uexkull was unconvinced by merely 
evolutionary bases for life.198 Instead, he felt that the study of life meant the 
observation of different species in various environments all of whom produced 
and read the “signs” of nature. 
Uexkull is considered to be a crossroads for many other firsts in radical 
forms of knowledge. As mentioned he is credited as pioneering biosemiotics, as 
being a “crypto-semiotician” which he may have had some idea of himself when 
writing that his concept of umwelt was a “bridge between science and the 
humanities.”199 He is credited also with influencing Ludvig von Bertalanfy, whose 
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creation of his general systems theory would later influence Niklaus Luhmann. 
Systems Theory would be in a mutually influencing relationship with Cybernetics 
and would be visible as the explicit “systems approach” methodology of 
ergonomics starting in the 1960’s.  
I ended with Uexkull because he has such a strong connection with 
Cybernetics as one of its most direct precursors. We should note that while it 
would emerge at mid-century with the digital computer and the automation of 
machines, cybernetics theoretical link to physiology and organisms of flesh and 
blood were just as strong. Uexkull’s influence is summed up in his introduction to 
his most influential work, “A Foray into the World of Animals,” 
From this, we can conclude that every living cell is a 
machine operator that perceives and produces and therefore 
possesses its own particular (specific) perceptive signs and impulses 
or "effect signs" ["Wirkzeichen"].200 
 
In addition to setting up the study of machines as organisms that cybernetics will 
produce, Uexkell’s passage expresses the non-mechanistic, holistic and 
integrative conception of organisms that cybernetics would inherit. Cells of the 
body are not its molecular or constituent elements but are, just as the whole 
organism, operators or subjects that perceive and act based on external signs.  
Decades after Uexkull another radical physiologist from Mexico, Arturo 
Rosenblueth together with Norbert Weiner would define Cybernetics in 
“Behavior, Purpose, and Teleology” which would kick off the first Macy 
Conference, and set certain events and knowledge productions into motion. The 
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first cyberneticians, including Norbert Wiener, Walter Pitts, and Warren 
McCulloch, “considered cybernetics as a branch of physiology” and “modeled 
computers to match physiology—all this in 1943.”201 Years earlier Uexkull had 
entertained the “converse but not opposite idea” that the functions of living 
organisms could be modeled using theories of machines,202 for the purposes of 
entertaining a subjective experience of other species, opening up a foray into the 
world of the Other.  
There is also the manifold of environments, in which things repeat 
themselves in always new forms. All these countless environments 
provide, in the third manifold, the clavier on which Nature plays her 
symphony of meaning beyond time and space.203 
 
This will be discussed in the following chapter where we will understand 
why it was that Norbert Wiener claimed that “organism is seen as message”204 or 
that Warren McCulloch would attempt to use Cybernetics in order to construct a 
“physiological theory of knowledge.”205  
  
Chapter 3: Cybernetics or Nonhuman Ethics/Subjectivity 
 
 
Introduction:  
 
This chapter describes cybernetics the second element of the triad 
(Physiology, Cybernetics, Ergonomics) constituting what I call a posthuman 
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matrix of vital machines, Cybernetics. In the previous chapter I characterized 
physiology, with its archaeological links to natural philosophy and its theoretical 
resistances to Cartesian mechanistic philosophy, as the foundation for a 
posthuman epistemology. It is a mode of knowing the co-constitutive affections 
between matter and life and a framework providing vital powers in an empirical, 
not mystical sense—one that conceives life beyond human scale into an 
ecological or cosmic scale.  
If the significance of physiology is as a posthuman epistemology, then the 
importance of cybernetics as this chapter attempts to show, is that of a 
posthuman Ethic. The two unique readings that an ethical account of cybernetics 
will show are: 1) cybernetics has been more concerned with processes of life and 
organism that computing and automation. 2) This discussion will ask, as Michel 
Foucault did of the Ancients in his last works, what is the “ethical substance” or 
the foundation which techniques work on? For cybernetics the substance where 
a machine ethics begins includes self-reflexivity, self-governance, and 
recognition of a system, which led both to freedom and responsibility. Where a 
machine ethics ends is the larger narrative this chapter builds towards in the 
practice of Ergonomics. 
Where in the previous chapter I was interested in the archaeological 
thread of physiological knowledge that expressed both a vitalist tendency as well 
as an openness to machines, in this chapter I provide a historical look at 
cybernetics as a “genealogy of problems, of problematiques,” as Michel Foucault 
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described his genealogical approach.206 This genealogy appears as fragments 
from the middle of the twentieth century, when “modern” cybernetics, 
characterized as related to information theory, digital computers, and the cold 
war, is generally thought to have emerged. The chapter also considers threads 
from the 19th century as well as from ancient Hellenistic and Roman cultures from 
which the etymology of cybernetics derives. My chapter considers the writings of 
cybernetician’s working during the 20th century such as Norbert Wiener, Warren 
McCulloch, Heinz Von Foerster, and Gregory Bateson, particularly those writings 
that exceed a scientific or explanatory model for cybernetics as a theory of 
knowledge. There is another reason I use the term genealogy. When explaining 
his method of genealogical interpretation, Michel Foucault said that three 
domains were possible for genealogy, knowledge, power, and subjectivity. 
Foucault claimed that genealogy could provide a “historical ontology” of how 
subjects constituted either as knowing subjects; subjects who act over others, or 
as subjects that constitute themselves through ethics.  
Two things strongly connect all the cyberneticians I discuss. One is a 
strong commitment to explore the limits of cybernetics into their respective fields 
of knowledge. That is to say, not satisfied with the strict application of cybernetic 
theories to real world machines, cyberneticians engaged in imaginative thought 
experiments on abstract machines. In order to push machine subjectivity to its 
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outer threshold they engaged not only in formal modeling but also in the kind of 
philosophical simulation that Gilles Deleuze called the virtual. As  
The second, and what I believe is a key feature of cybernetic thought is 
that each of them had throughout their work thought and wrote vigorously—in 
excess of scientific discourse—about the ethical and metaphysical implications of 
cybernetics. In short, I argue that the founding cyberneticians had recognized 
early on that cybernetics was problematic, dangerous, or precisely, as what 
Michel Foucault characterized, a “‘problematization’—which is to say, the 
development of a domain of acts, practices, and thoughts, that seem to me to 
pose problems for politics.”207 This chapter suggests that this problematization 
had little to do with “Control and Communication in the Animal and Man” as a 
formal or predictable formula, nor was it concerned with the solutions to cold war 
logics of operations research, or to command-control-communication-intelligence 
(C3I) as many commentators have suggested.208 
 Instead, I argue that their writings provided the beginning of a radical 
theory of machine-subject, one that was formed with the politico-ethical 
consequences of a possibility for new subject formations which the theoretical 
machine of cybernetics had illuminated. This chapter also describes the 19th 
century etymological route of English “cybernetics” as it was coined for an 
encompassing theory of government in French political thought. Additionally, I 
focus on its ancient register and Greek etymological route, of “navigation” or 
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“steersman” (Kubernetes)—especially, as I will conclude, through the late work of 
Michel Foucault on ancient subjectivity.  
 
Cybernetics or designing ethics 
 
 In 1973, the British cybernetician Stafford Beer was commissioned by 
newly elected leader Salvador Allende to move to Chile and design a computer 
controlled socialist state. The goal was to create project “Cybersyn” or cybernetic 
synergy, which was to be the first ever functioning computer network used for 
socio-economic management on a national level.209  
 This was far from the first time that a cybernetician had attempted to take 
the science of machines and apply it to human issues. Or more accurately put, 
Beer’s and Allende’s project was but one in a long line of deployed cybernetics in 
order to create a better world. As president Allende stressed for his socialist 
cybernetic government, it must be “decentralizing, worker participative, and anti-
bureaucratic…”210 And when, 
Beer finally reached the top level of his systematic hierarchy, the place in 
the model Beer had reserved for Allende himself, the president leaned 
back in his chair and said, “At last, el pueblo”.211  
 
El pueblo or “the people” as a Chilean Spanish colloquialism, this was, at least, 
the plan or design for Allende’s cybernetic social-democracy.  
                                                
209 Eden Medina, "Designing Freedom, Regulating a Nation: socialist cybernetics in Allende's 
Chile." Journal of Latin American Studies 38, no. 3 (2006), 572. 
210 Medina, Designing Freedom, 572. 
211 Ibid. 573. 
   103 
 
Anthropologist Gregory Bateson had, beginning at least as early as the 
1950’s developed a cybernetically informed theory of mind and psychoanalytic 
therapy. For him, cybernetics was the corrective to the Cartesian cogito, it was 
the necessary reunification of Mind with Nature. The separate and privileged 
mind was tantamount to an ecological disaster resulting from our continued use 
of an obsolete system of thought, and he on more than one occasion spoke to 
his board of regents about the perils of turning away from a cybernetically 
informed university pedagogy.212 In his introduction to “Cybernetics: or control in 
the animal and the machine” Norbert Wiener claimed that the ultimate answer to 
avoiding catastrophe “of course, is to have a society based on human values 
other than buying or selling.” This he said was the reason that he first shared his 
information and work on cybernetics to the Labor Unions of the United States.213 
Margaret Mead, who along with then husband Gregory Bateson helped put 
together/host the first Macy Conference on Cybernetics, wanted to first 
understand the effects of cybernetics on American society.214 She then deployed 
cybernetic theory in hopes that distant cultures could not only be understood but 
also predicted in cultural production. Her attempt with cybernetics was nothing 
less than an empirical cultural studies at the beginning of the Cold War. The 
results of which can be seen in her monograph, “The Study of Culture at a 
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Distance.” Calling it a “manual,” Mead combined the methods of historian and 
anthropology in order to practice, 
Interdisciplinary research practices as they apply particularly to the study 
of cultural character structure in cultures that are spatially or temporally 
inaccessible.215 
 
The importance of Mead’s early work as a cybernetician cannot be 
overemphasized and those engaged in the combining of posthuman studies with 
the study of sociological or cultural studies would benefit further investigation of 
her systems method that was informed by,  
dynamic psychology, especially as practiced clinically; studies of growth 
and development, including concepts drawn from embryology; studies of 
constitution and temperament; learning theory; experiments in change; 
theories of group behavior, ecology, and cybernetics.216 
 
These cyberneticians’ efforts represent the enduring problem for 
cybernetics—the attempt to apply machine theories to a social or human domain. 
The idea of “designing” better ways of life for humans with the use of technology 
quickly opens itself up to criticisms of technological determinism as well as anti-
democratic governance. The critique generally breaks down along the lines of 
de-generated possibility for true “human” communication in such instances of 
technological interference. The idea could be one of the seductive but 
incomprehensible speed with which machines produce and circulate spectacular 
images that short-circuit human deliberation and decision making. Likewise 
machines are seen as perpetuating a transmission rather than ritual model of 
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communication—whereby the extension of messages across geography allows 
greater control over geography and people.217 Gilles Deleuze frames the fearful 
position of human freedom in the Control Society where technological machines 
design life based on the movements of capital. Because of code, the digital 
language of machines along with the imperative for controlled access to 
information, “‘Individuals become’” “‘dividuals,’" and masses become samples, 
data, markets, or "‘banks.’"218 Alexander Galloway observed that this risk was not 
lost to the liberal humanist Norbert Wiener even as he developed and diligently 
publicized cybernetics after WWII. Wiener wrote with a regular fear of “general 
social exploitation” whether it came alternatively from the recently defeated 
fascist regime or a “more bullish American Capitalism.”219 Given the most recent 
dire results of technological design, namely in the Obama administration’s 
deployment of the drone as a fully operational warfare strategy or the National 
Security Agency’s utilization of web infrastructures for the mass collection of 
individuals’ private information—I understand the need for pause.  
However, critiquing structural inequalities or the domination of one group 
by another and attempting to “save the technical object”220 that is caught up in 
that domination do not have to be mutually exclusive. In fact the point of 
recognizing the power of technologies lies in recognizing resistance in those 
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materials and processes thought at first to be predictable and easily controlled. 
Galloway recognized the philosophical possibilities in Norbert Wiener wcith this 
observation: 
Yet I would argue that the proximity between man and machine in late 
twentieth-century life has more utopian possibilities in Wiener’s thought 
than it has derisive possibilities. Wiener is important because he valued 
the contingency of matter, be it man or machine. He recognized that 
material reality is the most important thing and that, contrary to a more 
static Newtonian view of matter, it can change. The self-determinism of 
material systems is therefore the essence of cybernetics, and it is a 
positive essence, one that also reflects the positive potential of 
protocological organization.221 
 
Galloway’s passage reflects a recent engagement with cybernetics for its 
philosophical and ethical contributions rather than anything it might have to say 
about digital culture per se. His reading of Wiener’s work is a valuable 
reinterpretation deploying cybernetics as a materialist and realist philosophy 
rather than a formalist, mathematical approach to machines. Finally, Galloway 
highlights a critical insight in cybernetics that has been picked up by new 
materialists and affect scholars, namely the agency of material objects. The “self-
determinism of materials systems,” has become a productive way to rethink 
human systems of power and social change, particularly those that rely so 
heavily on technological infrastructures and mediated communication. Objects, 
machines, communication networks, and bodies all act in unexpected ways that 
result in larger novel formations that cut across political and cultural contexts. 
Gilles Deleuze’s theory of the assemblage comes to mind as a descriptor of 
these novel systems of disparate forms of matter and life. Galloway reminds us in 
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his passage that this kind of radical thinking, a theory of subjectivity existed in the 
experimental sciences in America at least since the 1940’s. As the rest of my 
chapter illustrates, Wiener and the other cyberneticians were themselves 
accessing and modifying a conception of material agency that preceded them by 
a century.  
Contribution of Chapter 
In this chapter I hope to provide two important contributions to critical 
media studies. In her entry on cybernetics for “Critical Terms for Media Studies,” 
N. Katherine Hayles contends that the “connection between media studies and 
cybernetics is prefigured by Gordon Pask’s definition of cybernetics as the field 
concerned with information flows in all media, including biological, mechanical, 
and even cosmological systems.”222 First, it provides further context on why 
scholarship concerned with governmentality studies and biopolitical theory 
specifically, and theories of subjectivity generally, should begin to see 
cybernetics as less concerned with digital culture specifically and more 
concerned with the politics of the self-regulation of organisms.  
The conceptual distinction between the first cybernetics to emerge in the 
20th century and the next generations should be of particular interest to media 
scholars as it resonates with discourses of technology, governmentality and 
biopolitics. N. Katherine Hayles illustrates succinctly the historical division 
between a first order and second order cybernetics that was characterized 
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through reflexivity.223 This categorization she borrows from Heinz Von Foerster, 
who claimed that a cybernetician was neither objective nor apart from the system 
she observed and thus,  
the cybernetician, by entering his own domain, has to account 
for his or her own activity. Cybernetics then becomes cybernetics of 
cybernetics, or second-order cybernetics.224 
 
  This meant that cyberneticians from roughly 1960 on included the 
hypothetical observer within any biological or technical system being observed. 
Hayles characterizes a third or contemporary order of cybernetics that she 
characterizes as “virtuality.” This phase of virtuality is to Hayles particularly 
important to media (studies) because, “media are important primarily for their 
differential capacities to store, transmit, and process information.” Additionally 
cybernetics treats both human and animal bodies, namely organisms as media 
since they also act as storage, retrieval, and transmission devices. Media 
scholars Mark B. Hansen and Bruno Clarke argue that there are only two orders 
of cybernetics first order and neo-cybernetics, which begins with Hienz Von 
Foerster’s “Cybernetics of Cybernetics.” Importantly Hansen and Clarke similarly 
characterize the first iteration of cybernetics as a “technoscience of 
communication and control.”225 The differences between First order and Second 
order or Neo-cybernetics had as much to do with their historical contexts and 
disciplinary participations as it did their conceptual differences. First order began,  
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a base connecting biological and computational systems by way of 
information theory and communications technology. cybernetics was 
academically mainstreamed under the names Artificial Intelligence (AI ) 
and, more broadly, computer science in the service of command-and-
control systems.226 
 
Two things marks neo-cybernetics as distinct from first order, 1) the passage of 
time and distancing from the context of WWII and so called “command control” 
research programs; 2) the circulation of cybernetics principles into other 
academic areas including the social sciences, the humanities, and of course the 
life sciences. What resulted conceptually was a general shift from the figure of 
homeostasis that worked to solve instrumental communication problems such as 
target tracking and guiding munitions—to the figures of emergence and 
autopoiesis.227 228 The object for first order cybernetics was the abstract machine 
and “was theorized as an entity distinct from the environment in which it was 
embedded”229 ostensibly so that it could be instrumentalized—designed, 
controlled, and governed from its outside. On the other hand in Hansen and 
Clarke’s account for “neo-cybernetic” scholars the machine is embodied, alive, 
and always emerging within a larger system or environment. Though it is 
interconnected with environment the neo-cybernetic emphasis is on its individual 
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ability to emerge, organize, and maintain itself. We can see in first vs. neo-
cybernetics two distinct form of governance with respect to machine or organism 
and it bears more than a passing resemblance to the historico-political shift 
sketched out by Michel Foucault as the movement from Liberalism to 
Neoliberalism.  
The trajectory of cybernetics from an industrial and scientific regime to a 
framework for individual action follows nicely Michel Foucault’s trajectory of 
historical inquiry that “shifted from technologies of power and domination” to the 
ways “a human being turns him- or herself into a subject.”230 Media scholars 
have for years taken media forms—representations, discourses, and 
communication technologies—as communicative forms people actively use and 
participate in for the purposes of producing and managing their identities. Michel 
Foucault described governmentality as the point of contact between technologies 
of domination of others and technologies of the self.231 Toby Miller summarized 
the formation of governmentality in U.S. cultural studies. In it he suggested that a 
particular formation interested in Foucault and specifically Governmentality in 
U.S. Communication and Cultural Studies scholarship served as a corrective to 
the liberal/conservative paradigms in the field. He also claimed that unlike 
humanism that “underpins” a liberalist framework,  
studies in governmentality do not begin from the presumption of a 
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fully-formed human, preferring instead to see what defines and animates 
that subject.232 
 
Jeremy Packer writing in the same special issue observed that governmentality 
as it pertains to studying communication technologies is valuable for,  
the importance of communication as a means for organizing not just 
thought, but the movement of bodies and machines. Communications 
technologies… are coordinating machines.233 
 
We see in the above passages the dual character of governance that variously 
attempts to foreground individual self-governance as well as external structuring 
of that individual. Packer’s quote is also an early indication in the field of the 
affective character that technologies of self imply and that communication 
machines/media have long stood at the crossroads of both technologies of power 
and domination as well as practices of self-governance. 
Laurie Ouellette and James Hay argued that the “cultural power” of 
television as a communication technology was productive of viewers’ 
individualistic “active role in caring for and governing themselves through a 
burgeoning culture of entrepreneurship.”234 Importantly they point out as well that 
this characteristically neoliberal form of governmentality, particularly in the 
televisual form of the “life intervention” becomes intimately tied to a regime of 
health that deploys medical expertise and, ostensibly scientific measurement that 
aid individuals in managing the physiological markers of health and well being. 
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Ouellette and Hay’s insight here illustrates two important relationships, 1) 
between neoliberalism, biopolitics, and 2) the crucial role of mediation in the 
process of an individual managing one’s health or well being.  
 The biopolitical register of technologies of the self within the 
biotechnological revolution in life sciences has, as Melinda Cooper observed, 
resulted in a particular sort of neoliberal-biopolitics. It is a neoliberalism that 
attempts to capture,  
not simply the public sphere and its institutions, but more pertinently the 
life of the nation, social and biological reproduction as a national reserve 
and foundational value of the welfare state.235 
 
And, contra Foucault’s analysis of the development of homo economicus in early 
neoliberalism236, for those individuals doing self work in neoliberalism today,  
The operative emotions…are neither interest nor rational expectations, but 
rather the essentially speculative but nonetheless productive movements 
of collective belief, faith, and apprehension.237 
 
Technologies of the self in this case are those discourses, networks, and 
machines actively deployed by people to avoid or surmount various perceived 
scenarios of biological risk that prevail today based on neoliberal-biopolitics’ 
“vested interest” in profiting off of one form or another of “biological 
catastrophe.”238 The life sciences and biotechnologies become caught up in this 
culture of speculation and risk over literal and figurative biological contagion.  
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The shift in focus from technologies of domination to technologies of the 
self also reveals interesting interactions between science, individuals, and media. 
As Nicholas Rose has recently observed, national government, scientific 
communities, and citizens all have a new interest in “democratizing” science, 
opening up access to its knowledge production, and engaging the public in its 
affairs. This all has the effect of a change in the status of truth and democracy 
within scientific discourse. Rose observes an even more astonishing 
phenomenon that he calls the “active biological citizen.” Such an individual is not 
only managing herself through the instructions of biological and genetic sciences, 
but uses the threat of her survival as a form of biopolitical power back to state 
and capitalist interests.239  
This is manifested in new forms of collectivisation, new forums for debate, 
new styles of activism, demands for access to knowledge and for the 
funding of research into specific conditions: ‘it is “genetic citizenship” that 
connects discussions of rights, recognitions, and responsibilities to 
intimate, fundamental concerns about heritable identities, differential 
embodiment, and an ethics of care’ (2004, p. 57, emphasis in original).240  
 
The biological citizen then actively works to redirect and recuperate the 
“collective belief, faith, and apprehension” that Melinda cooper saw as the motor 
driving neoliberal-biopolitical catastrophe.  
 Put another way, through the various communication technologies, 
networks, and scientific knowledge, the biological citizen is capable of 
recuperating her capacity to affect and be affected in the future. This is, again, a 
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sort of active corrective to the simplistic representations of crisis, fear, health, 
and success that state and corporate media institutions deploy to control that 
affectivity. Through what he calls distributed mediation, Richard Grusin attempted 
to call attention to the “similar distribution of affect across human and nonhuman 
actors.”241 This is the key register on which cybernetics has deployed the notion 
of an autonomous, self-regulating agent that is at the same time inextricably 
linked to other agents as well as a larger system. Keeping in mind both 
governmentality and biopolitical registers the cybernetic subject is no longer 
limited to cyberspace or the digital but rather expanded all forms of the social. 
The traditional sociopolitical categories of: of identity and community no longer 
hold up to a cybernetic machine-subject that, as Patricia Ticineto-Clough 
described, make it, 
so that the defence against accusations of contagion and suggestibility 
among human subjects or in human groups and communities would no 
longer be required as a way of also defending a fixed boundary between 
the organism and the environment, between human affect and the affect 
of matter…242  
  
As a second contribution to media studies, I illustrate that the theory that 
increasingly informs critical media studies, namely continental philosophy, has 
strong and intricate ties to cybernetic thought. Increasingly in engaging with 
French and German philosophy North American media studies resembles 
cybernetics and related scientific or technical thought. Mark B. Hansen and  
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Bruno Clarke above, for example, have continued to develop a “neocybernetics” 
with the express purpose that “contemporary understanding that the human is 
and has always already been posthuman could not have emerged” without the 
cybernetic perspective.243 More work is being produced on the historical 
connections between Continental Theory and cybernetics at the middle of the 
20th century including “Lévi-Strauss, Lacan, Foucault, Derrida, Lyotard, Deleuze 
and Guattari” as a French philosophical movement embodied in a typically 
“American technological innovation.”244 
The most glaring example of this would be the work of Friedrich Kittler. He 
explicitly adopts Claude Shannon’s Mathematical Theory of Communication, or 
what would become Information theory as the founding theory of what he calls 
the “scientific history of media.” It liberated, Kittler thought, communication from 
an “unfathomable confusion” in the “bonds of language” because technical 
communication avoided, “any reference to ideas or meanings and thus to 
people.”245  
However, I wish to point out that cybernetics has and continues to 
contribute to a more general thinking that strives for what Rosi Braidotti 
described as alternative, conceptually creative, and affirmative new subjectivities 
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in light of the Posthuman.246 As such, this chapter highlights the relationship of 
cybernetics to the ethical leanings of French Theory.  For example, Felix 
Guatarri, who has influenced Mark B Hansen and others to form a “Neo-
cybernetic” theory, gestured towards ethics through his strong reliance a theory 
of the machine. As Hansen notes, Guatarri, 
Privileged the technical machine over all machinic orderings that impose a 
universal referent (capital, energy, information) precisely because they cut 
across material domains… they are mediators for human co-evolution with 
the environment…247 
 
Hansen believed that from our coevolution with machines along with our 
recognition of the important ways that they affect us result in ethical imperatives. 
After studying machines and accepting their form of alterity humans feel 
compelled towards cooperation and co-functioning:  
for if the human is to retain its relevance, if not necessarily its 
centrality, in the face of the massive and massively accelerating 
complexification of the world, human beings must welcome the alterity of 
machines as a crucial source of connection to a world ever more difficult 
to grasp directly.248 
 
As I will conclude in this chapter Michel Foucault in particular belongs in this 
 
growing body of scholarly work is rethinking the shape and evolution of 
the relations among science, technology, sociology, psychology, 
philosophy, history, literature, and the arts through neocybernetic 
terms…249 
 
Particularly in his later work on ancient subjectivity he provides a cybernetic form 
of subjectivation as an imagination and strategy for de-familiarization of the 
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humanist subject, what Braidotti has described as a critical posthumanism.250 As 
I have mentioned my interest in governmentality or the art of governing self and 
others leads me to introduce a reading of Foucault under a cybernetic lens. 
  
Part 2: Norbert Wiener, Warren McCulloch, and observing Ethics in 
Machines 
 
Norbert Wiener likened machines in the modern world to the Golem of the 
Rabbi of Prague. This metaphor is interesting for quite a few reasons, at least 
some of which Wiener must have intended. Golem is an old Hebrew term 
translated as “shapeless mass or embryo, connoting the unfinished human being 
before God’s eyes.”251 Like Frankenstein or stem cell research, the Golem is the 
creation from forbidden knowledge, that which should only be brought to life by 
God. And like Frankenstein’s monster, or Pinocchio, or the android Data from 
Star Trek, the golem is precisely that creation that humans seek out, and it is one 
that is necessarily flawed or lacking in some significant way. The Golem is also, 
from Jewish lore, one of the earliest ideas of human beings seeking that hidden 
knowledge (literally the Kabbalah) to create a life form in their own image. The 
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Golem of Prague tells the specific story of a Rabbi’s Golem that is not only a 
servant but a hero that, “averted many calamities and blood libels.”252  
Wiener described the modern machine, a product of computer science 
and robotics engineering, as a Golem for purposes that were ethical and 
metaphysical. It is one of the many examples of cybernetician writings that cross 
or bridge the discrete boundaries between scientific and philosophical 
discourses. He believed that Cybernetics as a science impinges on the realm of 
Religion precisely because “machine” is a problematic third term between human 
and God. He concluded that creative activity (creation), which is the ultimate 
purpose of cybernetic thought, is not a power endowed differently to God, 
humans, or machines.253 To the extent that cybernetics impinged on religion it 
was because the machines it theorized marked a new form of creative power that 
was not entirely in the realm of the human. 
Warren S. McCulloch who, through his investigation into cybernetics, 
endeavored to produce a “physiological epistemology of mind” also wrote an 
essay on the possibility of an ethical robot. In it he contributes to the contours of 
this machine subject theory. While admitting that “Science” could not currently 
say anything about good or evil, and dubious about the prospect of a 
“tautological theory of the good” akin to formal languages like math and logic, 
McCulloch did believe that humans 
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…can construct an observational science of evaluation. He must watch 
the choices of the organisms or machines to discover the causes of such 
conduct. But to be ethical, these must include other organisms and 
machines which must share effort and reward or no social questions of 
good and evil will arise. I shall investigate what Machines, by cooperation 
and competition, can constitute a society where their conduct becomes 
self-disciplined in a way that serves the ends created by their 
association.254  
 
From this passage we see vast similarity in McCulloch’s conception of 
observation and evaluation to his fellow first-order cyberneticians Gregory 
Bateson and Margaret Mead, who both happen to be anthropologists.  
Gregory Bateson took the concepts of various cyberneticians and the 
comparative work across sciences and across objects of different species in 
order to produce “defensible metaphors”255 for human communication and 
cognition. For Mead, the influence of cybernetics on Anthropology resulted in the 
ability to observe and analyze “Culture at a Distance” where distance meant that 
those societies observed were for different reasons inaccessible to direct 
observation. 256 Beyond the fact that McCulloch proposed that robots could learn 
to behave ethically by living together is a proposition he seemed to have 
borrowed from his cyber-anthropologist colleagues. That humans could establish 
a system and method of observing robot behavior is strictly speaking a 
suggestion of ethnographic knowledge of them. And what culture is more at a 
distance, more radically other to human observation than a community of robots? 
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McCulloch’s thought experiment exhibits an idea that anthropologist Samuel 
Collins would decades later call “virtual culture.” 
Culture construed as virtuality, on the other hand, foregrounds culture as 
pure difference; actualizations of cultural difference not only fail to exhaust 
the potentials of a virtual multiplicity, but they enrich the virtual (here 
coincident with the past) with potential as-yet unactualized (but no less 
real).257 
 
Robot culture, while not physically manifested either in McCulloch’s time nor  
 
arguably today, exists virtually as the pure difference of communicative robot  
 
agency. The post-human anthropology currently things’ abilities to influence and 
create human culture might productively include things that create their own 
culture. Anthropology’s inclusion of robot culture might force the replacement of 
Anthro- with another prefix designating an openness, not only to nonhuman but 
to inorganic culture.258 Taking the virtual to be real, as Collins argued, the new 
study of culture would prescribe new political and ethical configurations around 
such a culture. Hence the observation of culture would bring in the observer and 
become a social and political practice; “anthropology here is still descriptive, but 
it is also catalyzing, energizing, and morphogenetic.”259  
 In this section I discussed two of the founding members of the first 
generation of cyberneticians. I showed each as attempting to theorize the ethical 
implications for a field of science dedicated to the study of machines. I believe 
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that part of the misunderstanding and dismissal of cybernetics includes an 
unawareness of the social and ethical components to its theories. Machines, 
outside of an engineering context, was taken as a whole subject or organism, 
and one that was meant to interact with and affect humans directly. 
 
Part 3: Cybernetics Reconsidered 
 
 
In this section I expand on some of the misunderstanding and skepticism 
surrounding cybernetics. The discourse generated by the term Cybernetics in the 
last 60 years suggests that it has been difficult for a theory of machines with 
conceptions of their autonomy, to withstand objections concerning human dignity 
and freedom. Particularly in political and cultural realms there seems a direct 
correlation between the increase in number, powers, and prevalence of 
machines—and an increasing alienating effect on human life. From Baruch 
Spinoza’s “spiritual automaton” to La Mettrie’s “Man a Machine” to the 
“Automaton theory” of 19th century psychology260, or even John Von Neumann’s 
“Theory of Reproducing Automata,” any scientific theory that either sets out the 
existence of machines beyond human control or that takes seriously the 
comparison between machine behavior and human volition, has but the briefest 
shelf life both in scientific and humanistic contexts.  
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The one exception, as I discussed earlier in Physiology, has been the 
philosophical and physiological work of Renee Descartes. Though, again, 
Descartes’ is a machinic theory only insofar as he uses the actual word in his 
prose. His fidelity lies instead with the immutability and irreducibility of mind as a 
substance to the attribute of body. His materialism is a stop-gap at the least and 
disingenuously idealist at worst, and most importantly the perseverance of 
Cartesian thought in philosophy, science, and industry, is due to a practicable 
“mechanization” that I have laid out previously—and mechanization is by no 
means a synonym for machine. This brings up a recurring claim in my 
dissertation, one originating from my sketch of physiological vitalist-machine 
theories that machines neither have to be mechanical in any particular sense, nor 
must they be reducible to their smallest parts. My discussion of cybernetics 
continues exploration of this claim and takes cybernetics to be a successful 
“failed” intellectual project that has contributed to the concept of a vital machine.  
As a Failure 
Peter Galison argued in 1994 that, “Cybernetics no longer appears as a 
futuristic bandwagon or as a rising worldview…”261 Historian and philosopher 
Jean Pierre Dupuy opens his history of cybernetics by explaining that its history 
should be a recognition of what it got wrong as a cognitive science so that history 
would not repeat its mistakes. 
For I saw the history of cybernetics—the first great attempt to construct a 
physicalist science of mind—as the story of a failure. And indeed 
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cybernetics was soon forgotten, apparently consigned to a dark corner of 
modern intellectual history.262 
 
The below definition also suggests that what is key to Cybernetics is a 
basic failure of reception and that what was not well received was its dissolution 
of Identity—of unique humans, organisms, and machines 
Any attempt to reconcile these legion cybernetic understandings would 
likely be as fruitless as it would be misguided: like many other ambitious 
projects, contradictions, inconsistencies, paradoxes, and programmatic 
failures have long been hallmarks of cybernetics. Wiener’s failed attempts 
to improve fire-control in the 1940’s, the Macy Conferences failed effort to 
develop a universal science of control and communication in the 1940’s 
and 1950’s, and the ambivalent appropriation of cybernetics by theorists 
ever since speak to the difficulty—and likely impossibility—of reconciling 
humans, animals, machines, and societies into a consistent, coherent or 
unified intellectual program.263  
 
This definition is highly instructive and representative in that it reflects a general 
consensus that the cybernetics project has always been attached 
epistemologically to its failure. Cybernetics has alternatively been characterized 
as a “scientific farce founded on sloppy analogies between computers and 
human organisms.”264  
From the above quote we also see the implication of the personal stakes 
of failure for the founders such as Wiener, often characterized as individually 
failing at his employed task with the U.S. military during WWII. This is not an 
isolated event of connecting these cyberneticians’ foibles with the fate of 
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cybernetic thought. According to Peter Galison it was not only Wiener’s 
obsession with an imagined nonhuman-human hybrid enemy, or that with 
developing anti-aircraft weapons, but his entire biography that led him to develop 
cybernetics as a violent “philosophy of nature.”265  
N Katherine Hayles provides an in depth psychoanalytic read of Wiener’s 
writings, arguing that his strong commitment to a liberal humanist worldview was 
itself one of the perceived victims of cybernetics’ success. The dissolution of the 
distinction between human and machine severely threatened the investment in “a 
coherent, rational self, the right of that self to autonomy and freedom, and a 
sense of agency linked with a belief in enlightened self interest.”266 This threat 
resulted in vast contradiction, not only in his work but also in his behavior as he 
worked. The conceptual boundaries in Wiener’s cybernetics, those that elided the 
“very real differences existing between the inner structures of organisms and 
those of machines” for example, was mirrored in the boundaries he saw in his 
personal life as “an outsider, standing apart from a privileged group whose 
boundaries did not include him.”267 
As Hayles sees it, Wiener’s “intense identification of personal conflicts with 
conceptual problems” another aspect of his liberal humanism, would be 
productive of his theory making in cybernetics, as “boundary formation and 
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analogical linking collaborate to create a discursive field in which animals, 
humans, and machines can be treated as equivalent cybernetic systems.”268 
Viewed in historical perspective, Wiener was not successful in containing 
cybernetics within the circle of liberal humanist assumptions…It is to 
Wiener’s credit that he tried to craft a version of cybernetics that would 
enhance rather than subvert human freedom. But no person, even the 
father of a discipline, can single-handedly control what cybernetics 
signifies when it propogates through the culture by all manner of 
promiscuous couplings…the voices that speak the cyborg do not speak as 
one…269 
 
Hayles’ analysis, both fascinating and personal, illustrates the inextricable link 
between cybernetics and its failure. In the above instance it is both that Wiener 
“failed” in his attempt to authorize a monolithic version of cybernetics that 
enhanced liberal humanism, but also, that cybernetics failed insofar as it was 
successful at laying bare the illusion or construction of the autonomous and 
unique human subject.  
 
Part 3: The Cybernetics of the Human ushers the Posthuman  
 
This section begins with the work of Plato as it is one of his meditations on 
the value of government that provides a powerful sense of cybernetics as a 
recognized form of knowledge. Cybernetics can be seen as a field that bridges 
antiquity and modernity as an inquiry into the government of life. It also affirms 
Foucault’s interest in analyzing the ancients and providing in them a very 
different kind of subject, a point I will conclude with. Making one of its first 
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appearances in Plato’s Clitophon, the political dimension of cybernetics appears 
quite strong. In the dialogue Clitophon reiterates Socrates’ philosophy: 
…someone who doesn’t know how to use his soul is better off putting his 
soul to rest and not living at all rather than leading a life in which his 
actions are based on nothing but personal whim. If for some reason he 
must live, it would be better for such a man to live as a slave than to be 
free, handling over the rudder of his mind, like that of a ship, to somebody 
else who knows [kubernetes/cybernetics] that skill of steering men which 
you, Socrates, often call politics, the very same skill, you say, as the 
judicial skill and justice.270 
 
The key to this ancient cybernetics is still a relationship between the governance 
of self vs. governing others based on the proper living of a life. As cybernetics is 
the skill of steering men it is already in antiquity a technology of governance. And 
this technology of governance, as a power over others is made necessary only 
after a human being has already lost or never has had the ability to manage the 
use of her own soul. Foucault put the insight into Greek steersmanship succinctly 
claiming that the modes of training the self, pedagogy or healing, and politics 
were all the same in the techne of government created by the ancients. Further, 
the latter two derived from the former, 
that is, the possibility of making oneself like the doctor treating sick 
ness, the pilot steering between the rocks, or the statesman 
governing the city*-a skillful and prudent guide of himself, 
one who had a sense of the right time and the right measure.271 
 
The next time the concept of cybernetic government would be used would be by 
Andre Marie Ampere, the French physicist and experimenter. He would borrow 
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cybernetique from the Greek kubernetes in 1834 in part to describe the art of the 
natural sciences. Cybernetics was to be the exemplary science of government. 
His description of cybernetics sounds strikingly similar to the steersmanship the 
ancients in his “Essai sur La Philosophie des Sciences.” In it Ampere wrote not 
as a scientist or naturalist, but as someone who believed that an empirical 
understanding of government could enact the greatest good. Cybernetics or the 
“art of governing in general,” was to be an active, ongoing, and all encompassing 
practice for the leader of the nation. Each and every decision by a leader was 
made in response to numerous external variables or “diverse” elements making 
up the State. The list of objects a leader must empirically identify included the 
State’s: “character”, “morals”, “opinions”, “history”, “religion”, its “means of 
existence and prosperity”, and its “laws”.272 Ampere no doubt had in mind the 
recent “July” revolution in which the French monarchy was replaced by a 
constitutional one when he concluded that everything done by government 
should be for “l'amélioration de l'état social” the betterment of the social state.273  
It should be stressed again the integrative or “global” way in which cybernetics 
would work according to Ampere: 
Ampere’s idea of cybernetics is not marred by debilitating physicalism. For 
contrary to the narrow outlook of physicalism, Ampere emphasized that 
the science of governing should be based on a thorough attentiveness to 
every facet of human life and activity. Cybernetics…far transcended the 
skill of establishing quantitative correlations. It was, rather, a science that 
had to ponder carefully the character, manners, history, religion, and laws 
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of society before trying to formulate the general patterns of human 
activities.274  
 
Ampere not only borrowed the name from the Greek’s but also seemed to 
recognize that they had already extrapolated from the individual act of navigating 
or steering one’s ship to the regulating or steering of numerous movements 
whether physical, linguistic, and social. As Michel Foucault noted of the ancients 
“their idea of piloting as an art” was a “theoretical and practical technique 
necessary to existence.”275  Ampere thus did not just call cybernetics a science of 
government but also a “theory of power” at work in society.   
 
Gregory Bateson, Margaret Mead, Heinz Von Foerster: The Cybernetics of 
Ethics 
 I have already mentioned that Wiener and McCulloch were scientists who 
theorized the ethical implications of powerful and social machines. In this section 
I discuss three cyberneticians who, more than any others perhaps, applied 
machine theories to the human sciences. Gregory Bateson is key figure of 
cybernetics to explore in order to investigate it as a theory of subjectivity and 
ethics. In March of 1976, after some thirty years, Margaret Mead and Gregory 
Bateson reflected on the circumstances and ideas that generated the Macy 
Conferences. They briefly keyed in on the concept of feedback that is historically 
attributed as fundamental to cybernetic thought.  
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Mead: Yes, and shifting back and forth between these levels and keeping 
everything straight was very interesting. So we used the model, 
‘feedback,’ and Kurt Lewin - who didn’t understand any known language, 
but always had to reduce them to concepts - he went away with the idea 
of feedback as something that when you did anything with a group you 
went back and told them later what had happened. And he died before 
anything much else happened. So the word ‘feedback’ got introduced 
incorrectly into the international UNESCO type conferences where it’s 
been ever since. 
 
Bateson: In the small group cult, feedback now means either telling 
people what they did, or answering. 
 
Mead: Yes. ‘I don’t get any feedback from you,’ or ‘I can’t go on with this 
without some feedback.’ It wouldn’t have survived if Kurt had lived. He 
would undoubtedly have got it right.276  
 
On the surface the two are recalling the game of telephone that can result 
from the politics of conferencing, and more crucial to Mead’s life work, to the 
popularization and supporting of social theory. On a deeper level, this 
conversation indicates the misunderstanding, at the most basic level, and at the 
moment of inception of the concept. This misunderstanding led to an 
instrumental view of a dynamic and changing concept in cybernetics from outside 
observers. It speaks to the problematic nature of building a first philosophy of 
communication, or as cybernetics was called, a meta-science.  
From Mead and Bateson’s recognition of the problem of “feedback” we 
may view the starting point of simplification by the misrecognizing cybernetic 
critic—that characterizes feedback as merely “talking back” or, as a reflexivity, 
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another concept from anthropology and that has circulated, in the form of 
participant observation, throughout the humanities. What becomes evident is that 
the founding principle of Bateson’s particular project, with special attention to 
self-integration in mechanisms and processes, is quite apart from a teleological 
causality of a feedback loop. Instead, the concepts generated by Cybernetics 
would lead him to posit that human beings, their culture and language constitute 
a much larger system, or an ecology.  
The “black box” is the figure of bracketing or hiding a set of phenomena 
from systematic analysis. It is the underlying figure of Hayles’ critique of 
cybernetic thought, and also plays into her understanding of Gregory Bateson’s 
alteration of cybernetics. In her discussion of cyberneticians’ conflation of man 
and machine it is by the very act of black-boxing mechanisms in favor of patterns 
of general form that human beings and machines seem very similar.  
At heart of 1st order cybernetics’ concept of information is this “black 
boxing” effect inherited in part from behaviorism that first simplified all human 
phenomena. For purposes of illustrating the tenuous position of the observer in 
cybernetics—the objective myth and black boxing of observer by engineers, as 
well as the rudimentary revision by Norbert Wiener’s cybernetics, Hayles drew on 
the interview between Mead, Bateson, and Stewart Brand. She paraphrases a 
moment in the event where Bateson draws a diagram of an input/output 
communication model before cybernetics: 
The drawing shows a black box with input, output, and feedback loops 
within the box. The space labeled “Engineer” remains outside the box. A 
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second drawing represents Bateson’s later understanding of 
cybernetics…In this drawing the observers are included within the system 
rather than looking at it from the outside.277  
 
The figure of the black box here demonstrates the simplistic form of reflexivity 
that will need a robust theory of embodied subjectivity for her purpose, and the 
overall bracketing of reflexivity at the conferences lead also to the black boxing of 
the psychoanalytic perspective, and any interest in the unconscious. It is 
productive to look at the commentary that accompanies Bateson’s diagram at 
length: 
[T]here’s an input and an output. Then you work on the box. What Wiener 
says is that you work on the whole picture and its properties. Now, there 
may be boxes inside here, like this of all sorts, but essentially your 
ecosystem, your organism-plus-environment, is to be considered as a 
single circuit… 
And you’re not really concerned with an input-output, but with the events 
within the bigger circuit, and you are part of the bigger circuit.278 
 
Here Bateson is shirking the outmoded language of the box, as he reminds 
Brand that the lines of the box are always only conceptually drawn by us. The 
consequences for this conceptual boxing of what we observe are ethical to 
Bateson.  
While it is quite clear that he has no intention of getting at reflexivity 
through the figural inclusion of the observer, through mediating linguistic 
practices of self-disclosure, or the literary process of narrative, Bateson is 
attempting to open up observation to the material integration of human and 
nonhuman systems.  The circuit here both is and is not a metaphor, as opposed 
                                                
277 Ibid. 74. 
278 Brand, “For God’s Sake,” 12.  
   132 
 
to the conceptual “box.” That is, a circuit is figural for purposes of explanation 
only, and, with the advent of electronics and then digital computing technologies, 
the circuit became specifically articulated to an inorganic mechanism. However, 
there is a transparency between concept and physical object and the metonymy 
is unnecessary when an observer “as” a circuit is a circuit. A circuit is merely a 
circular route that may fit within the context of bodies, ideas, energy, or 
information.  
Additionally, unlike the conceptual closed-ness of a box, which signifies 
metaphorically, as Hayles is arguing, a closed mindedness or un-self reflexive 
positionality, a circuit literally opens and closes based on its use, based on 
stimuli from its environment.  Moving away from the boxing off of an object or 
problem, Bateson instead uses the figure of a “circuit” in relation to an overall 
ecology whereby both organism and environment are composed of an 
overdetermination of processes, physical, biological, and cultural.279 Organism 
and environment are both within a larger circuit as relays at the same time as 
they are circuits constituted from below with other relays that interact and 
complete their own circuits.   
N. Katherine Hayles admitted that Bateson’s thought at mid century, unlike 
Wiener, McCulloch and others, had a non-semantic and emergentist sense of 
information.280 It seems the case that he anticipated a particular cybernetic 
moment, though not the one that manifested at Macy, through his conceptual 
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work on Schismogenesis and in Bali through the 1930’s, and on schizophrenia 
studies where he and others at the Palo Alto School used cybernetics and 
communication theory to center psychoanalysis on interpersonal communication.  
Gregory Bateson was never preoccupied with the potential of information 
as a power, quantity, or language.281 In perhaps Bateson’s most memorable 
aphorism, information was neither data nor energy specifically, but generally “a 
difference that makes a difference.” It is pattern, finally, that would unify his work 
in a quasi-mystical practice of observation that would eliminate the human in 
universal sameness. But pattern, without quantity, without measure or 
instrument, would take his work out of cybernetics, out of information, the world 
of technology and out of Hayles’ full purview. Her posthuman thesis, one 
grounded ultimately in an integrated comparison of the plentitudes and variations 
in language, patterns of thought, and patterns of life. “The pattern which 
connects;” Bateson sought the underlying structures that mapped similarity 
across all the radically different living things.  
 What pattern connects the crab to the lobster and the orchid to 
the primrose and all the four of them to me? And me to you? And all 
the six of us to the amoeba in one direction and to the back-ward 
schizophrenic in another?282 
 
To be aware and moved by the pattern that connects all living things, the 
biosphere that Bateson knew to be threatened by modern human civilization, was 
to be both scientific and ethical.  
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There is this much connection certainly between scientific truth, on the 
one hand, and beauty and morality, on the other: that if a man entertain 
false opinions regarding his own nature, he will be led thereby to courses 
of action which will be in some profound sense immoral or ugly. 
 
This was why he returned again and again to writing about the question of why 
so few teachers in most schools were not teaching students the pattern that 
connects, the cybernetic skill that empowered a human being to meet their 
environment/ecology with “recognition and empathy.” After all, cybernetics above 
all marked a revolution in the study of communication in learning283—whether it 
be how an organism learns to stave off disease and death, or how a machine 
learns to mimic certain human characteristics, or how a human being learns to 
communicate with family members or spouses. Living, learning, and 
communicating were tantamount to the same organism action. Cybernetics was 
to Bateson, a living art, a technique of continually putting oneself back into one’s 
environment. Thus by “aesthetic” he meant “responsive to the pattern that 
connects.”284 This was the ethical urgency of putting the observer into its system, 
the performative nature of a reflexive cybernetics that brought together cognition 
and living properly, consciousness with attending to one’s environment: “We 
might say that in creative art man must experience himself—his total self—as a 
cybernetic model.” 
 
Reflexivity from Cybernetics 
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N. Katherine Hayles argued that since the turn of the 20th century there 
emerged a revolution in modern thought that she thought was represented by a 
“field theory” worldview replacing one based on teleology, simple cause and 
effect, and the knowability of the universe—in a word, objectivism.285 In place 
now are what she identified as the new heuristics for perceiving ourselves and 
our environments as caught up in “‘cosmic dance," a "network of events,'' and an 
"energy field.’”286 A foundational characteristic of the field worldview, one that 
Hayles believed is shared by modern scientific and humanistic (literary) thought, 
is the enduring problem of the external, outside observer based on the modern 
emergence of self-referentiality. On the self-referentiality of language existing 
within a field Hayles claimed, 
Because everything, in the field view, is connected to everything else by 
means of the mediating field, the autonomy assigned to individual events 
by language is illusory. When the field is seen to be inseparable from 
language, 
the situation becomes even more complex, for then every statement 
potentially refers to every other statement, including itself.287 
 
At heart of the issue with the field worldview is the problem of knowledge, but it is 
a twofold problem because in a field an individual loses both knowledge of an 
observed object as well as self-knowledge because of the self-reference that 
makes identity dependent on the outside, on the object before the fact of 
identification.  
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 The power of Hayles’ argument, now over 25 years old, is her observation 
that through the concept of self-referentiality, what she will later write on as 
reflexivity in observation in her book on cybernetics and the posthuman, we can 
see a general isomorphism between science and the humanities. Whether one’s 
object is Goethe’s poetry or Einstein’s Theory of Relativity, or “Godel's 
theorem288 or 
Gravity's Rainbow, self-referentiality is a crucial issue."289 Hayles later defined 
reflexivity as the refinement of self-referentiality seen in cybernetics. It was, 
 the movement whereby that which has been used to generate a system is 
made, through a changed perspective, to become part of the system it 
generates.290  
 
Taken together we can see that humanistic and scientific thought, most recently 
through self-referentiality or reflexivity, shift their perspective in similar if not 
complementary ways.  
This definition of reflexivity has much in common with some of the most 
influential and provocative recent work in critical theory, cultural studies, 
and the social studies of science. Typically, these works make the 
reflexive move of showing that an attribute previously considered to have 
emerged from a set of preexisting conditions is in fact used to generate 
the conditions… It is only a slight exaggeration to say that contemporary 
critical theory is produced by the reflexivity that it also produces (an 
observation that is, of course, also reflexive)291. 
 
Hayles’ comparative work here on literature and sciences pushes us to 
entertain the notion that despite their disciplinary concerns and historically 
                                                
288 Kurt Godel’s mathematical “incompleteness theorem” or theory of non-computability of things 
in the universe. 
289 Hayles, The Cosmic Web, 41. 
290 Hayles, How We Became Posthuman, 8. 
291 Ibid. 9. 
   137 
 
constructed “two cultures,”292 the humanities and sciences are interacting parts of 
a single, much larger conceptual field. Take as an example Marshall McLuhan’s 
contribution to the transformation of Literary Studies and the development of 
Media Studies. His affinity for complexity and information as derived from the 
sciences are strong, and particularly he read “critically, but avidly,” cybernetic 
literature in the 1950’s and,  
Could almost instantaneously intuit the relevance of Norbert Wiener’s and 
C.E. Shannon and W. Weaver’s ideas about cybernetics and systems 
theory in the light of modernist art, literature, poetics, aesthetic theory, and 
cultural production.293 
 
 McLuhan’s innovation in historical method was what he called a “mosaic or field 
approach” to historiography. 
Such a mosaic image of numerous data and quotations in evidence offers 
the only practical means of revealing causal operations in history. 
The alternative procedure would be to offer a series of views of fixed 
relationships in pictorial space. Thus the galaxy or constellation of events 
upon which the present study concentrates is itself a mosaic of perpetually 
interacting forms that have undergone kaleidoscopic transformation 
particularly in our own time.294  
 
Importantly Hayles too lands on the concept of a kaleidoscope to explain 
the movements and communications between objects in field, noting that while 
as observers we try to stop the kaleidoscopic movements in order to see pattern 
that by doing so we lose the, “dynamic essence of the dance, for the static 
"patterns" never in fact existed as discrete entities…”295 within the field.  
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As another example we can hold up the similar conception shared 
between Norbert Wiener and Marshall McLuhan during the time when 
information and cybernetic theories emerged. Ten years before Understanding 
Media was published, Norbert Wiener wrote that the “organism is the message.” 
The lexical resemblance to McLuhan’s “the medium is the message” illustrates 
the same shape in thought they each had produced regarding new forms of 
technological communication. Neither organism or medium stood in as 
metaphors for communicative figures such as message, content, or information, 
but rather were identical to them, having the same communicative capacities as 
language and thought.  
Wiener was writing profusely and in philosophical terms about something 
he recognized was, to use Michel Foucault’s words, neither good nor bad, but 
dangerous.296 His intention, as N. Katherine Hayles has commented, was to 
utilize that danger in the service of liberal humanism, to “enhance rather than 
subvert human freedom.”297 Marshall McLuhan in the same way theorized in 
response to the danger that had exploded literary form, the electronic medium. 
The cybernetic organism and the (electronic) medium, these became of singular 
importance to Wiener and McLuhan and shaped their thoughts as a continual 
vacillation between their liberal humanist commitments and what they observed 
as radical in the tendencies of modern machines. On the one hand, McLuhan 
spoke publically about the end of humanity through technologically determined 
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catastrophe. On the other, he heralded an electrified and totally automated 
society, his global village, concluding that any panic about automation was 
merely a product of our previous mechanical media bias, a bias and worldview 
that, “was now past.”298  
 I highlight the similar danger perceived by Wiener and McLuhan in order 
to reframe the picture of reflexivity emerging from the sciences and most 
explicitly in cybernetics. Largely reflexivity in scientific observation, to the extent 
that it provided a “powerful critique of objectivist epistemology,”299 has seemed to 
remain in the realm of epistemology, shifting from simplistic and erroneous 
formulations to more complex and valid observations. However, with the critical 
humanities the figure of reflexivity has been deployed explicitly for the dynamics 
of power engendered by objectivity in science, such is the “deadly fantasy 
identified by feminists and others” as Donna Haraway noted, in “objectivity 
doctrines in the service of hierarchical and positivist orderings”300 that ultimately 
route back to “white capitalist patriarchy.”301 Or, as Hayles noted of feminist 
science scholars, the posthuman occurs when critics replace substitute old 
concepts with new ones, emergence instead of teleology, reflexivity instead of 
objectivism, and distributed cognition instead of autonomous human will.302 What 
soon gets replaced are not epistemological concepts but rather ethico-political 
ones. To use Hayles’ example, with the posthuman,  
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 a dynamic partnership between humans and intelligent machines replaces 
the liberal humanist subject's manifest destiny to dominate and control 
nature.303  
 
The crucial point is that looking more closely at cybernetics while analyzing it 
within the same epistemological field as the critical humanities produces two 
results. One, it becomes clear that reflexivity, what in cybernetics is called 2nd 
order observation or placing the observer within the system it observes, was 
deployed expressly with an ethical science in mind. Two, beyond the intentions of 
the cyberneticians I discuss, the move of the observer into the system has the 
result of producing not just a self-reflexive observer but one that self-monitors 
and self-regulates—in short a subject that actively works on itself given its 
connection to system and other.  
Heinz Von Foerster 
 Heinz Von Foerster named 2nd order cybernetics as a therapy for a 
perpetual blind spot in the West’s “problem solving conceptual apparatus.” He 
called the blind spot a 2nd order blind spot because, “we do not see that we do 
not see” particular phenomena or we are not aware of having any deficiency that 
blinds us in presence of particular events. This is due to the fact that if something 
cannot be explained by causation or deduction—if we cannot show a cause or 
provide a reason for it, if we cannot readily explain something—then “we don’t 
wish to see it.”304 The root of this blind spot that was twice removed was the 
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tradition of objectivity, or the proposition that “the properties of the observer shall 
not enter the description of his observations.”305 
Instead Von Foerster sought to ask, “what are the properties of an 
observer” and include the results of the inquiry in the system; description of 
observer together with object or system observed. Adding another layer to his 
description of 2nd order cybernetics Foerster spoke in terms of the observer 
needing to “account for his accounting” in other words to be responsible not just 
for observing but for stating or producing language.306 Thus he added an 
important element to the binary of observer/observer or if you will subject/object. 
Language would be the third term that would make observation a necessary and 
interrelated triad. Observers (not subjects and objects), their language, and the 
“society” that forms on account of their language. None of the three exist before 
or after the others, and you need all three to have all three. Thus Von Foerster, to 
the extent he believes cybernetics is a therapy to objectivism, shifts its cure from 
the epistemological to the social. 
From this it appears to be clear that social cybernetics must be a second 
order cybernetics—a cybernetics of cybernetics—in order that the 
observer who enters the system shall be allowed to stipulate his own 
purpose: he is autonomous. If we fail to do so somebody else will 
determine a purpose for us. Moreover, if we fail to do so, we shall provide 
the excuses for those who want to transfer the responsibility for their own 
actions to somebody else: “I am not responsible for my actions; I just obey 
orders.” Finally, if we fail to recognize autonomy of each, we may turn into 
a society that attempts to honor commitments and forgets about its 
responsibilities.307 
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Von Foerster emphasized here the role of the observer that enters the material 
system and then “must” be allowed to contribute to its autonomy, to self govern. 
At this point Von Foerster took the legacy of scientific epistemology that had 
conceived of the self-regulating organism and constructs an ethical proposition 
for such autonomous acting agents in what he calls the “responsibility operation.” 
In reflecting, just before he died, on his work, Von Foerster expounded on a 
statement by one of his favorite philosophers, Wittgenstein, that “it is clear that 
ethics cannot be voiced.”  
If I begin to put ethics into words, I will be moralizing, well, and then ethics 
becomes a moral sermon…If I’m preaching morals, I’m always saying to 
others: You must do this, or you may do that…Ethics on the other hand 
doesn’t refer to the other but to one’s self. I must do this, I should do that, 
and so forth…308 
 
Margaret Mead was one of the first anthropologists to conceive of and 
advocate for a meta-theory of anthropological theory—a way to reflect on 
identity, authority, and responsibility for the production of its work.  
“When it comes to the ethics and politics of their discipline,” Margaret 
Mead wrote in 1978, “anthropologiests have shown themselves to be 
extraordinarily incapable of applying the principles of their own discipline 
to themselves.”309 
 
She had been thinking precisely about the problem of un-reflexive 
disciplinary research for at least 25 years prior to the above statement, and 
reflexivity was the concept she worked throughout to get into the consciousness 
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of Anthropology. To the extent that it lacked a systematic way to self-apply 
ethical principles anthropology was not unique. Mead had expressed similar 
sentiment about some of the very scientists she was working with to produce the 
seminal features of cybernetics at the beginning of the 1950’s. She told a story 
about the founding of the Society for General Systems Theory in 1954 where she 
had proposed that systems theory should be applied to human society. Mead 
spoke of the utter confusion that resulted from the suggestion that a radical new 
scientific concept be turned in on the scientist in a different context.  
When the Society for General Systems Research was formed, I proposed 
that we apply general systems to our society. Nobody knew who I was and 
I was feeling like the little old lady in tennis shoes. I went up at the end of it 
and talked to Ashby, and he said, ‘You mean we should apply our 
principles to ourselves?310 
 
Mead recognized the reflexive character in Norbert Wiener’s work years 
before Heinz Von Foerster introduced his 2nd order observer. In “The Cybernetics 
of Cybernetics,” She proposed that the remnants of Weiner’s theory be put to 
sociopolitical and ethnographic discourse after it clearly had not become “a way 
of thought.”311 Throughout the essay Mead emphasizes the need to integrate 
other disciplines and concepts into cultural theory, from cold war international 
policy, to the then burgeoning field of “ekistics.”   
                                                
310 Stewart Brand, “For God’s Sake Margaret: conversation with Gregory Bateson and Margaret 
Mead,” Downloaded from Project Alice, accessed May 1st 2014, 
http://www.alice.id.tue.nl/index.htm, 
311 Heinz Von Foerster et al. ed. Purposive Systems: proceedings of the first annual  
sumposium of the American society for cybernetics. New York: Spartan Books, 1968, 1. 
 
   144 
 
On the other hand, she saw cybernetics primarily as a communicative 
corrective to “a world of increasing scientific specializations.”312 Above all else, 
Mead called for a concerted empirical effort to “take another step and develop 
ways of thinking about systems that are still bounded but within which there are 
loci of very contrasting degrees of organization and disorganization.”313 She also 
imported the concept of disorganization from cybernetics. In Entropy is 
foregrounded as an object of analysis important for human beings also as noise 
and the potential for disorganization may surround consciousness, subjects, and 
importantly, discourses (or communicative intention).  
An important question is why embrace, as she had for all of her career, 
myriad disciplines of thought, while on the other hand, cautioning against a “sort 
of social metastasis in which there are fragments of formerly highly organized 
behavior which are unsystematically related to each other?”314 The answer was 
that Mead continued to exhibit a strong balancing act in her thought between 
diversity and uniformity, freedom and control, and organization and complexity in 
her conception of human systems. The evolution of social science, the 
“cybernetics of cybernetics,” the next order of observation would, for Mead, have 
to include observation of the social because the cybernetic idea of reflexive 
observation was also the idea that all observation was communicative in nature. 
All observation in the scientific study affected was affected by human sociality or, 
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as Von Foerster argued, because subject, its other, and the system were 
interdependent, “reality=community.”  
In the ashes of cybernetics’ waning popularity and its re-assimilation into 
the specialization of American sciences, it was now to anthropological theory that 
Mead looked as a possible meta-discourse on the dynamics of Anthropology that 
must be able to pull the concept of reflexivity into the field of human action, 
namely culture, and make 2nd order observation a general way of thinking.  
 
The Ethics of Emergence 
 
The attempts to posit an ethics by cyberneticians culminates in the 
concept of emergence. The recent development of emergence shows up most 
prominently in the work of Chilean biologists and philosophers Humberto 
Maturana and Francisco Valera, who are considered 2nd wave cyberneticians. 
Scientists, philosophers, and neo-cyberneticians see the concept as inseparable 
from an ethical understanding of how human beings exist in larger systems. The 
concept of emergence is then picked up not only to theorize what is possible in a 
given human or nonhuman system but the very process of emergence is taken 
as what is preferable or what “should” take place in all systems. Umberto 
Maturana in particular explicitly characterized the emergence of new phenomena 
as a fundamentally ethical act because from his biological perspective of 
autopoiesis a human social system, or society, was merely a sub-set of 
numerous other social systems in the universe. Key to Maturana’s understanding 
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is that the kinds of interactions between individuals within a system define the 
type of society it is. Just as the “science” of cybernetics led Norbert Wiener to the 
prescription that “community=reality,”  
Maturana was led to the conclusion that any individual, human, biological, 
or otherwise, to the extent that it acted as an autonomous agent, was only ever 
realized as such through its “neighborhood relations.”315 Emergence is “ethical” 
where humans are involved because however individual or isolated they may be, 
“constitutively affect” other agents or neighbors.316  Maturana finally got to the 
point where, considering emergence, self-organization, and communication 
between individuals as ethical occurrences—the regulation and diminution of 
such occurrences for the order and organization of the larger system was 
unethical in both biological and social contexts. The call for emergence as 
increasing creativity through a multiplicity of choices led him to conclude that at 
the very least, “a social system is an essentially conservative system.”317 At its 
worst, 
 the spontaneous course of the historical transformation 
of a human society as a unity is towards totalitarianism; this is so because 
 the relations that undergo historical stabilization are those that have to do 
with the stability of the society as a unity in a given medium, and not with 
the well being of its component human beings that may operate as 
observers.318 
 
Maturana’s passage was a socio-political extrapolation, a prescription to keep 
systems of life away from equilibrium and closer to the chaotic state of constant 
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change. Andrew Pickering believed that a worldview open to emergence to “what 
the world has to offer us,” was a choice one could make to be non-modern in 
nature and utilizes materialism and bodies in motion in order to escape 
modernity’s linguistic turn.319 The importance of such an escape was to realize 
first that the “constitutive role” for material reality lay in performance of an agent 
within a system, in “worldly happenings, not in in knowledge.320 As a historian of 
cybernetics Pickering was in full agreement with Von Foerster, Bateson 
Maturana, and others that ultimately ethics was an aesthetic, a techne as art or 
craft that necessarily puts together human and nonhuman agencies in a 
“dance.”321 To the extent that he and the cyberneticians he agrees with are 
“constructivists” it is so that they might help construct an “ontological theatre,” as 
“somehow staging and dramatising configurations and interrelations of human 
and non-human agency.”322 In other words, the possibility for ethics requires this 
“staging” of uncontrolled experiments between human and nonhuman, what I 
have discussed as the virtual modeling of abstract machine systems. This 
machine aesthetic is found in the practices of ergonomics as well, and it is not 
only the observation of but also the participation in such systems that is valued 
as an insight into the novel ways that humans and machines might interact. 
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Conclusion: Continental Thought and Michel Foucault’s Cybernetics as 
pushing beyond Machine Bare Life 
 
 
Recent work by Celine de Fontaine and others have show the strong 
epistemological affinities between French continental thought, particularly 
Structuralism and poststructuralism, and cybernetics of mid 20th century.323 
Jacques Lacan devoted much his 2nd seminar on integrating psychoanalysis with 
cybernetic to understand the “nature of language” and its relationship to the real. 
It has even been suggested that Lacan’s work with mathematics and cybernetics 
resulted in his uncovering of a “cybernetic unconsciousness” in cold war Euro-
American culture whose recognition helped Lacan develop his, “paradoxically 
nonlinguistic view of language, the symbolic order, and the unconscious.”324 
Bernard Dionysius Geoghegan highlighted what he called the “cybernetic 
apparatus,” a historical matrix of cybernetics, information theory, and new 
technical instruments and communication technologies at early mid 20th century. 
He argued that specifically those who study new media and deploy continental 
theory should be aware of their shared history, one that offered 
a repertoire of sources, methods, and perspectives for recognizing how 
this apparatus yoked together the development of “French” theory, media 
studies, informatics, and global science. The appeal of poststructural 
theories within the United States during the 1980s and 1990s owes much 
to this neglected history. Considering recent university-level efforts to 
reconceive the humanities in light of digital media, this revisionist history 
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may prove timely.325 
 
What Geohegan called an apparatus Celine de Fontaine called a 
cybernetic matrix in that, as a  
true matrix of techno-science…[that] made its imprint on the outset of an 
epistemological revolution, the scope of which we are only beginning to 
fully measure.326 
 
She went on to argue that while a rereading of “deconstructionist, 
multitude, rhizome and ‘everything is language’ thinkers” through cybernetics 
seems unnatural to many in the humanities, it sheds new light on the fact that 
many of these French thinkers’ were more influenced by a post-war American, 
not French context. 
In “The End of the Book and the Beginning of Writing,” Jacques Derrida 
took cybernetics as the fundamental break in our way of thinking difference 
through language. He argued that  
whether it has essential limits or not, the entire field covered by the 
cybernetic program will be the field of writing. If the theory of cybernetics is 
by itself to oust a metaphysical all concepts-including the concepts of soul, 
of life, of value, of choice, of memory-which until recently served to 
separate the machine from man,327 
 
And reading Foucault, particularly in Discipline and Punishment one 
senses that in defining power as diffuse, systematic, and fundamentally as an 
apparatus that works on macro and micro levels—that the disciplinary power 
Foucault had in mind was in line with the “Zeitgeist,” of the, “cybernetic rupture” 
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of 20th century.328  
However, I am more interested in the less acknowledged insight that post-
structural attempts at ethics resemble Cybernetician’s own account of subjectivity 
and freedom.  Foucault’s work evolved away from studying power that resembled 
the general understanding of cybernetic control as an instrumental, Cold War 
means of military governance. Instead he began to ask questions about how 
subjects have actively worked to constitute themselves. I argue that his late work 
on subjectivity takes up the concern of what makes up life in all its individual, 
social, and ethical facets. Foucault’s is a holistic conception of life that intersects 
strongly with the vitalist tendency in physiology I have discussed. Fellow 
vitalist/machine theorist Deleuze defended his belief that vitalism was in the 
major understandings of his work explaining that there were two elements of 
vitalism in Foucault. Deleuze’s first point was that in his work on power, “the play 
of forces operates along a line of life and death that is always folding and 
unfolding, tracing out the very limit of thought.”329 Secondly, Deleuze explained 
that later in his work,  
when Foucault finally introduces the theme of "subjectification," it amounts 
essentially to inventing new possibilities of life, as Nietzsche would say, 
to establishing what one may truly call styles of life: here it's a vitalism 
rooted in aesthetics.330 
 
I choose to end with Michel Foucault, who was responsible for opening the 
eyes of many a critical scholar to the workings of biopolitical production. His late 
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work in particular, perceived to be his ethical period or at least his preoccupation 
with ethical practices—that I highlight as keying into an openness that resonates 
with an affirmative biopolitics, a sense of machine life, a different form of 
communication, as well as a theory of subject that resonates strongly with 
Cybernetics.  
It is Foucault’s post-1982 turn to the ancient techniques which marked a 
“care of the self” that is generally agreed as Foucault’s shifting concern with 
Ethics.331 It is generally taken that Foucault’s late work was criticized in a 
reaction, 
now less prevalent with the more extensive publication of Foucault’s 
writings…that his focus on the subject in his later work was a sudden and 
mysterious occurrence and marked a rejection of an earlier radical 
stance.332 
 
To Foucault the task for an ethical philosophy, as Paul Rabinow noted, “is not to 
replace one certitude with another but to cultivate an attention to the conditions 
under which things become “evident,” ceasing to be objects of our attention and 
therefore seemingly fixed, necessary, and unchangeable.333 The task to which 
Foucault put his final research on the ancients was not to map the content of 
their knowledge but rather the forms/structure of their knowledge, which were 
primarily shaped in order to know one’s self and one’s relationship to the self. 
Very much in line with what I have argued as the century long history of 
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cybernetics as a theory of the subject, Rabinow showed that Foucault provided 
both context on why he might turn to the ancients as well as modernity’s 
tendency to trap its perspective with presentism and the error of, “the new.”  
Foucault approvingly invoked Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s definition of the 
task of philosophy, “to never consent to be completely at ease with what 
seems evident to oneself.” What seems so new, if we are attentive, often 
can be seen to have been around, at the back of our minds, at the corner 
of our vision, at the edge of things we almost, but never quite, saw or said. 
“The most fragile of passing moments has its antecedents. There is a 
whole ethics of an alert certitude [evidence] which doesn’t exclude a 
rigorous economy of Truth and Falsity, far from it, but isn’t summed up by 
that economy either.”334 
 
Judith Butler argued that the Final Foucault was determined to conceive of 
subjectivity as a non-identity that was simultaneously unrecognizable at the same 
time that it demanded our recognition.335 In fact, Butler speculated that Foucault’s 
turn to the subject resulted in two late breaking features in his work. His analysis 
of subject intimated a, “Spinozistic presumption that every being seeks to persist 
in its own being…to what will further the cause of its own self preservation and 
self-enhancement.”336 Crucially Butler saw “reflexivity” entering Foucault’s 
account of the subject, as a recognition and attachment to one’s self that 
becomes a, “desire or passion of some kind.”337  
On the one hand Foucault’s subject exhibited this tendency to persist, 
what Spinoza called a conatus unique to each individual—a purpose. On the 
other hand reflexivity was key to subject formation as an attachment to one’s self 
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required an observation and account of what that self was. Purpose and 
reflexivity, the basic tenets of cybernetics were entering Foucault’s work at a 
moment when it began to perform the ancient qualities he unearthed. He wrote 
that an ethics of discomfort was a particular practice of self, both for the journalist 
and philosopher alike, which fought similarly against the “pressure of identity and 
the injunction to break things up” that were both abusive.338 The act of constant 
response and change in the face of these pressures was both a feature of life 
generally but also an important part of observing and critiquing such power 
structures as one subjected to them. Foucault adopted the singular and individual 
act of ethics because while nothing was more arrogant than imposing one’s laws 
on others, “my way of no longer being the same is, by definition, the most 
singular part of what I am.”339  
Buttler’s analysis certainly affirms the above quote and Foucault’s call for 
an “Ethics of Discomfort.” Perhaps it is the case that his foregrounding of the 
ancient subject, despite or even because its political exclusions of women, 
slaves, and most identities that were not a virile masculinity—put both the 
modern subject and the Judeo-Christian subject in a particular discomfort. As 
Foucault admitted he wasn’t holding up the Greeks as a model, perhaps the 
discomfort would lead to something completely new, leaving all three behind in 
history.  
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In On the Genealogy of Ethics: an overview of a work in progress he 
discussed the analysis and possible appropriation of an ancient form of 
subjectivation for either political and/or ethical purposes.  
Among the cultural inventions of mankind there is a treasury of devices, 
techniques, ideas, procedures, and so on, that cannot exactly be 
reactivated but at least constitute, or help to constitute, a certain point of 
view which can be very useful as a tool for analyzing what’s going on 
now—and to change it.340 
 
Foucault worked to unearth a particular ethical practice, a “subjectivation” in the 
ancients that was distinct both from the religious or pastoral construction of self 
that would succeed it as well as the modern subjectivity that would seek to gaze 
upon the other as an object of knowledge. The fundamental ethical process for a 
Judeo-Christian subjectivity, known as asceticism, was/is a “renunciation of the 
self [a]s the essential moment of what enables us to gain access to the other life, 
to the light, to truth and salvation.”341 The Christian ethic of renunciation, which 
took hold of antiquity and Europe, was what Foucault understood as a “trans-
subjectivation,” a change from outside or even an evacuation of existing self in 
favor of a new subjectivity. Instead, the ancient subjectivation he was interested 
in exploring was a conversion as care for existing self. 
I would propose that the conversion of the philosophy of the first centuries 
of our era is not a trans-subjectivation. It is not a way of introducing or 
marking an essential caesura in the subject. Conversion is a long and 
continuous process that I will call a self-subjectivation rather than a trans-
subjectivation.342 
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On the other hand, the Cartesian subject that took hold after the 17th century, if it 
could be considered as an ethic of self in any sense, supplanted the care of the 
self as a maintenance and endeavor, with the certitude of “I think therefore I am.” 
Foucault was well aware of Descartes’ place in the pantheon of modernism and 
sought a way out of the taken-for-grantedness of modern consciousness. He 
recognized that, 
…by putting the self-evidence of the subject’s own existence at the very 
source of access to being, this knowledge of oneself…made the “know 
yourself” into a fundamental means of access to truth.343 
 
The Cartesian version of the self, or cogito or “gnothi seauton (know yourself),”344 
as I discussed earlier that chose mind over body and then the power of 
psychology over physiology, also rejected self-work in favor of a certitude of self 
that sought to work on the objects of the World outside.  
But if the Cartesian approach thus requalified the gnothi seauton, for 
reasons that are fairly easy to isolate, at the same…it played a major part 
in discrediting the principle of care of the self and in excluding it from the 
field of modern philosophical thought.345 
 
In perhaps one of his most explicitly laid out descriptions of his work, which I 
quote at length here, Foucault produced a sentiment that this chapter has 
attempted to echo. Our modern vantage point on crises of power, the political, 
and ethics are nothing new, and the tools for possible solutions may be traced 
through perceived failures, anachronisms, and out of place ideas. This passage 
is, I believe, a testament to how his lectures are greatly informative of Foucault’s 
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struggle to explain his historical projects as ethical projects and as containing an 
inextricable though contradictory link between the ethical and political, referred to 
indirectly by the imperative for a history of the present. 
The theme of return to the self has never been dominant for us as it was 
possible for it to be in the Hellenistic and Roman antiquity. To be sure, 
there is an ethics and also an aesthetics of the self in the sixteenth 
century, which refers explicitly, moreover, to what is found in the Greek 
and Latin authors I am talking about…a whole section of nineteenth 
century thought can be reread as a difficult attempt…to reconstitute an 
ethics and an aesthetics of the self…what I would like to point out is that, 
after all, when today we see the meaning, or rather the almost total 
absence of meaning, given to some nonetheless very familiar expressions 
which continue to permeate our discourse—like getting back to oneself, 
freeing oneself, being oneself, being authentic, etcetera—when we see 
the absence of meaning and thought in all of these expressions we 
employ today, then I do not think we have anything to be proud of in our 
current efforts to reconstitute an ethic of the self…I think we may have to 
suspect that we find it impossible today to constitute an ethic of the self, 
even though it may be an urgent, fundamental, and politically 
indispensible task, if it is true after all that there is no first or final point of 
resistance to political power other than in the relationship one has to 
oneself.346 
  
We see in the passage the trajectory that Foucault led himself by following the 
figure of the individual. Perhaps the figure most indicative of the modern era, the 
individual can organize itself as many things—a single organism, subject, 
consciousness, ego. Whatever the particular identity was, it was irrelevant to 
Foucault in terms of the ethical, which was why he declared that all of our quips 
and contrivances about “oneself” were meaningless. Instead what was true and 
good for the self was never identity but the choices surrounding a self. I suggest 
that it was what choices had been made and what choices a self would make 
available for the future—this was somehow how an individual could be evaluated 
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ethically to Foucault. It was similar motivation away from the modern individual 
that led Von Foerster to declare that the ethical imperative for cybernetics was to, 
“[a]ct always so as to increase the number of choices.” 
I have so far illustrated that the seeds for cybernetics as a theory of 
subject were present in 20th century via cybernetics as well as in 19th century 
political thought and 18th century physiology to varying degrees. They can also 
be found in Foucault’s work on antiquity where the common problem is a theory 
of governance as a self-deployed technique. It is understandable why both 
cyberneticians’ work and Foucault’s have been regularly met with criticism over 
ethical concerns. On the one hand cybernetician’s continued to explore the idea 
that one could design freedom through technology, environment, and policy. On 
the other, Foucault believed so strongly that any organized form of government 
was a disciplinary apparatus imposed on individuals from the outside, that his 
proposal for an ethics leveraged the criticism that he was amoral. There exist, 
“grave misunderstandings” that sees his work as either calling for a return to 
Greek Life, or at worst an ethics based on amoral aestheticism.347  He did 
express his interest in a form of ethics so autonomous and divorced from modern 
governance that it left more questions than answers to how it would be a better 
way.  Foucault wondered if there could be an ethics that was, 
a very strong structure of existence, without any relation with the juridical 
per se, with an authoritarian system, with a disciplinary structure . All that 
is very interesting.348 
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In the sections of his work that most resonate with the cybernetic theory of 
subject, Foucault deemphasizes the metaphysical register of care of the self that 
cares for one’s soul, and instead focuses on the care of the self as “a rule 
coextensive with life.”349 What Foucault unearthed in Marcus Aurelius’ thought as 
a “biotic” or an “art of living” is tantamount to “both an open and oriented 
preparation of the individual for the events of life.” It is also emphasized that the 
art of living as a set of techniques of caring for the self is not like the conquering, 
mastery, or the “triumph over others” in life.  
Rather the maintenance of life is “nothing other than the set of necessary 
and sufficient moves, of necessary and sufficient practices, which will enable us 
to be stronger than anything that may happen in our life.”350 Foucault reiterated 
throughout his late work that he was interested in a subjectivation that neither 
renounced the self or what it knows, nor one that made itself (in the form of the 
mind principally) the object of its knowledge. I argue that in order to answer the 
question of substantially distinguished this ancient model of subject Foucault 
introduced two concepts shared by cybernetics. The first is familiar to those who 
have used Foucault as technique or technology of self and is a shift in 
perspective towards subjectivity that is active, that negotiates power in a 
continual process of self-making. The second concept he has in common with 
cybernetics is teleology or the acting by a subject through time with purpose. 
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 Foucault repeatedly stated in lecture the importance of conceiving of 
subjectivation as a journey, and turns to adopt the metaphor that has been most 
important to cybernetic thought, that of navigation, or steering oneself. The 
metaphor of navigation of the self had four components that made it a “complex, 
both theoretical and practical knowledge, as well as being a conjectural 
knowledge, which is very close, of course, to the knowledge of piloting.”351 These 
four components also resonate with the foundational concepts of Cybernetics 
and reflect well their deployment into a theory of subjectivity. First was the idea of 
the journey, that the movements of change to a subject were “a real movement 
from one point to another.”352 Second, there is the implication that movement 
itself is movement directed towards a particular aim or purpose. These two 
components reflect teleology, or the conception of purposeful action through 
time.  
Third, within the metaphor is the idea that the purpose or point of 
movement of the self is its port, its place of origin or its homeland.353 This 
movement from self to self, and one that Foucault repeatedly describes as a turn 
or return to the self, is in fact a precise understanding of what Hienz Von Foerster 
characterized as the, “partnership in the circularity of observing and 
communicating,”354 the idea that to do the one is to do the other. Reflexivity in 
(2nd order) cybernetics was the including of the observer into observed systems, 
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or the critique of behaviorism by moving empirical focus from observation to the 
observer or subject. Just as Foucault was interested in an ancient self that 
eschewed the Cartesian, objectifying and psychologized modern subject, 
reflexivity of observation in 2nd order cybernetics moved to a powerful critique of 
objectivist epistemology, and the turning towards the self for Foucault will, as I 
discuss later, continue to drive the power of this particular subject.355 Finally, 
within the idea of navigation is that there are external dangers and risks that alter 
your course or “lead you astray,” and because of your experience of those 
dangers your navigation implies a knowledge (savoir), and technique, an art” 
necessary for the undertaking of your voyage.356 
 As Foucault concludes in his lectures on the hermeneutics of the subject,  
the care of the self which was within a practiced “tekhne tou biou” or art and craft 
of living, “became the correlate of a test, an experience, and an exercise.357 That 
is to say that the function or purpose for a care of the self was always strictly 
speaking the maintenance of the human subject, physiologically and socially, in 
response to outside forces acting against that maintenance of subjectivity. 
Echoing Wiener’s “the organism is the message” the continued expression or 
communication of subjectivity through space and time, and against adversity, 
which we can translate as dissolution of subject, or entropy, is the purpose of the 
endeavor to know oneself. Foucault moves even closer to the cybernetic theory 
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of subject when he further explains the process of care of the self as a “reversal 
of the gaze” onto oneself. 
You see then, and I strongly emphasize this, that this demand for a 
reversal of the gaze, as opposed to unhealthy curiosity about others, does 
not lead to the constitution of oneself as an object of analysis, 
decipherment, and reflection. It involves, rather, calling for a teleological 
concentration…358 
 
Foucault characterizes this ancient production of (human) subject, one that he 
would show affinity for in his late work on Paeresia and Truth, as a teleological or 
purposeful. And it seems to me that it is a rather bizarre purpose, one distinctly 
without an End in itself: purpose, not end or finality. For, he continued: 
 We must be aware, permanently aware as it were, of our effort… 
but being always acutely aware of this tension by which we advance 
towards our aim. What separates us from the aim, the distance between 
oneself and the aim, should be the object, once again, not of a 
deciphering knowledge (savoir), but of an awareness, vigilance, and 
attention.359 
 
So the purpose of this subjectivation—in other words not the purpose of the 
subject but the purpose of the production of the subject—was not the aim but the 
distance between self and the aim. To imagine one’s utmost concentration not on 
ends and not on identity (and how to maintain it) but rather on the distance 
between self and perceived end, was in some sense Foucault clamoring for a 
move in his late work, already beyond the machinations of power, beyond now 
the subject as we have known it.   
 It was, I believe, the inherent connections between purposefulness, ethics, 
and a conception of life (in general) unindividuated by knowledge, that compelled 
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both Foucault and Gilles Deleuze to end their scholarly lives, as Giorgio 
Agamben observed, concerned with Life. Although considering the utmost 
urgency he attributed to his teacher and historian of life sciences Georges 
Canguilhem’s work360, as well as his mission statement for his appointment at the 
College De France, it is not surprising that the physiological and biological 
components of life would influence his final work. 
  It is why Foucault, in finally reformulating life to be “that which is capable 
of error, was attempting, again as Agamben observed, to find another major axis, 
“distinct from both knowledge and power” or for that matter from Subject, at least 
as it has largely been theorized, as well.361  
At the center of these problems one finds that of error. For, at the 
most basic level of life, the processes of coding and decoding give way 
to a chance occurrence that, before becoming a disease, a deficiency, 
or a monstrosity, is something like a disturbance in the informative 
system, something like a "mistake."362 
 
This definition dovetailed well into Foucault’s understanding of the entire 
enterprise of Philosophy: the notion that Life continually belies, and short circuits, 
and persists in the face of Truth. Deleuze, who had detailed the plane of 
immanence as constituting what exists both actual and virtual, in somewhat of a 
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reversal, claimed in his last writing that pure immanence is contained within Life, 
or more specifically a Life, that is as Agamben understands it, unattributable life.   
The plane of immanence thus functions as a principle of virtual 
indetermination, in which the vegetative and the animal, the inside and the 
outside and even the organic: and the inorganic, in passing through one 
another, cannot be told apart.363 
 
Foucault not only surmised that the genetic function of life was to provide the 
possibility of erring, he believed this to be an ethical imperative for one’s 
subjectivity. For what, as Paul Rabinow observed, was the quality of error if not 
simply the capability to not remain the same self, the capability of change? 
 "One's way [facon] of no longer remaining the same," he  
wrote, "is, by definition, the most singular part of who I am." However,  
that singularity was never a blanket negation : if one knew in advance  
that everything, including one's self and the current state of affairs, was  
bad, what would there be to learn? What would be the sense of act- 
ing? Why think? A life without the possibility of error would not be  
conceivable. One might say, following Georges Canguilhem, such a life  
would not be alive.364  
 
The strange coupling of the teleological navigation within Foucault’s late work 
and his final understanding of the error of life, stands, I believe, as a fine 
beginning definition of the subjectivity of the machine, but a very particular 
machine. The “non-trivial machine” as Von Foerster defined it, is history 
dependent, analytically undeterminable, and unpredictable. Additionally, non-
trivial machines are the only kind of machine that have ever been.  
I would even say that nothing is predictable. All systems that we isolate 
from the universe are non-trivial systems. Our hope that they are trivial is, 
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looked at carefully, a naïve hope…365 
 
The problem is that humans have always misrecognized the machines that exist, 
complicated and unpredictable, for the kind of machines we want—simple, 
predictable, and controllable. What results from such misrecognition is usually 
violence and loss along with a human response of suspicion to all machines.  
The ethical implication of Foucault’s life as error, Deleuze’s unattributable life, or 
Von Foerster’s non-trivial machine, is seemingly that of mortal danger.  
  For at this moment the most readily available examples of unattributable 
life arise as traumatic anthropomorphisms. Unchecked, unmanageable growth 
goes viral, infects, is contagious, and metastasizes. It is the tendency within our 
own bodies for undifferentiated cellular growth, the cancer that, if not battled, 
produces the severe dissolution of what we know to be a good life. These tropes, 
too, of cancerous growth, or of viral contagion, inform our fearful understanding 
of our technologically connected lives and the prospect of unchecked 
connectivity among machines. Eugene Thacker and Alexander Galloway have 
attributed this danger to the confluence of “language, life, and code.” It is 
software as computing machine language and our sustained attention to 
discourse that sees that language as a threat and “to see communication and 
contagion as inseparable processes.366  
                                                
365 Heinz Von Foerster, The Beginning of Heaven and Earth has no Name (New York: Fordham 
University Press, 2014), 19. 
366 Alexander R. Galloway and Eugene Thacker. "Language, Life, Code." Architectural Design 76, 
no. 5 (2006): 26. 
   165 
 
This is perhaps why Patricia Ticineto Clough speaks with senses of 
urgency and danger about the Affective turn in critical scholarship, all while 
continuing to push beyond language and ideology to those affective and social 
aspects of an agent, “which exceeds all efforts to contain it, even our efforts to 
contain its thought in the affective turn.”367 Her call consistently pushes us 
beyond perceived trauma to face ourselves up to what Gilles Deleuze theorized 
as “life” a, 
frightful non-organic life of things . . . oblivious to the limits and wisdom of 
the organism. . . pre-organic germinality, common to the animate and the 
inanimate, to a matter which raises itself to the point of life, and to a life 
which spreads itself through all matter. (1986: 50–1)368 
 
Again, without being able at this moment to offer a less reductive 
anthropomorphism of good life in mortal conflict with its malignant other, I do 
suggest that, because of the inextricable link in biopower, between life and its 
other, we should persistently complicate the matter further, even at the cost of 
communicating a life form that is in our moment unrecognizable as such. To end 
with Agamben, perhaps the most urgent of biopolitical observers, “Today, 
blessed life is on the same terrain as the biological body of the West.” I would 
add that our machine friend’s body lies just below that.  
The mortal danger is intensified greatly when our attention is turned to 
those situations where the error of human life and the error of machines are put 
together most intimately. The field of engineering that cybernetics birthed, bionics 
                                                
367 Patricia Ticineto Clough, and Jean Halley, The Affective Turn: theorizing the social (Duke 
University Press, 2007), 28. 
368 Patricia Ticineto Clough, "Afterword: the future of affect studies," Body & Society 16, no. 1 
(2010): 227. 
   166 
 
(aka bionical creativity engineering), or the science of modeling technology 
based on the observation of biological life—materially grafts one to the other.  
Also, there has, since mid 20th century, been serious attention paid to 
technological systems where humans and machines mutually communicate, 
react, and adapt to one another. These dangerous scenarios of machine-human 
communication with its potential for error will be the chief concern of the science 
of “proper” interrelationship—Ergonomics, which is the subject of my next 
chapter.  
 
 
Ergonomics or The Study of Human-Machine Affection 
 
I have argued to this point that physiology and cybernetics shared a vitalist 
tendency towards both organisms and matter. In other words the principle 
present in a longstanding history of posthuman thought states that matter in 
general is self-organizing based on its relational interactions with other matter—
systems tend to organize themselves. In what follows I demonstrate that 
ergonomics continues this principle of material agency, though with the additional 
express recognition of affect as the fundamental medium of communication 
between any agents. 
The coverage of ergonomic design in popular media has recently taken on 
a deterministic character. In 2009 the London Museum of Design put together a 
yearlong exhibition celebrating Ergonomics, or as it describes, the “science of 
everyday life,” which both the Guardian and BBC reported on as the essential 
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ways that ergonomics designs and shapes our “daily lives.” Designers, 
advertisers, and manufacturers agree on a peculiar truism, that you can have too 
much a good thing insofar as ergonomic design. Even good ergonomic design, 
moreover, can be a bad thing for business. As Dick Powell, the designer that 
created the first “ergonomic” bra in the 90’s, complained that  
there's more than enough ergonomics being applied. It's frustrating when 
the ergonomists tell you it's not enough. We usually design things to be 
produced in millions, and something has to give…369 
 
The business side of the production of work machines has a naturally 
antagonistic relationship to ergonomics because ergonomics has generally 
appeared in the form of regulations and penalties levied on business practices 
and increased premiums based on workers’ compensation. Ergonomics allegedly 
goes too far in its capacities to impinge on free market decisions, pitting the 
market against the well being of the worker. It took more than 40 years for the 
field to gain national recognition for its successful interventions into on the job 
trauma and its worker safety recommendations beginning in the 1990’s. The 
passing of the Americans with Disabilities Act in 1990 was a key moment that 
opened up workspaces and machinery to evaluation and government authorized 
recommendation by ergonomists.  
By 1992 the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) had 
drafted its, “Ergonomics Program Management Recommendations for General 
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Industry.”370 OSHA, itself put into legislation in 1970, was talked about by 
ergonomicists as both being a law for general well-being of workers that was 
ahead of its time and one that seemed likely to fail in its effectiveness.371 In 
January of 2001, OSHA’s, “Ergonomics Program Standard went into effect, with 
the aim of protecting approximately 27.3 million employees from musculoskeletal 
disorders (MSDs).”372 It was the closest that government oversight had ever 
come to an ergonomic perspective on labor conditions, and it took less than 7 
weeks for it to be repealed by congress under pressure from business leaders 
and the national insurance lobby.373 More recently, Michigan became the first 
state to put a statewide ban on ergonomic regulations in order to help business 
and job growth.  
There is an alarmist online story at Fastcodesign.com called, “How 
Everyday Ergonomics Shape Your Behavior.” Fast Company is a magazine and 
web site that describes itself as  
the world's leading progressive business media brand, with a unique 
editorial focus on innovation in technology, ethonomics (ethical 
economics), leadership, and design.374 
 
The story begins with another provocative insight provided by Charles Darwin 
over 100 years ago in, “The Expression of Emotions in Man and Animals,” where 
he concludes that, “the free expression by outward signs of an emotion 
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intensifies it.”375 This recurring theme of my study is echoed here in the power of 
external expression, namely the expressions of the body free or in excess of 
psychic control. The article explains this insight as one of physiology, that our 
physical and physiological actions to the outside environment influence and 
intensify what we think and feel “inside.” It then goes on to argue that 
ergonomists have been designing many of our external environments for 
decades. Additionally, everyday or incidental ergonomics, those design elements 
we may not be conscious of, affect our behaviors in unintended and not 
necessarily good ways. Interviewing a psychologist whose recent work 
investigates ergonomics’ relationship to unethical behavior in humans, the article 
concludes with a vague cautionary as an insight into the moral quandaries of 
design, highlighting the longstanding ergonomic hypothesis that humans not only 
have an ecological/symbiotic connection to things in their environment but also 
do not have the control over their psychology or behavior that they believe that 
they do.  
What emerge from these and other headlines are two interrelated ideas 
about how ergonomics influences, shapes, and engenders human behavior. 
One, on a societal level its design principles can inhibit business interests and 
“impede job growth” as Michigan Governor Rick Snyder claimed after putting into 
law a ban against ergonomics rules in local companies.376 Also on societal level 
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ergonomics influences workers’ behavior and actions towards predesigned ideas 
about healthy, efficient, and economical labor. This results from machines and 
equipment designed with concerns for musculoskeletal effects from sedentary 
jobs, physiological stress caused by repetitive motions, as well as workers 
coming to a job who are differently enabled. As I discussed earlier, this notion of 
large-scale design to improve ethics, culture or the health of a population has 
serious consequences for American notions of freedom, creativity, and 
individuality. 
 The second idea now emerging about ergonomics is that, given that 
ergonomic design determines behavior through and with machines, ergonomics 
takes on a pedagogical role for individuals seeking to improve certain areas of 
their lives. Phrases such as “whole life ergonomics” and “everyday” ergonomics 
suggest a kind of ubiquity to the designed machines and spaces that affect us 
and also that the science of ergonomics can itself become a set of technologies 
by which we may negotiate and understand ourselves outside of official “work”. It 
is this emerging notion that ergonomics, beyond an academic and industrial field 
that studies humans and machines, can be thought of as a set of technologies of 
self for individuals as they become more aware of the important ways that they 
interact with all sorts of machines.  
Amy Cuddy, who coauthored, “The Ergonomics of Dishonesty: The Effect 
of Incidental Posture on Stealing, Cheating, and Traffic Violations,” in the journal 
Psychological Science, has recently taken her knowledge of ergonomics’ power 
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to the marketplace. At TED talks and other business organization events she has 
argued that an ergonomic understanding of your posture in public can bring you 
success in career and happiness in life. She has introduced “Power Poses” as a 
sort of ergonomic technique for asserting individuality through physical 
movement and posturing. Cuddy, as the creator of Power Posing claims, “I want 
to help people feel as powerful as they can feel.” This underscores well the 
precarious standing of ergonomics as a field of knowledge and practicable skill. 
Ergonomics is already being used on an individual level as a set of techniques to 
alter someone’s psychology and physiology. There is an intuitively felt power to 
ergonomics, to what it tells us about our behavior and to the ways we will change 
our actions based on that knowledge.  
 
Ergonomics and Media Studies 
 I believe that my study of ergonomics will shed light on its role as both a 
theory of good design for the health of a population as well as its more recent 
status as a set of technologies of the self for individuals to direct their own lives. 
The idea of individuals actively involved in a set of ergonomic technologies is a 
continuation of my discussion of governmentality and technologies of self in the 
cybernetics chapter. Additionally, the lineage of thought informing ergonomics 
will illustrate just how long individuals have worked on the idea that humans 
coevolve with technologies and distribute both their cognition and affect with 
machines. Ergonomics provides an example of mediation on a bodily and 
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affective level showing what mediation through machines does to human beings 
rather than what it means or represents to them. For Grusin the study of affect 
led to an entirely different theory of media.  
 Affectivity helps shift the focus from representation to mediation, 
deploying an ontological model that refuses the dualism built 
into the concept of representation. Affectivity …refuses what Bruno Latour 
has characterized as the modern divide, variously understood in terms of 
such fundamental oppositions as those between human and non-human, 
mind and the world, culture and nature, or civilization and savagery 
(Latour, 1993).377 
 
Ergonomics followed the thread of affectivity through vitalism in physiology and 
through the open systems and ethics as aesthetic that cybernetics had to offer. It 
also follows a critical trend that I have discussed as a critic looking to non-
modern solutions and ways of thinking through modern problems. In his latest 
book Alexander Galloway engages again in this sort of ancient parsing of modern 
conceptual problems.  
 
Donna Haraway observed years ago that the modern First World had 
undergone an epistemological and political alteration to many previously fixed or 
naturalized categories—and she described this shift as an “informatics of 
domination.”378 Importantly she stated that where there existed before an 
“organic division of labour” there was now in its place an “ergonomics/cybernetics 
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of labour” and where there had existed a notion of (human) labour there was now 
robotics.379  
I bring Haraway’s analysis to attention in order to first suggest that it was 
less a description of the moment in which she was writing and more a 
prognostication that inextricably links the future of machines to the history of the 
digital through the profusion of information or binary code. I also like to point out 
that neither cybernetics nor ergonomics need be limited to the their historical 
status as “coded by C3I, command-control-communication-intelligence”380 and 
that just as I illustrated earlier with cybernetic theories of machine subject, so to 
with ergonomics there emerged a practice of human machine research that, 
unlike Haraway’s prognostication, did not pit the organism against the machine in 
a “border war” and that, very much in the spirit that she suggests, ergonomics 
has to various extents taken “pleasure in the confusion of boundaries” between 
humans and machines and has also adopted a “responsibility” in their 
constructions. 
Through the intellectual threads of physiology and cybernetics I have 
attempted to carefully reconsider the links between their machine-theories and 
their later integration into ergonomics as a posthuman complex.  After reading 
dozens of attempts to systematically define the field, I believe that there is no 
strong contradiction or differing opinion on a basic guiding principle—that 
ergonomics aim is to fit technologies to human beings. This sensibility does not 
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base its use of machines on instrumental rationality nor an efficient process 
calculated by measuring profit margin to paid labor cost.  
As such my analysis separates an integrated and holistic ergonomics from 
the very narrow conception of it as a form of technoscience. Haraway described 
it as on the one hand a historical change in biological science under the auspices 
of biocapital production.  On the other hand it was an information/systems 
approach shift based on a communications technological revolution that  
changed the strategy of control from organism to system, from eugenics to 
population management, from personnel management to organization 
structures (sociotechnical systems and ergonomics) based on operations 
research (Lilienfeld, 1978, ch. 4).381 
 
The problem with ergonomics from this perspective is exactly the same problem 
with cybernetics as members in a group of “bogeyman” theories. Through 
biocapitalist production, what Haraway calls the “biopolitics of postmodern 
bodies”382 the epistemology and empirical methods of particular sciences reduce 
into simplistic programs for governing bodies and subjects. In order to 
disarticulate ergonomics from such a characterization this chapter makes two 
basic points regarding its development. 1) I complicate its history by showing that 
since its first use in the 1857 ergonomics has been highly influenced by a utopic 
thought that is reformist, progressive, and liberalist in character. 2) My chapter 
shows that this liberal humanist tendency in ergonomists’ thought coexisted 
alongside the foundational use of cybernetics and system theories that at the 
same time fundamentally altered the idea of what humans were in relation to 
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machines. With these together ergonomics provides a powerful way of materially 
and empirically better understanding human and machine affect. From this point 
on when I refer to an “ergonomic” perspective I am referring to the above 
description.  
 
Ergonomics Defined and seeds of Humanism 
KHF Murrell coined Ergonomics in England as the science of “man in his 
working environment.” It was a field that owed its emergence to WWII and the 
subsequent powerful belief in the West that an intricate relationship between 
Scientific thought and the technology it produced, if let to flourish, could prevent 
Fascism and fundamentally better humankind.383  HFE research flourished during 
this high moment of techno-science in the West, or the conflation of science and 
technology based on the singular belief in their powers to alter reality (physical, 
political, ethical). Murrell was attempting to create a multidisciplinary group 
whose sole purpose was based on the most basic principles of “human 
research”, “health” and “the good.” What had been the “Human Research group” 
became the Ergonomics Society and quickly shifted its scope beyond merely 
conditions of the work environment and beyond as well designing machines of 
war and of the factory. To its earliest 20th century proponent Murrell, Ergonomics 
developed the first principle of the machine where it and the human operator 
were parts of a larger system,  
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To achieve maximum efficiency a man-machine system must be designed 
as a whole, with the man being complementary to the machine and the 
machine being complementary to the abilities of man.384 
 
From the inaugural issue of “Human Factors: the journal of human factors 
society of America” in 1958: 
In this study [of human factors] in which cross-fertilization between life 
sciences and engineering is encouraged, the human factor is considered 
in relation to the machines and environments in which man works and 
plays…the ultimate aim…is toward the optimal utilization of human and 
machine capabilities to archive the highest degree of effectiveness of the 
total system.385 (Morehouse 1958, 1) 
 
More recently, the 1989 preamble to the Human Factors and Ergonomics Society 
code of ethics defines its work thusly:   
The Human Factors and Ergonomics Society is dedicated to the 
betterment of humankind through the scientific inquiry into and application 
of those principles that relate to the interface of humans with their natural, 
residential, recreational, and vocational environments and the procedures, 
practices, and design considerations that increase a human's performance 
and safety at those interfaces.386 
 
Between the end of the 1960’s and the beginning of the 1970’s developed an 
explicit liberal humanist philosophy, one that put ergonomists in a long lineage of 
scientists deploying radically anti-anthropocentric theories. This would lead to the 
problematization of many cold war uses of statistics and measurement for the 
control of closed systems of human beings and technology. 
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I am for the measurement, description, prediction, and control of human 
behavior. But I am concerned as to where that control will reside. 
Obviously, I want as much of that control as possible to reside with the 
individual.387 
 
This concern illustrates the development of a philosophical view of ergonomics 
which sought, against statisticization of processes, to see the human being not 
as an error but as a creative problem solving component of an open and less 
uniform human machine system.388 Thus, from the perspective of designing a 
system conducive to this human role, the ergonomist was called upon to be 
“empathetic” as an observer and as a decision maker. Crucially, in ergonomics 
this human centric philosophy was unproblematically put to work alongside 
systems and cybernetic theories, those that, as I go on to argue, provided very 
similar creative and reflexive qualities to nonhuman organisms.  
After reading the above and dozens of other attempts to systematically 
define the field, I believe that there is no strong contradiction or differing opinion 
on a basic guiding principle—that ergonomics aim was and is to fit technologies 
to human beings. Like cybernetics, ergonomics and its radical conception of 
humans and machines provided the possibility for multiple, intense re-
articulations of a humanist-human figure back into its technological systems. All 
of this produced, as I argued in chapter 2, a feedback mechanism whereby the 
radical nature of cybernetics and systems theories produced the humanist desire 
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for an ethical reframing of technologies towards increased freedom and quality of 
life for human beings.  
 
Part 2: Ergonomics a Subjugated Knowledge of Work Science 
 
 In a sense ergonomics represents not an evolution in bio-techno-capital, 
but is rather an example of a subjugated knowledge based on its 
problematizations of Capitalist interests’ bottom line. We can see this in the 
recent past of ergonomics and its embattled position between American 
Business and the Federal Government.  
Just as physiologists had taken it up in the last decades of the 19th 
century, ergonomists were largely concerned with the idea of human fatigue both 
as a physical and psychological straining of the worker. And just as physiologists 
had assumed to build industrial machines that would adapt to the optimal 
function of human anatomy, ergonomists sought as a founding principle to “fit the 
job to the man.” This philosophy of adapting work environments to the 
indulgences of laborer well being was not the answer that Frederick Taylor and 
American work science were satisfied with at the turn of the century, nor was it 
again after 1945 when Fordist accumulation had come to fruition.  
As David Harvey pointed out, Ford’s innovations did not lie in the 
technological and scientific processes of his factories, those he simply inherited 
from Frederick Taylor and the movement of science management from the turn 
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of the 20th century.389 Harvey here built upon Antonio Gramsci’s mechanistic 
linking of Fordism to its predecessor Taylorism, with no change in the 
“puritanical” sensibility toward the worker that from a technological sense 
reduced work to only its physical-physiological processes and from the human 
standpoint put the workers in an ascetic relationship to their labor. Ford thus 
continued the divestment of the “spirituality” of the worker, the worker’s 
relationship to art, her role as “demiurge”—in a word, the humanism in labor.390  
 The break in this line from Taylor to Ford that ergonomics produced, 
worked beneath its explicit concerns with the “optimization” of workers and 
machines productivity, and despite its attribution of its methodology to the 
science of work before it. Implicit in the research principle to fit the job to the 
worker was the basic interest to empirically understand how, “technological 
development can produce effects on operatives which may not always be 
foreseen.”391 This marks the beginning of the philosophy of ergonomics in its 
literature that frames technology’s influence on human’s users in terms of 
registers unknown or even non-conscious to humans. It is a point I will return to 
at the conclusion of the chapter that ergonomics is a serious attempt at the 
empirical study of affection that technology is responsible for in humans, and the 
attempt to locate the human factor in the machine is an attempt to trace the 
reciprocity of affect that humans return in their design of machines. The 
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importance of affection and its reciprocal nature between them is what will lead 
the most contemporary ergonomics to study non-economical forms of 
labor/leisure practices like symbiosis, sensuality (Kansei) or happiness produced 
between humans and machines. 
 However, on a more concrete level ergonomics did not provide the change 
or answers sought by Fordist technological innovation to Taylorist work 
conditions. For example, managers and work experts both relied on any and all 
scientific findings pointing to psychological and physical pacification of workers 
and their acceptance of a production system in the assembly line that 
 rested so heavily upon the socialization of the worker to 
long hours of purely routinized labour, demanding little in the way of 
traditional craft skills, and conceding almost negligible control to the 
worker over the design, pace, and scheduling of the production 
process.392 
 
Along with the deskilling of labor, or as Gramsci argued, taking the intimate 
relation between art/craft and labor, the importance of this Fordist technology 
was in the dynamic it established whereby the industrial machine “trained” or led 
the direction and rapidity of movement of the human operator—this was the 
functional essence of what Ford had invented, the automated conveyor belt. 
Ergonomist Murrell called this “machine pacing,” in his brief tome “Men and 
Machines.”393 In his concluding section, “Machines controlling Men,” the pacing 
of the worker, or the inducing of the worker by mechanism to “work at a rate of 
his/her choosing,” had results for productivity that were “difficult to interpret and 
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compare.”394 Murrell discussed a general industrial philosophy that forcing a 
worker to work at the accelerated rate of a machine will cause the worker to 
adapt to its productivity over time. Two aspects of Murrell’s philosophy are 
especially significant. 1) Murrell’s analysis of this (managerial) practice is 
complicated, expressed largely through numbers, and provides answers by way 
of maintaining that context and individual characteristics matter. 2) His analysis 
began with the assertion that machine pacing does not lead to the desired 
productivity. Machine pacing, leading, or governing of the human worker was 
antithetical to the project of ergonomics as Murrell saw it. Not only was it an 
instance of the modernization of work that fit the man to his job. It also neglected 
one half of the entire man-machine system, it neglected to see the two as 
communicating with one another. Murrell would continue to stress the wholeness 
of the human-machine system as well as the necessity of a relation of equity 
within it. As in cybernetics,  
[f]or effective communication, perhaps there can be no master. Both 
sender and receiver must have arrived at a basic agreement on the 
meaning of the terms and their codes…395 
 
Murrell designed ergonomics in order to, “advance the ability of men and 
machines to communicate with one another.”396  
 
Humanism, Progressivism in Ergonomics  
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It is not surprising that the first strong interest in Hywel Murrell’s work 
came first from the Navigators of the British Royal Army, given that it was almost 
immediately apparent in his writings that he was trying to develop a theory of 
work based on humans and machines with the skills to self-navigate as they 
worked. The navigation of one’s individual labor between an external 
environment of government and the internal necessity of comfort or health would 
be the driving problematic for his development of ergonomic theory, and his 
guiding principles would vacillate between progressive era humanism and the 
insights of cybernetics and systems theory. Murrell’s suggested ergonomics 
stands first and foremost as a particular response to and shift away from the 
work of Frederick Taylor, whose scientific management I have previously 
discussed.   
Interestingly Hywel Murrell identified not as an Ergonomist but a 
psychologist and took the study of humans and machines, seemingly on the 
surface to be largely the work of the psychology.397 This also is not at all 
surprising, as it indicates the dominance of psychological study in industrial 
contexts since the turn of the 20th century and the rise of scientific management 
specifically as Friedrich Taylor envisioned it. As already discussed, Physiological 
theory dictated answers to problems of fatigue and efficiency that industrialists 
and factory owners had no use for in their bottom line of cheap, adaptable human 
labor. The psychologist rationalization was that physiological processes were at 
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best partially accounting and at worst mere symptoms of mental “performance 
capacity.” This new industrial buzzword arising from scientific management, “was 
primarily a psychological phenomenon and must be studied from the perspective 
of psychology…”398  
The emphasis on psychology implied ultimate ergonomic interest in the 
“why” of human labor, which lead to certain of the key concepts of study like 
motivation, desire, annoyance, and attention. This is largely a matter of the 
enormous industrial interest and pressure exerted on ergonomics by owners, 
industrial investors, and other capitalist interests. In fact it is not an exaggeration 
to claim that the emergence of ergonomics depended almost entirely on two 
vested interests, the WWII British military and the continued interests in an 
efficient labor force in industry.  
As Chunglin Kwa observed, 1945 marks a watershed in the development 
of sciences insofar as government support, particularly its military arm, of 
ostensibly “basic science” or discovery—jumped to unprecedented levels.399  
Those who recall the 1945-1970 period as the golden age of unfettered, 
pure research, or as the age of scholarship in the ivory tower, are 
overlooking the stunning extent to which academic science relied on 
defense contracts and fed into military programs.400 
 
While psychology shared a much smaller piece of the WWII and post war pie 
than physics, its military and industrial support began much earlier in the form of 
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the Galtonian paradigm of applied psychology, or statistical comparison of 
individual to population, throughout Europe and the U.S.401  
Murrell did not come from the standpoint of pushing the necessity of 
psychological measurement of aptitude, intelligence, or skill. Rather, he as much 
as admitted that it was the industrial dynamic between workers and managers, 
not the processes of labor, that was the relationship necessitating the 
psychologist in his more social writings.  
The main problem between managers and workers is the division of the 
surplus accruing from their efforts, that is, how much goes in dividends 
and how much goes in increased pay. Both sides argue over this 
and gradually they come to look upon each other as antagonists 
and at times even as enemies.402 
 
From the standpoint of psychology and its idealistic deployment in the work 
setting, Murrell shared the idea of the “mental revolution” that Fredrick Taylor 
espoused before a senate committee. This was at best the idealistic desire by 
managers and owners to change the hearts and minds of their labor, and at 
worst a disingenuous claim by Taylor and others to veil their base line desire for 
optimal profit from minimal investment in labor.  
Though general consensus is that modern ergonomics emerged directly 
from the “work studies” of scientific management403 and that Fredrick Taylor 
stands as a precursor to ergonomic study, Murrell provided a very different 
understanding of Taylor’s discipline. In his placement of Taylor in the history of 
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the study of work, Murrell actually strongly defended Taylor’s management 
science. In assessing the then fashionable act “to belittle Taylor's activities and to 
decry his psychology…” Murrell concluded that much of Taylor’s ideas had been 
the victims of misapplication and that to some extent the man himself had been 
scapegoated.404 
As unsightly as Murrell’s apologism for Taylor may seem, it is however, 
productive to show the actual juxtaposition in Murrell’s own ideas about labor, 
class, and worker manager relationships. For he inherited a sensibility opposed 
to Taylor’s contribution to an efficiency movement void of a politics of quality of 
life. As Antonio Gramsci described, 
Taylor is in fact expressing with brutal cynicism the purpose of American 
society-developing in the worker to the highest degree automatic and 
mechanical attitudes, breaking up the old psycho-physical nexus of 
qualified professional work, which demands a certain active participation 
of intelligence, fantasy and initiative on the part of the worker, and 
reducing productive operations exclusively to the mechanical, physical 
aspect.405 
 
Where Taylor depended wholly on strategies of motivation that governed workers 
both punitively and with incentives, what Murrell surmised was the entire history 
of the “carrot and the stick” of management, Murrell claimed to be seeking a third 
way.  
Whether or not there is scientific validity in Theory X or Theory Y, it is an 
inescapable fact that the carrot-and-stick type of management no longer 
works and that an alternative, whether you call it Theory Y or anything 
else, has got to be found.406 
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There is quite a provocative discussion of individual versus group or “class” 
running through Murrell’s work. In his book on “Motivation at Work,” Murrell 
expressed an interesting opinion apropos the development of industrial 
psychology, Fredrick Taylor, and the “management” of human laborers. It bears a 
resemblance to Norbert Wiener’s admission that part of his reasoning for working 
on cybernetics as a new paradigm was in order to produce a society “based on 
human values other than buying or selling.”407 Ultimately, it was not the validity of 
theories of psychology but rather, “the real determinates of managerial practice 
were the social, political, and economic climates of the period.”408 This is the first 
sense in which Murrell breaks away from Taylor’s trajectory toward behaviorism, 
the efficiency movement, and the assumption that the worker was nothing but “‘a 
perfectly adaptable machine,’ whose only goal was to ‘increase output.’”409 His 
position is not one of belief in the access to industrial organization through 
science but a humanistic approach to better living through uses of science and 
technology.  
Instead of “Taylor’s most cherished claim, increased profitability,” Murrell’s 
history of motivation provided an account of diverse management strategies and 
manager-worker collaborations that emphasized incentives that were not limited 
to individual profit or promotion. Specifically he offered a consideration of the use 
of profit sharing—and also one with collective bargaining, or worker input built 
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into it—or what Murrell calls a “co-partnership” between labor and managers, as 
an alternative to individual incentive management. To speak in terms of maximal 
profitability in profit sharing of this sort, was to miss the point of its motivation 
entirely.  
Alternatively, a profit sharing scheme devised and introduced with the 
collaboration of the work-force which includes arrangements which will 
enable the workers actively to promote the larger profits in which they will 
share, should achieve in some measure a breakdown of the “we-and-they” 
between management and workers and should motivate the workers to a 
greater productive effort. But this is not really a financial incentive, since 
the true motivating factor which can be achieved under this kind of regime 
can be a feeling of belonging to a firm and a pride in its commercial 
success.410 
 
It is of crucial importance to note that the historical development of profit sharing, 
since at least the turn of the 18th century, can be conceived of as a troubled 
negotiation or third way between the ideologies of Capitalism and Socialism.411 In 
1896, Albert Trombert contended that it was a system that could only develop 
“between two mountains: the doctrine of pure individualism; and socialist 
doctrine.”412  
 It should be recognized that the emergence of profit sharing as well was 
ideological in nature and could always be deployed disingenuously by employers 
or politicians. Charles De Gaulle prominently politicked for profit sharing as a 
“third way” to direct the French people between communism and capitalism.413 
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All the while, De Gaulle was implementing many other policies that “directed” 
(dirigisme414) capitalist interests and quelled socialist and pro-labor voices in 
service of a strong French state. It is worth noting also the critiques of profit 
sharing as a system that produces the movement of flexible wages for 
employees, thus recreating a tension between them and managers/employers, 
and potentially lowering any non-monetary motivation for labor.  
 However, in Murrell’s assessment of profit sharing he connects the 
discussion to the work of Joseph N. Scanlon, whom he discusses further as 
another alternative to Taylor’s efforts to “motivate” labor. The “Scanlon Plan” was 
an industrial management plan based upon the tenants that there “should be 
almost equal division of actual work at the establishment between the workmen 
on the one hand and the management on the other,” that there be “a device for 
sharing any economic gains which may accrue from improvements in 
productivity-a unique kind of cost-reduction sharing,” and finally the plan was 
itself a system by which “each individual in the firm with an opportunity to 
contribute his brains and ingenuity to the improvement of productivity.” Created 
and Implemented by Joseph N. Scanlon, a “steelworker, cost accountant, 
professional boxer, local union president” Murrell notes that  
important characteristic of the Scanlon suggestion scheme is that it is 
collective, there is no individual pay off, each individual is expected to 
contribute his ideas for the benefit of everyone else.415 
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And while Scanlon, an avid proponent of a united labor voice was skeptical at 
best, if not cynical about other managers/owners’ intentions when implementing 
profit sharing, his plan mirrored a profit share between them, only in its inverse 
as a cost sharing system, “the only essential, for Scanlon, was labor-
management cooperation in seeking cost savings and sharing these gains with 
the employees.”416  
The key similarity being that what employees and employers shared could 
increase in size both by sharing in increased profit or in reducing various costs in 
production. The key difference was that a cost-savings-share system did not rely, 
as Taylor’s work did, on mere acceleration the speed of production or increase in 
output—but rather, to attention to detail, efficiency, and the overall quality of 
product, at every level by everyone within the organization.  
 On the system of profit-sharing Scanlon did not believe the system to be a 
non-solution in itself, only that the tendency by managers was to use profit share 
as a replacement for higher wages, but perhaps more dangerously, as a 
substitute for forethought and (nonhierarchical) participation in decisions on cost 
savings. Ultimately the concept of profit was not sufficient to understand all 
quantities of production, including a lack of surplus. The notion of cost-sharing-
saving was.  
 Whether or not a union is involved, if profit-sharing plans are to be 
successful, they must be a product of joint formulation, participation, and 
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responsibility.417 
 
Finally, if there is a single element that Murrell, Scanlon, and Frederick Taylor 
share in common, it is the necessity for the systematic accrual of knowledge on 
the working elements within an organization—though many of the vehement 
critiques of Taylor come from other work scientists, and claim that more rigorous 
study would have compelled Taylor to very different conclusions. Scanlon’s, and 
by extension Murrell’s in his affinity, demand for “co-operation and participation” 
as an alternative to individual motivation and profit, is matched by their call for 
systematic rigor in understanding the organization of humans at work. As the 
remaining tenants of the Scanlon plan illustrates, 
 (1) All the traditional knowledge which in the past may have been in 
the hands of the workmen should be gathered together and 
recorded, tabulated, perhaps even reduced to mathematical 
formulae. (2) There should be scientific selection and progressive 
development of workmen. (3) Science and scientifically 
selected and trained workmen should be brought together 
The desire for absolute rigor in the study of work processes was a wholly 
opposing view to Taylor’s that human beings begin as laborers self-interested, 
unmotivated, and resistant.418 This desire was also an expression of positive 
affect towards human labor, an alternative that treated labor holistically rather 
than a segmented reducible function of the factory.  
This "humanity and spirituality" cannot be realised except in the world of 
production and work and in productive "creation". They exist most in the 
artisan, in the "demiurge", when the worker's personality was 
reflected whole in the object created and when the link between 
art and labour was still very strong. But it is precisely against this 
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"humanism" that the new industrialism is fighting.419 
 
Murrell would construct a humanism very much in the spirit of Gramsci’s 
passage, and articulated it in technical description as a holistic and integrative, 
rather than isolated, reductive, or mechanistic study—ergonomics stood as the 
“capacity of fitting the whole of the job to the man, not just the movements which 
he makes.” It’s arguable that this type of merging of a humanistic understanding 
of labor with a scientific approach to its processes was an integrative process 
itself. The science was deployed in order to achieve the ends of collectivity, 
participation, and better life, simultaneously as the humanistic love for work as 
creative endeavor informed the science against the dehumanizing effects of 
mere mechanism in human movement and energy output.  
Murrell owed his humanist counter position to two main sources of 
humanist-scientist. The first is from the etymological source of the term 
ergonomics, Wojciech Jastrzębowski and the second was the work of Lillian 
Moller Gilbreth emerging from American Scientific Management.  
 
Systems Theory, Cybernetics in Ergonomics 
The story of the systems approach as taken up in ergonomics derives, 
again, from 19th century sciences. The systems approach is also an influence of 
international scientific theory that undergirds American ergonomics at mid 20th 
century. Though its century old, specifically Eastern European roots would be 
hard to recognize in reading American ergonomics accounts that by and large a-
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historically describe it and give little hint as to where systems thinking ever came 
from. 
The ‘systems’ approach…embodies systematic attention to both 
engineering and human factors considerations toward the objective of 
developing integrated systems that consist of optimum combinations of 
physical and human components.420 
 
Hywel Murrell’s work, additionally, has all the markings of systems theory 
especially when humans and machines are together and “man’s role” is as a 
“system component” among others.421 There was astonishingly little explanation 
of why the systems approach to engineering was either the best or the only 
approach to ergonomics of humans and machines. One strong factor was that 
the continual work on systems theories in the Soviet Union embroiled it in the 
larger ideological cold war and resulted in a turn away from systems approaches 
in the U.S. especially by the time of the Regan administration.422 
However, the immediate context of Hywel Murrell’s seminal introduction of 
ergonomics to a post-WWII audience of scientists and engineers was that he was 
compelled to speak about bodies and machines in terms of what cybernetics and 
systems theories had to say about them. Two fields of knowledge that had long 
since evacuated identities and inner states, as Arthur Ashby stated frankly that 
Cybernetics did not propose to ask ‘“what is this thing?” but, “what does it do?”’—
and as Systems theorist Niklas Luhman commented that within systems theory 
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approach the “daily visibility of self-inspired actions by human beings…” was 
merely a superficial frame.423 Ergonomics would shift decisively from a work 
environment to a human machine system, and this shift would emerge in no 
small part due to the intensification of scientific research in general towards fully 
automated machines, of which the digital computer is but one important 
component. Instead of the isolating of human labor to particular movements and 
durations through time and motion study, Murrell’s ergonomics dictated a holistic 
and integrated vantage point of a worker in an environment.  
 As I demonstrate, it is crucial precisely where and when ergonomics picks 
up its systems approach, particularly from life scientists geographically and 
culturally influenced not by capitalist but communist thought. The link to the 
science fully acknowledged even while the link to a culture or ideology other than 
the American capitalist and military contexts of the 20th century is downplayed or 
disregarded all together by ergonomic histories.  
Most importantly though, ergonomics borrows from General Systems 
theory the specific concept of an irreducible and open system which is then used 
to understand human machine interaction. This is important because Ergonomics 
owes a philosophy of systems most strongly to the physiological thought 
specifically of Pitor Anokhin and Ludvig Von Bertalanffy, and the recognition of 
this historical link further complicates the generally accepted narrative that a 
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systems approach was developed during WWII and cold war eras only at the 
behest of military logistics and command control.424  
In the following section I offer historical context setting up how the field of 
ergonomics is distinguished from psychology, scientific management, 
behaviorism, and generally reductionist science. David Meister had done some of 
the most extensive and most cited background on the formal, informal, and 
intellectual histories of ergonomics.425 He described the “formal” history of 
Ergonomics as a story about the development of engineering and psychology 
between the two World Wars. War and its intimate relationship with the rise of 
ergonomics are largely, if not cynically and unproblematically understood by 
ergonomists as a causal relationship because, as Meister quipped, war always 
stimulates the “development of more sophisticated equipment” that must then be 
better understood.426 Prior to WWII the designed fitting of a human operator to 
tool was more akin to the Darwinian selection process based on “trial and error.” 
Meister noted that in both American and European contexts the major 
precursors to Ergonomic thought remained a “machine domination in the human-
machine equation” that lasted through WWI.427 This was exhibited in the fitting of 
smaller men by militaries into cramped machines such as the Confederacy’s 
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submergible Hunley or the Soviet’s small quarters of the T-34 tank, in which 
small men were immediately “promoted” to be operators. Interestingly 
Ergonomics’ precursors are thought to be purely a branch of engineering, 
material, and machine sided, where the beginnings of the field itself is conceived 
of as a “behavioral” science.428 
In its 59-year history…it has been profoundly influenced by its 
predecessor discipline, psychology. Although human factors is practiced in 
an engineering context, its fundamental concepts are derived from 
psychology.429 
 
WWII, its unprecedented tapping of resources and U.S. Nationalized 
participation actually provided the conditions of possibility for ergonomics to turn 
away from work science and the aptitude testing of psychology “Because this 
was total war, involving great masses of men and women, it was no longer 
possible to adopt the Tayloristic principle of selecting a few specialized 
individuals to match a preexisting job.”430  
Interestingly, Meister included an extended account of Russian 
Ergonomics (much more so than Britain where it first developed). Interesting 
insofar as it indicates a more general interest that U.S./western ergonomics has 
in Soviet era scientific theories. While Meister describes its auspices as severely 
influenced by the ideology of communism, his description highlights the 
translatability between the two. The strongest conceptual difference being that 
the Russian model is not influenced by behavioral approach like American 
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ergonomics is. It is rather a holistic approach that attempts to tie together inner 
states with external forces on human operators.  
The principal distinction between the Russian activity approach and the 
behavioral approach is the existence of the conscious goal, which 
determines the specificity of the selection of information and influences the 
strategy of its attainment. A person does not react to the stimulus or 
simply process information but actively performs in a given situation based 
on the goal and existing motives. 431 
 
Russian Ergonomics in practice is thus more integrated and exhaustive in the 
analysis of a work event, “in all its sensorimotor, perceptual, cognitive, 
motivational, and emotional aspects.”432 This ergonomic perspective was not 
limited to Soviet Cold War era scientific thought but was rather a product of 19th 
century Russian scientific philosophy of activity theory.  
The openness of the systems approach in ergonomics owes not to a 
steady historical line of scientific thought but rather to a particular cluster of 
biologists working at roughly the same time period. In explicating this cluster 
made up of scientists regularly mentioned in ergonomic’s history, I illustrate that 
ergonomics should be considered as a study of complex systems or a systems 
science. Ivan Pavlov was a mentor to Piotr Anokhin who is considered an 
important precursor to modern ergonomics.433 While he is not mentioned with the 
following scientists as formative of systems science he is notable as a theoretical 
crossroads between open complex systems and behaviouristic conditioning of 
organisms. I believe it is important to point out that at the same time that Pavlov 
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did much work to mechanize human reflex (through the reflex) and simplify 
sensuous encounters, or affect—his work was also a jumping off point for a more 
radical picture of human agency and affect. 
Working at a time when mentalist psychology, the doctrine that the most 
valid means of studying psychological phenomena is by subjective data like 
introspection.434 The foundation of this classical definition of psychology relies on 
the assumption that “whatever modern methods may have or will evolve, the 
classic assertion remains—the subject matter of psychology is mental activity 
itself and it can be studied.435  
Pavlov instead developed psychological study based only on the empirical 
observation of physiological responses to outside stimulation. Through 
experiments with dogs and shifting their salivation response from food to the 
human who was associated as their “feeder” to a bell associated with feeding 
time—he deduced the principles of classical conditioning.436 First, that the 
conditioned reflex was the most basic unit of behavior meant that when an 
organism first reacted or reflexed to its environment and was either rewarded or 
evaded unpleasantness because of that reflex, it became instrumental to 
expectation of the same outcome. Essentially this meant that if humans were 
anything like dogs then their most basic actions in the world were largely 
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involuntary and that to the extent that they learned it was through training the 
proper responses to stimuli.437 We can recall here the aforementioned article on 
how ergonomics shapes our behavior and Darwin’s insight that our (external) 
physiological expressions strengthen feelings we have.  
The simplicity Pavlov thought was in the brain resulted from manipulations 
so reductive that animals could learn only reflex associations. Humans 
thus confined might behave just as simply.438 
The mention of a mechanistic or non-conscious component in human 
action is taboo in both popular and political contexts today that have been so 
driven by entrepreneurial and individualistic rhetoric. Jodi Dean identified this as 
a world divided simplistically into freedom and oppression, as presented to the 
American public starting at mid 20th century through presidential address.439 This 
binarism developed and entrenched itself in American culture alongside the 
development of neoliberalism, or what Dean calls communicative capitalism. The 
imperative of freedom as expressed merely through individual choice and 
economic mobility is to such an extent that today the Right and Left in America 
share this language rooted in the individual and it is increasingly difficult to think 
beyond Democracy.440 Just as Leftist scholars continue to quip, “it is easier to 
imagine the end of the world than the end of capitalism”441 similarly it seems 
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impossible to imagine that individuals are governed by anything other than deep 
and complex conscious behavior. 
This is due in part to Pavlov’s legacy; that of a scientist whose findings 
were quite easily problematized from the start but whose “messianic enthusiasm” 
allowed him to use “extremely limited evidence to make utopian promises of 
human perfectibility.”442 Again, as with the cyberneticians and others I have 
mentioned a “design” becomes problematic when it is closed off to change or 
variability and outcomes are limited to predictable, binary outcomes. Pavlov 
remains an important touchstone for ergonomic thought because he is another 
figure of machinic thought that had to be left behind once again so that an open 
system of human machine interaction might be reached. In the man’s own words 
about the trailblazer for physiology: 
Three hundred years ago Descartes evolved the idea of the reflex. 
Starting from the assumption that animals behaved simply as machines, 
he regarded every activity of the organism as a necessary reaction to 
some external stimulus, the connection between the stimulus and the 
response being made through a definite nervous path: and this 
connection, he stated, was the fundamental purpose of the 
nervous structures in the animal body.443 
 
Pavlov stands as a powerful re-instantiation of Cartesian physiology and 
mechanistic science for the modern era. Interestingly his thought did allow for an 
external environment, “so infinitely complex, so continuously in flux” in “the world 
around” the animal/human organism.444 It was just that he could not conceive of 
the individual, the psyche, or the consciousness as complex entities participating 
                                                
442 Baars, "IP Pavlov and the Freedom Reflex," 20. 
443 Pavlov, Conditioned Reflexes, 137. 
444 Ibid. 141. 
   200 
 
productively in that world. Instead they could only react and wait for a positive 
outcome.  
 Pyotr Anokhin’s work diverged from Pavlov, John B. Watson, and B.F. 
Skinner’s reductionist behaviorism, and bridged physiology to systems theory of 
Bertalanffy. In 1935 he introduced the notion of biological feedback, which 
significantly altered the concept of a reflex. Pavlov serves as a reminder of a 
transitive or reciprocal philosophical relationship. First and foremost, those 
moments when science, theory, and thought are reduced for simplicity or for the 
sake of their universalization across all phenomena, are moments where 
ideological or political interest can reduce life and social processes, to stimulus-
response for example, for the purpose of designing better human beings. Such 
was the case in the conclusions Pavlov reached for his salivating dogs as the 
prominence of “conditioned reflex” as the basic unit of behavior that were 
extrapolated and built into the idea that human pathology could be trained 
through negative conditioning like electroconvulsive shock treatment.445 
Ergonomics owes its capacity to make sense of “human as system 
component” to the integration of cybernetics with biological science. The reason 
for this is that ergonomics is fundamentally concerned with the empirical study of 
both physical and social phenomena. Just as Warren McCulloch admitted that 
science had nothing to say on matters of “good and evil” so too in ergonomics 
there emerge objects of the social that the formal languages of logic and 
                                                
445 Edward Shorter and David Healy. Shock Therapy: a history of electroconvulsive treatment in 
mental illness (Rutgers University Press, 2007), 211. 
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mathematics fail to make sense of. Jacob Von Euxkull concluded that the study 
of biological environments illustrated on a basic level “the inconstancy of objects” 
within them down to their constituent matter.  
No single property of matter remains constant as we course through the 
series of environments…In this human environment, matter is the rocher 
de bronze on which the universe seems to rest, yet 
This very matter volatilizes from one environment to another. 
No, the constancy of matter on which the materialists insist is 
no solid basis for an encompassing worldview.446 
 
It was this perspectival shift in reconfiguring object identity, and even its 
constitution, that led Uexkull to include that in any environment there was only 
subjective, not objective reality.447 To say that environments change in relation to 
objects was to claim that the “sensory spectrum” of a particular subject made a 
particular environment, to which those objects depend for their meaning. The 
thrust of this move was not at all to introduce a “relativist science” but rather to 
provide a third way between the “too strict objectivity of physical mechanism and 
the too random planlessness of Darwinism.”448 All this was to say that if all 
objects changed based on a shift in perspective then all objects in an 
environment, even the environment itself, had the potential to have a perspective 
and a subject.  
 
Part 2: Ergonomics is Radically Human  
 
                                                
446 Jakob Von Uexküll, A Foray into the Worlds of Animals and Humans: with a theory of meaning 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2010), 198. 
447 Uexkull, “Foray,” 125. 
448 Brett Buchanan, "Onto-Ethologies: the animal environments of Uexküll, Heidegger, Merleau-
Ponty, and Deleuze (Albany: SUNY Press, 2008), 16. 
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In The Posthuman, Rosi Braidotti treats Leonardo’s Vitruvian Man as  
the emblem of Humanism as a doctrine that combines the biological, 
discursive and moral expansion of human capabilities into an idea of 
teleological ordained, rational progress.449 
 
Images of the Vitruvian Man are scattered throughout ergonomics literature  
and it is a centerpiece for the field’s humanistic philosophy of perfectibility and 
beauty of the human form. However, contained within this figure in no small part 
because of the theories of machine subjectivity inherited from cybernetics, the 
Vitruvian man becomes transformed into its other, the nonhuman. 
 
Figure	  1:	  Human	  Factors	  and	  Ergonomics	  Society	  Emblem	  
 
                                                
449 Rosi Braidotti, The Posthuman, 20. 
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Figure	  2:	  Cover	  of	  Human	  Factors	  Journal.	  
Interestingly, the way in which she continued invoking “updated” Vitruvian Men 
throughout her book indicates a sort of repetition, or, as I have been using, a 
recursion as a returning to a particular subject, as well as a self-updating image 
of humanity through the image of man. Or at least, this is partially correct. The 
image for the cover art of the book is of “The New Vitruvian Woman,” and is the 
first mutated iteration of Vitruvian Man. Along with donning an additional set of 
arms that give the sense of multiple bodies or individuals, woman’s face, hair, 
skin, and eyes have been darkened in the update, evoking a multicultural 
feminism with striking aesthetic similarity to Time Magazine’s 1993 “The New 
Face of America,”450 which utilized computer graphics modeling to show a new 
multicultural population. As Braidotti noted, New Vitruvian Woman strongly 
expressed the “universal humanism” and “social constuctivism” of second wave 
                                                
450 “The New Face of America, Nov. 18th 1993, Time Magazine online web site, accessed April 
30th 2014, http://content.time.com/time/covers/0,16641,19931118,00.html. 
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feminism, and “forged a bond of solidarity between one and the many…to grow 
into the principle of political sisterhood.”451  
The Vitruvian Machine 
 The second update to Vitruvian Man is a digital art piece called “Robot in 
the style of Leonardo’s Vitruvian Man.” Its image evokes both the current 
significance of the digital and particularly computer modeling of “real” world 
objects, as well as the context of biochemical technologies and engineering 
whose works on human bodies are demanding new definitions of human. These 
examples of updated and mutated Man can be talked about in two ways that are 
productive to a new understanding of Posthuman. As this dissertation has 
continued to stress, the Posthuman or Nonhuman subject should be conceived of 
without either agonistic or eschatological implications for the human subject.  
First, we may think of them as expressing not what Foucault observed as 
the effacement of the figure of man, but rather positively as a progression or 
accretion where more and more previously marginal identity positions are “let in” 
to the sphere which humanism originally allowed for man. In this sense it is the 
modern project of democracy that has allowed for a less androcentric and more 
global or cosmopolitan view while maintaining humanistic ideals. The idea of a 
non-male or nonhuman Vitruvian subject brings to mind ---- proposition of a 
“democracy of objects” except still within the sociopolitical realm of humanistic 
equality.  
                                                
451 Braidotti, The Posthuman, 21. 
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 Further, we can begin to think of Vitruvian Man as what is called 
conceptually a skeuomorph. A skeuomorph is “a derivative object that retains 
ornamental design cues from structures that were necessary in the original.452 Or 
as N. Katherine Hayle explained, a skeuomorph “is a design feature that is no 
longer functional in itself but that refers back to a feature that was functional at an 
earlier time.”453 We can describe skeuomorph design in terms of both mimesis 
and anachronism. Hayles uses the example of a vinyl dashboard of a car with 
ornamental stitching of the same material that refers back to when leather and 
thread had been used. Either non -functioning or revised functioning elements 
are ubiquitous in the technologies we use, and persist in the shift to virtual, digital 
interfaces. Apple has long been described as a heavy user of skeuomorphic 
design, and users are familiar with many visual representations of a button, 
gauge, or knob that indicates an illusory hardware interface from the past—and 
beyond the visual is the “shutter” click of smart phone cameras that lack physical 
shutters.  
Hayles explained that in the context of “the new” and particularly new 
technologies that humans come into contact with, the skeuomorph is an essential 
component of design.  As a design element the skeuomorph’s main function is to 
be familiar and recognizable to a user. She made two important insights 
regarding the working of skeuomorphism in technological/material design. One is 
                                                
452 Basalla, George (1988). The Evolution of Technology. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University 
Press. p. 107. 
453 N. Katherine Hayles, How We Became Posthuman: Virtual bodies in cybernetics, literature, 
and informatics. University of Chicago Press, 2008, 17. 
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that a material artifact, in this case a skeuomorph, “materially expresses the 
concept it embodies.”454 Second is that epistemological fields develop similarly to 
the evolution of material culture. In this sense, Hayles observed cybernetics as a 
field of knowledge neither evolved according to Kuhnian paradigmatic 
incommensurability nor like a Foucauldian sharp epistemic rupture. It moved, 
instead, in a seriated pattern. “Rarely is a constellation discarded wholesale. 
Rather, some of the ideas composing it are discarded, others are modified, and 
new ones are introduced.”455 
  Hayles concluded by describing the singular power of the skeuomorph in 
our perception of change:  
Like a Janus figure, the skeuomorph looks to past and future, 
simultaneously reinforcing and undermining both. It calls into a play a 
psychodynamic that finds the new more acceptable when it recalls the old 
that it is in the process of displacing and finds the tr4aditional more 
comfortable when it is presented in a context that reminds us we can 
escape from it into the new.456 
 
 I’d like to suggest that the necessity of skeuomorphs need not only apply 
to the design of vinyl car interiors and specific scientific concepts, but to the 
possibility/capabilities of human understanding in general. The Vitruvian image is 
an example of the fact that concepts, thoughts, and entire systems of thought 
become skeuomorphs and persist that way, providing crucial recognizability to 
what succeeds it. Judith Butler stressed this idea in her discussion of radical 
subjectivity that stands at the edge of unrecognizability even as it demands to be 
                                                
454 Hayles, How We Became Posthuman, 15. 
455 ibid. 15 
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recognized. In this sense not only humanistic thought but the humanity, the 
culture and human beings it has developed, have become skeuomorphs. These 
skeuomorphs simultaneously help understanding and possibly transformation 
into nonhumanity, while at the same time continually reasserting themselves and 
their meaning.   
 The skeuomorph is essential to Ergonomics as a field that designs new 
interactive possibilities between humans and machines, as well as redesigning of 
preexisting and accepted ones. I suggest that the “human factor” constituted by 
human life, culture, and Humanistic thought, is precisely the skeuomorph at work, 
as Ergonomics is faced with deciding which elements of the human are 
acceptable to revise, discard, and create anew. What is essential to my 
understanding of Ergonomics is that the human-skeuomorph works not only in 
this way as a conceptual design element (epistemological change) but also as a 
design element for subjectivity (ethical change) as well as the design of actual 
systems of life (embodiment, affection, or materiality).  I suggest that Ergonomics 
is, as constituted by both Physiological thought and a Cybernetic ethic, 
exemplary of a new recognition of what may be called Nonhuman subjectivity 
where subjectivity is thought of as matter poised to be life. As I have already 
discussed in previous chapters, though my dissertation analyzes key moments 
leading to what various authors describe as a posthuman subjectity, I prefer to 
focus on the recognition of a nonhuman agent in machine bodies.  
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More importantly, Ergonomics puts into practice certain kinds of 
nonhumanity that allow for the conditions of possibility for their embodiment or 
materialization. It is my belief that, again, it is not in the agonistic repudiation of 
the human or the dissolution of its identity where the burgeoning nonhuman 
subject is to be found. Rather, it is in the continual articulation of what is human, 
the innervation of thought, experience, and sensation with the idea of humanity—
where its limit and other will emerge again and again.  
Throughout the dissertation I have touched on historically significant and 
heterdox attempts to both distinguish and connect organic life to inorganic 
matter—particularly those that resist a method of simple mechanistic reduction. 
Taking ergonomics as an object and in a sense culmination of the earlier 
attempts in physiology and cybernetics, this chapter connects these theoretical 
understandings with their politico-ethical ramifications or how these ideas can 
affect a biopolitical register of governance in science, research, and design. My 
guiding claim is that the machine, both as an abstract mimetic concept, as well 
as a material service provider/tool, has been inextricably linked to our modern 
conceptions of life—but further, that we must understand all that we can about 
the figure of the human that continues to mutate and persist in the face of 
(perceived) besiegement by technology.  
There is an interesting epistemological foundation in Ergonomic research 
and writing that bears emphasizing. As mentioned before Cybernetics largely 
defined itself not as a particular branch of science, mathematics, or engineering, 
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but rather as a theory of machines suis generis and thus as a meta-science in 
which many other fields existed. Likewise, ergonomics describes its work as 
multi-disciplinary approaches to the problem of human machine interaction. As 
such, there exist many scientists and engineers engaging in ergonomic design 
whether they claim it as such or are conscious of the human factor at work in 
what they do. This is also the reason for much revisionist history that is done in 
the field resulting in the grandfathering in of prevalent scientist-inventors as 
progenitors or latent ergonomists. This kind of historicizing is also very much in 
line with a liberal humanist edification of ideas and progress narrative 
construction. As a recent article in the official bulletin for “The Human Factors 
and Ergonomics Association” proposes that the first American ergonomist was 
none other than Benjamin Franklin.457  
In fact, the founding principle that Hywel Murrell wrote into his treatise on 
ergonomics, the study of human beings specifically in their industrial working 
environment,458 has largely been dispensed with. In another sense, the study of 
how we labor with machines has dispersed into all areas of life and in this sense 
corresponds quite well to the shift to a neoliberal economy and an intensified 
attention paid to the labor we do outside of our official workspaces. In addition, 
take an example like the recent buzz over the ergonomics of standing at work in 
one’s office, and the socio-economic imperative to produce new standing desk 
                                                
457 John W Senders, “Benjamin Franklin, The First American Ergonomist?” in Bulletin Human 
Factors and Ergonomics Association 54, no. 5 (2011): 10. 
458 Murrell, Ergonomics. 
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contraptions, articulates well a general biopolitical regime of health that has 
likewise dispersed through our daily lives.  
There is an additional motivation for the general ergonomization of any 
machine in any context, in other words there is a very specific motivation for 
ergonomics to conceive of itself as a meta-science as well. The result of which 
illustrates ergonomics as the inverse of cybernetic observation. Cybernetics 
generally held that whether the object was a chemical reaction, a frog, a family 
interpersonal dynamic, or human culture459—it always acted in a sense as a 
machine. Or as my earlier analysis showed more accurately what was common 
to humans, organisms, and machines was that they all acted as governors. On 
the other hand, ergonomics begins from the supposition that whether one is 
designing an operating system, a phone bot, or an automated industrial welder, 
there will always be a human factor influencing it. Even in completely automated 
machines and systems (if such a thing could ever exist) the emergence of such 
systems from human thought, design, and handwork is paramount.  
It is in this sense that I mean ergonomics to be an inverse of cybernetics, 
that where cybernetics is a theory of machines (subjectivities) real, virtual, or 
imaginary—ergonomics acts as a theory of the human qua human. Though, as I 
will later demonstrate, cybernetics and systems theories are the very backbone 
                                                
459 These were all actual research objects of cyberneticians. The frog was the subject of the 
seminal paper introducing cybernetic purpose, the “Palo Alto Group” introduced cybernetics into 
psychology and interpersonal communication fields, and both Margaret Mead and Gregory 
Bateson deployed cybernetic principle into their anthropological theories. 
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of ergonomics, the machines that result cannot help but be rearticulated through 
the “divine proportion” of the human being.  
Ergonomics utilizes the human being as a skeuomorph in order to redefine 
the basic ways that we communicate with machines. The outmoded 
communicative forms include type, touch, and text as the physical processes of 
inscription that have persisted from print media to new media machines. The 
interface as we know it provides the other component of the skeuomorph, the 
visual-representational hermeneutic, and includes screen, image, window, and 
luminescence as the persistence of visual culture. Ergonomics is at work on 
redefining human machine communication without the reliance on inscription and 
the visual hermeneutic—replacing them instead with the production and 
transmission of affect. The new human who interacts with new machines will do 
so through her cognition, emotion, and body. The new elements of mediation that 
ergonomics study include heart rate, blood pressure, respiration, temperature, 
voice modulation, and facial expression. The frontiers of experimentation 
whereby the human skeuomorph ushers in the new affective human include 
physiological or affective computing and human-robot interaction. The new 
Vitruvian human will not be significant for its proportions or representational 
beauty but will be important as a body that feels and perceives and moves and 
manages its self and body in the world. 
To return to Braidotti’s example of the Vitruvian Model that frames in its 
image the human as “the rational animal endowed with language,” the closer the 
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investigation into the minutia of what physiologists refer to as the rhythms of life 
the more collisions are felt with the nonhuman. As Art Historian Paul Valery 
noted, Leonardo Da Vinci was in a sense so committed in his science, art, and 
invention to the discovery of the processes of the human body that defined 
human life that his inundation led to some very “inhuman” conclusions on the 
touchstones of humanity life, love, and death.460 The Vitruvian Man was, in fact, a 
product of Da Vinci’s obsessive love with the human body—with physiology over 
the mind, the body over the soul—and his inundation with it resulted in 
observations that Valery observed were alien to renaissance and moderns alike. 
So detached an intelligence is bound to arrive at curious attitudes in the 
course of its movement—as a ballerina will astonish us by achieving and 
sustaining for several moments poses of utter instability. His detachment 
is a shock to our instincts and a mockery of our preconceived ideas. 
Nothing could be more free, that is to say nothing could be less human, 
than his judgments on love, on death.461 
 
Importantly it is from the great intensity with which Da Vinci, and, as I have 
shown all of the scientists in this dissertation, have focused on the minutia of life 
and organism, coupled with an underlying “belief” in the figure of the human—
that the machine emerges again and again. It was the reason that Da Vinci 
chose the human body over the soul in absolute beauty—proportion, motion, and 
mass above thought or Love. This is also why He describes himself, his ultimate 
role in his art and invention, as “O speculator on this machine of ours…”462 
                                                
460 Paul Valery, Introduction to the Method of Leonardo da Vinci, trans. Thomas McGreevy (New 
York: John Rodker, 1929), 18. 
461 Valery, 11. 
462 Richard A Turner, Inventing Leonardo (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994), 197. 
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A cursory viewing of his sketches reveals Da Vinci’s focus on human 
musculature and movement, and, on the other hand of new and imagined 
machines. References abound in Ergonomic literature not only to the image of 
Vitruvian Man and its similarity to current ergonomic graphic image, but to Da 
Vinci himself as either a precursor to ergonomic design or as “the first 
ergonomist.” Much of ergonomic research, like physiology, utilizes 
biomechanics463, which, based on his extensive sketch work on anatomy, Da 
Vinci is credited as a foundation.464 In this way, we see the strong current of 
humanist aesthetic and ethic that informs modern ergonomic research from a 
pre-modern tradition. Again, much like mid 20th century cybernetics, ergonomics 
has been an empirical study in continual interaction with its perceived cultural, 
political, and ethical implications. This is exemplified in the immense legacy that 
Vitruvian Man and his divine proportion. 
The classical tradition was prescriptive. It dealt with idealized human 
beings as they ought to be according to some pre-existing aesthetic or 
metaphysical principle, rather than real human beings as they actually 
are.465 
 
The first component of ergonomics is thus aesthetic and influenced in part by 
humanism and its own ancient history. Protagoras’ “Man is the measure of all 
things,” or the idea of man as microcosm in Mediaeval scholar Isadore of 
Seville’s though stipulates that, “all things are contained in man, and in him exists 
                                                
463 W. Jastrzebowski, “Outline of Ergonomics or The Systematic Study of the Human body as 
Governed by the Laws of Physics,” International Encyclopedia of Ergonomics vol. 1, ed. 
Waldemar Karwowsky (Boca Raton, FL: CRC Press, 2006),104 
464 Ibid. 104. 
465 Ibid. 107.  
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the nature of all things” so as “to place man in communion with the fabric of the 
universe.466   
Ergonomics will be a productive mode of knowledge for understanding 
both the humanism and nonhumanism to come. Put another way, observing the 
practice of ergonomy as an ethical philosophy put into methodology may get to 
Rosi Braidotti’s chief concerns of, 
how to find adequate theoretical and imaginary representations for our 
lived conditions and experiment together with alternative forms of 
posthuman subjectivity.467 
 
Ergonomics will also most certainly continue to be exploited by the 
biotechnological economy and in so doing will continue to reproduce on physical 
and cultural levels many forms of exploitative designs built into our everyday 
lives. Further, it is certainly a field whose influence on our everyday lives 
functions largely beyond our conscious understandings of our relationships to 
machines. In what follows I discuss those individuals (Ergonomists and 
precursors), experiments, and machines that most strongly magnify this 
innervation of human and recursion between human and nonhuman factors. 
 
Wojeiech Jastrzebowski, Divine Labor, and Spinoza 
This labor-science-humanism complex had already culminated in the thought of 
“Polish scientist, naturalist and inventor, professor of botany, physics, zoology 
and horticulture.” Wojciech Jastrzębowski, who is the first person known to use 
                                                
466 Isadore of Seville, Encyclopedia of the Dark Ages, (Indiana University Press 1912). 
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and define the word ergonomics. His astonishing document, “An Outline of 
Ergonomics, or the Science of Work Based upon the Truths Drawn from the 
Science of Nature,” is less a scientific text and more a manifesto, “He who 
complains against his work knoweth not life: work is an uplifting force by which all 
things may be moved. Repose is death. And work is life!”468  
Besides creating a metaphysical register to which human labor 
contributes, “work enriches or divitiates us, bringing us closer to the divine”469 
Jastrzebowski’s outline provides an account of labor and human life reminiscent 
of the 18th century physiologists who had discovered self-regulating organisms 
and processes. Form, identity, or organization is never born or given. Labor is the 
fundamental mechanism by which form is maintained. Intertwined with the 
outline’s metaphysical divination is an austere mechanics of labor that resonates 
with Karl Marx’s assertion that labor was a uniquely human activity and that 
through labor man, “realises a purpose of his own that gives the law to his modus 
operandi…”470 Jastrzebowski’s outline also in proclaiming that the “exercise of 
our forces…is the principle and essence of our lives” is strongly evocative of the 
naturalistic physics in Baruch Spinoza’s Ethics, and in particular, Jastrzebowski 
had described in labor a uniquely human conatus, or as Spinoza put it in 
strikingly similar fashion centuries before,  
the power of any thing, or the conatus with which it acts or endeavors to 
act, alone or in conjunction with other things, that is (Pr. 6, 1II), the power 
                                                
468 Jastrzebowski, “An Outline of Ergonomics,” 161. 
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or conatus by which it endeavors to persist in its own being, is nothing but 
the given, or actual, essence of the thing.471 
 
Crucially, like many naturalists with affinity for “natural philosophie” 
Jastrzebowski’s outline expressed an integrated and holistic perspective in the 
face of the increased instrumentalization and extraction of science from 
philosophy. He asserted that,  
Lest this Science of Work understood as Work in the comprehensive and 
integral sense, not merely its part that is physical labor or toil. But 
physical, aesthetic, rational, and moral work. That is Labor, Entertainment. 
Reasoning. And Dedication. That is Work to be performed by all the forces 
assigned to us by our Maker and to relate to all the purposes of our 
existence as intimated by pure religion and an untarnished sense of 
personal dignity…472 
 
When humans do labor, as the exercise of vital forces, or as a tendency of 
humans to persist and to be active, they exercise four vital forces at their 
disposal. First is the physical vital force that he takes to be the weakest. The 
aesthetic or creative, he also calls the feeling vital force, and our intellect or 
reason makes up the third. Finally, Jastrzebowski concludes, again, that labor is 
an integrative process of the three forces, and that a when a final moral or 
spiritual force is added to the prior three our labor  
induces us to work not only for our own und the common good (which 
entails the glory of God, the welfare of our neighbors, of our fellow 
creatures and or ourselves)473 
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With the foundations of his ergonomics—To labor in common or for the common 
good, to produce abundance, and to engage our vital forces with “other forces 
appertaining to both the living and inanimate in Nature,” Jastrzebowski is an 
integral first step towards modern ergonomic theory and practice. His outline 
stands as an inherited model, which is at once holistic, ethical, and crucially, one 
gesturing to a modern notion of affection. 
 
Lilian Gilbreth and the Feminizing of Work Science 
The second major influence informing Murrell’s humanist-scientist 
complex is Lillian Moller Gilbreth. The magnitude of Lillian Gilbreth’s work and 
thought on management science, domesticity, and the relationship of the 
feminine to technology is so great that it necessitates, I believe, an entirely new 
radical history that is beyond the scope of this chapter. Beyond her recognition in 
the field as a “pioneer in ergonomics,”474 many historians are now documenting 
her role in reconfiguring the kitchen and household of American homemakers. 
Immortalized in the book and film “Cheaper by the Dozen,” she also stands as a 
very early female celebrity, famous by virtue of being a career scientist/lecturer, a 
mother, wife, and homemaker—which is also significant to her science, which I 
discuss later.  
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http://www.newworldencyclopedia.org/entry/Frank_and_Lillian_Gilbreth 
   218 
 
While there is little doubt that Gilbreth’s work significantly transformed 
home and work life for women after the depression, she is also a divisive figure in 
terms of whether the changes in domesticity were good for women. Based on 
more liberalist historical accounts she championed equality for women through 
both her writings and as a role model for motherhood and professional women, 
particularly in the sciences.475 On the other hand, from a more materialist feminist 
position she stood as one of the “key ideologues of the antifeminist, pro-
consumption, suburban home.” According to Architect and Historian Dolores 
Hayden it was the commitments to a consumer life, the privacy of the home, and 
reliance on technologies and not people, that made Lillian and other women’s 
“experts” of that era the antithesis of materialist feminism and its utopian visions 
of women’s lived spaces. While her treatments of both Gilbreth and scientific 
management are cursory, Hayden’s assessment rings true insofar as Lillian’s 
career and persona gravitated towards consulting for manufacturers who 
produced women’s consumption products, and she did not seek to radicalize the 
home or alter the Nuclear picture that was developing.  
On the other hand, Lillian was one of the earliest if not the first to uniquely 
combine psychological study and management science to provide a gender 
analysis of work inequality and began, after the death of her husband, to 
champion the study of little addressed laboring subjects, the handicapped and 
women in the emerging suburban home. In this sense “antifeminist” is a severely 
                                                
475 Jane Lancaster, Making Time: Lillian Moller Gilbreth, a Life Beyond "Cheaper by the Dozen" 
(Northeastern University Press, 2004); Julie Des Jardins, Lillian Gilbreth: Redefining Domesticity, 
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deficient description of the complexity of her work as a scientist, public 
intellectual, and celebrity. For the purposes of this chapter it was precisely 
Lillian’s turn to scientific observation and technological innovation as a means of 
self-management or government for the two marginalized laboring subjects, the 
handicapped to some extent, but especially women. 
For the ergonomic science that was to come Gilbreth needed to alter 
management science/work science with its specific application to women’s labor 
and the home, and with enabling of bodies in mind. It was then that practitioners 
could move the study of human labor and energy beyond the factory floor and 
office, and extend their objects to include human affect and happiness. We may 
consider her work in its contradictory relations to progressivism and capitalism of 
her era, as a problematic not unlike Margaret Mead who years later would create 
(cybernetic) social theory as a tool for the “engineering” of idealic human culture. 
Gilbreth proselytized the social ill to be remedied only after she had become a 
widow and single, female scientist. 
Even more does it consider human resources and we try to look (and 
I hope it is internationally all over the world,) to see where these human 
resources can be found and developed. It is not only the physically 
handicapped who are our responsibility, but the mentally handicapped, the 
emotionally handicapped. And we try also to think in terms of the benefit of 
mankind. Who really knows what that benefit is? None of us is exactly 
sure, but we do know, if our code brings it to our attention, that we are to 
think in these terms: it should stimulate us.476 
 
My argument is that Gilbreth’s work stands, again, as both an articulation of 
humanism and simultaneously something more than or beyond human 
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recognition. What emerged is what I argue as a queer image of the working-man 
and his (according to Frank’s work) “one best way” to work. Thanks to Gilbreth, 
this worker had been transmuted, on the one hand into the equalized 
handicapped worker who, under Taylor’s and Frank’s systems was dealt with in a 
very different way. On the other hand the working man was transmuted to the 
working women, who Gilbreth knew from personal experience to be productive of 
many essential practices of labor all while to varying extents “managing” her 
bread winner. In this particular case it was her feminine subjectivity itself that 
produced both these tendencies and propelled work science in a new direction. 
Her relationship to her husband, like many husband wife professional teams, was 
one of professional sacrifice and relative lack of credit given her. This no doubt 
along with her progressive political viewpoints would spur her work on “the best 
way” to provide comfort and health to women in their homes.  
 The work that Gilbreth would come to be known for after her husband’s 
death—as bringing better working conditions to the handicapped and to women, 
was implicit while they worked together. For the scientists, psychologists, and 
Frank as well, “her professional reputation was always secondary to his. She 
understood this implicitly…”477 That more and more histories are now being 
written about Ms. Gilbreth than her husband is due to the increasing recognition 
that his work was inextricably her work. 
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[I]t’s why she took time out from her research to index a new edition of 
Field System (1908 ) and why she quietly did the lion’s share of the 
preparation of manuscripts and papers for Frank’s academic and 
professional meetings. The books Concrete System (1908), Bricklaying 
System (1909), and Motion Study (1911) were published in Frank’s name 
only, but in truth, Lillian had worked so closely with Frank on these texts 
that even he could not tease out his contributions from hers. 478  
 
The work that was directly attributed to her was of a different character. Where 
Frank’s singular function in creating motion studies was to combat an ecological 
evil of “this waste going on in the whole civilized world.” Of the resources 
squandered Frank felt that, [t]here is no waste of any kind in the world that 
equals the waste from needless, ill-directed, and ineffective motions.479 While this 
in itself was more of a philosophical and progressive view that Taylor’s science of 
labor, Gilbreth shifted the aim away from efficiency and towards the well-being of 
the worker. She argued  
that the aim of motion study was to eliminate unnecessary fatigue by 
designing convenient workbenches and chairs, providing regular rest 
periods, and introducing other salutary measures.480 
 
And if Frank and Lillian together had indicted Taylor’s stopwatch, Lillian Gilbreth 
had also convicted the manager himself. In fact she too believed similarly that the 
worst sin was to “discard” or waste “human potential.”481 However, what Lillian 
actually saw as waste and worked to eliminate in her research, was the 
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discrimination against and firing of older women and people with injuries or 
disabilities for faster, cheaper labor. This practice would  
not only increase the number of non-productive, unhappy people in the 
community, but would commit what is sure the greatest of industrial 
wastes—human waste.482  
 
As a result, Lillian initiated a research study on the discrimination of older women 
at the workplace, and became more publicly outspoken on this as an issue of 
labor and of resource waste, and reiterated her unpopular argument that men 
needed to learn to manage a “50/50 marriage” and share in a woman’s “24 hour 
work day.”483 
Gilbreth certainly put her efforts towards devoting resources to women’s 
work day through the innovative design of her environment and tools. Among the 
credits to her reconfigured kitchen Gilbreth designed the “door closet,” composed 
of a thin cabinet fastened to a door to more easily access mops, cleansers, 
etc.484 She also designed the foot pedaled trash can which, besides a more 
efficient means of opening the trash can, was also a substituted foot motion for 
what was “normally” a hand motion, reflected her thought towards the differently 
enables. Then there was the “management desk” designed with the post-
depression era woman who both worked at home and at a job. This official desk, 
Gilbreth claimed, was designed for the homemaker to better organize both 
manual and managerial work.485  
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At the Chicago World's Fair in 1933, she unveiled the Gilbreth 
Management Desk, promoted as the "Business Headquarters of the 
Household Manager." Intended for the kitchen, the desk had a clock and, 
within easy reach, a radio, telephone, adding machine, typewriter, 
household files, reference books, schedules, and a series of pull-out 
charts with tips on organizing and planning household tasks.486 
 
Her transforming of the homemaker into a “household manager” was very much 
like women’s activist Catherine Beecher’s earlier “home minister” in that it worked 
to legitimize the labor within the house while it gave women opportunity to 
consciously recognize that part of their work was in managing their “bread 
winners,” “[w]oman as “home managers” would study the best ways to keep the 
“homeowners” functioning as stable, conscientious workers, husbands, and 
fathers.487 Key to Gilbreth’s understanding of women’s identity/subjectivity as 
laborers was of course her own performance in her various social roles. Beneath 
her public persona as one of the first women to “have it all”488 was a very 
different idea about women’s integral role in connecting home and work life—and 
this idea began forming after her husband’s death. It was at this point that 
Gilbreth both undertook her more political research on discriminatory practices by 
employers, but that she also increased her research, teaching, and commercial 
work in general as a new head of household. Whether in order to curb her grief, 
to increase her public persona, or to foot the bills, it was a turn to labor, and an 
active expansion of all of her work that was her answer. It was during her 
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increased participation as a product design consultant that Gilbreth formed a very 
powerful and prescient idea.  
 Whether women were contained within the nuclear family dynamic or were 
less conventionally the head of their own household, their labor was 
distinguished from the masculine, factory and office paradigms that had 
developed into Fordism and Taylorism. In the formal economy men had foremen, 
experts, and managers, and in the informal economy they had, as Frank had in 
Lillian, a manager at home that was to varying degrees working unrecognized.  
Woman as “home managers” would study the best ways to keep the 
“homeowners” functioning as stable, conscientious workers, husbands, 
and fathers.489 
 
It was this simple truth, that where working men had external authorities, working 
women had themselves, were self-managers, that Gilbreth designed an entire 
environment to surround women in order not only to expedite and render safer 
their work, but also to enable their continued self-managing practices.490  
This was the less obvious upshot to the more sweeping and detrimental effects 
of her work such as social control, industrialized disciplinary techniques and 
domestic isolation of a population of women. It was the notion of self-
management, self-government, and self-regulation through labor. It was one that 
she formed by way of experience, performativity, and her own recognition. 
Beyond its liberal context, self-regulation was not freedom/autonomy, and 
beyond the implication of a future neoliberal context, self-regulation was not a 
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conscious and active participation in a field of rules established by a juridical and 
economic system to optimize self. Though of course the principle of self-
regulation could easily be subsumed by both.  
 Gilbreth hit upon a simultaneous metaphysical and scientific principle that 
identity or subject is maintained through its continual renewal by labor. It was a 
rule that Jaezrbrowski hit upon in 1857 just before the “question of labor” would 
be asked, and from Gilbreth, motion studies, and the imperative to design for a 
marginal yet self-governing subject, Murrell would inherit the principle into his 
system of ergonomics. No, Gilbreth’s work never attained a political register that 
could be considered radically feminist—she was too ingrained in the 
developments of normative masculinist and capitalist forces. No, Gilbreth’s 
science was nowhere close to suggesting a posthuman work science—that was 
yet to come in general systems theory, cybernetics, and then together with 
ergonomics. But I believe her work was an embodied, performative gesture to 
both of those possibilities and because of the interaction or perhaps collision of 
her humanism with her belief in technoscience, Gilbreth expressed a latent 
radical otherness key to both conceptions of machines and of women that 
general domination suppresses or irradiates as a “failure.”  
Technology in some way is always implicated in the feminine. It is young; 
it is thingly. Thus every instrument of war is given a feminine name. The 
feminine, in whose way we are, does not arrive. She is what is missing. 
Constituted like a rifle, she is made up of removable parts. She hinges on 
the other, like the allegorical symbolics of which Heidegger speaks. The 
woman has gotten in the way of things…491 
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Her system of studying human beings and the welfare of their labor, while 
certainly a “failure” in the sense of a more radical feminist and anti-capitalist 
study, both kept vital a sense of self-regulation in a coming Fordist regime of 
labor organization, as well as gesturing towards the scientific foregrounding of 
technological bodies so that marginal human bodies may be recognized.  
 
Elizabeth Duffy, Affect, Energy 
 Elizabeth Duffy was one of the first scientists that not only sought the 
serious study of human emotion but also the reconfiguration of emotion beyond 
literary, descriptive, and cultural meanings. Duffy proposed a psychology that 
questioned the “common assumption” that emotions were unique categories 
distinct from other kinds of responses and the use of categories such as anger, 
fear, or joy, as unproblematically empirical states. Instead Duffy argued that 
emotions be seen as similar to both cognitive as well as physiological processes. 
She thus importantly exploded the age-old binary between emotion and 
intellect/rational thought and reintegrated the two as interdependent phenomena 
related and interacting by “the total organization or pattern as determined by the 
various dimensions in their relation to each other.”492 As a psychologist she 
informed a kind of thinking that would later emerge in ergonomics as the study of 
human-machine affect. In integrating previously distinct psychological elements 
like emotion, cognition, and consciousness, to name a few, she shifted the 
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theorization of affect away from psychology’s “the emotions” to the physical, 
physiological, and embodied form of affect that has developed in continental 
thought and cultural studies. Duffy emphasized this shift in affect when she called 
for the description of emotional and other responses in humans as a range of 
energy mobilizations. The energy of affect would play a huge role in giving 
psychologists and ergonomists the vocabulary to describe material systems of 
embodied encounters. In the section that follows, I explore how breakthroughs in 
thought like Duffy’s could be extrapolated into ergonomics and coupled with 
attempts to humanize machines.  
 
Ergonomic “Human Factor” and Anthropomorphism 
To the extent that radical theories of machinic life and machine subjects 
remain vital(ist) and holistic in ergonomic theory, it will continue in its co-
constitutive humanism and non-humanism, to temper the reductive and 
mechanistic effects that capitalism and rationality have wrought on the social 
through biotechnological control. This chapter has attempted to offer a 
“retrospective by way of an alternative” in the form of the emergence of 
ergonomics at points in history where much more reductive and dominating 
controls or governing mechanisms were deployed on humans and machines at 
work. My claim has been that ergonomics, as a complex constituted by the 
epistemology of physiology and the theory of subjectivity driven by cybernetics, 
produces the embodiment or materialization of those theories.  
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 The notion of anthropomorphism is central to this line of thought. Heinz 
Von Foerster defined anthropomorphization as “[p]rojecting the image of 
ourselves into things or functions of things in the outside world.”493 He agreed 
that anthropomorphism in general was not only a standard human practice but 
that it was not in itself bad, stating, “in principle there is nothing wrong with 
anthropomorphizations; in most cases they serve as useful algorithms for 
determining behavior.”494 The problem was that such project tended to lead to a 
delusion that dismissed or destroyed the difference of the nonhuman thing by 
fitting it to the common name it shared with humans. To the extent that an animal 
or machine “remembers,” “feels,” or “communicates,” how were those 
phenomena unique to them? An attempt needed to be made so that a human 
observer could make projections that both she and other humans might 
understand as meaningful while maintaining the differences among species of 
subjects. Keeping with Uexkull’s perspective that observation was a foray into 
another subject’s world, Von Foerster did feel it necessary to push back against 
rampant anthropomorphization. 
There are two major research issues or problems that have led 
ergonomicists into ongoing discussion about the benefits and drawbacks to 
anthropomorphic design. The first is a research technology and field called 
Human Modeling or Digital Human Modeling that has, since digital computers 
became a design tool within ergonomics, been used to create accurate 
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simulations of human processes that can be applied to the “real” world. Simply 
put in modeling, “a digital representation of the human [is] inserted into a 
simulation or virtual environment to facilitate prediction of safety and/or 
performance.”495 The emergence and development of human modeling with the 
digital computer was for the express purpose of aiding with the, “the manipulation 
of a simulated human figure easy for a particular user population human factors 
design engineers or ergonomics analysts.”496 From an ergonomic perspective the 
earliest modeling techniques were physical models or simulations, machines that 
surrounded the human in order to mimic a particular mechanical process. In this 
sense the grounded flight (cockpit) simulators were an example. However, as 
Manuel DeLanda observed, it was at the end of WWII that Los Alamos scientists 
began to experiment with the “virtual worlds” that the new computers were able 
to create.497 From that point time would need to pass in order for the processing 
power and graphical display of modern computers to increase such that 
adequately complex and realistic representations of human bodies could be 
produced. It was in the 1980’s when the microprocessor led to the development 
of the personal desktop computers that human modeling became a viable and 
well-resourced research problem.498 The most famous example would come out 
of the University of Pennsylvania’s Center for Human Modeling and Simulation 
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(HMS). The “Silicon Graphics workstation based Jack TM,”499 a registered 
trademark of the university, was compact enough to fit into small laboratories or 
classrooms, where one ergonomist would sit and view, replicate, and manipulate 
a human model within a designed work environment.  
One can think of Jack as an experimental environment in which a number 
of useful general variables may be readily created, adjusted, or controlled 
the workplace the task the human agents and some responses of the 
workplace to internally or externally controlled actions.500 
 
As digital modeling software and processing power continue to advance the  
power to create artificial worlds has moved beyond human modeling into the 
contexts of simulating populations and virtual societal infrastructures such as 
traffic flows and population movements. It is a deployment of the virtual for 
purposes of general risk management that, as a subset of computer research, 
owes to John Von Neuman’s war-time development of Game Theory. On the 
other hand, in the realm of human modeling outside of an ergonomic perspective 
neuroscience uses the technology for the purposes of modeling brain function to 
discover and map its constituent parts. While computational genomics has made 
use of the smallest units of life in order to create a “complete computational 
model” of a simple organism.501 Both are examples of a sort of reverse 
engineering of the processes of life by way of reductionism and 
informationalization through reliance on the Human Genome Project database. It 
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is not surprising that like the Human Genome Project before them the U.S. 
BRAIN initiative and Europe’s Human Brain Project are both massive 
government initiatives to produce complete, all encompassing virtual models or 
databases of the human brain. Both are encouraged and partially funded by 
government militaries and subsequently are seen as non-transparent, dubious 
scientific endeavors by scientists across the globe.502 
However, when Delanda argued that computer modeling had the promise 
to, “track the machinic phylum in search of a better destiny for humanity,”503 he 
was neither referring to computer modeling’s checkered past as a simulacra for 
war nor its present state in military-market driven state of the art research. Rather 
the promise for virtual modeling lay precisely in how the technology has yet to be 
deployed, or in its radical experimentation on the margins. There is evidence to 
suggest that ergonomics is deploying virtual modeling, anthropomorphism in 
order to design and study of robots as human companions.  
To give context, the first initiative for an industrial robot modeled on 
humans came from Honda in 1986 and continued through the 1990’s in a 
development that coincided with computer modeling technologies.504 “The Honda 
Humanoid Robot ASIMO” was the result. The emergence of humanoid-robots or 
androids should be emphasized because, as I discussed in the introduction, it 
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marks the beginning of a shift in tandem with the shift of the affective turn. It 
characterizes a de-emphasis on software and code and a foregrounding of 
hardware and bodies as well as a shift away from a hermeneutic of the visual 
screen interface to that of an embodied encounter. Additionally, the continuing 
imperative for automation in industry that led to the robot’s emergence brought 
the crucial concept of anthropomorphism into the lexicon of ergonomics in this 
period of the 1990’s. For example, Anthropomorphism appeared sixty six times in 
the major U.S. journal Ergonomics, with its first appearance in 1993, one more in 
1995, and a marked increase after 2000. In place of an older paradigm that 
framed human users in terms of fatigue, distraction, and error, was the design 
imperative to study terms like familiarity, comfort, and trust in the human user 
towards a robot other. Human modeling became one instructive technological 
tool for this purpose. One ergonomics experiment utilized the modeling of a 
virtual industrial work-space, a technical system that consisted of robots and 
humans. The function of the experiment was to test the hypothesis that, 
“[a]nthropomorphism is a promising approach to improve the acceptance of a 
robotic system as a team-partner.”505  
With Anthropomorphism’s inclusion into its literature ergonomic design 
provides a unique opportunity to work through a fundamental problematic at the 
heart of many forms of critical scholarship—posthumanism, new materialism, 
environmentalism, species studies, and affect studies—who are in solidarity 
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through their attention to the nonhuman. That critical problematic is a matter of 
how we may access epistemologically (or more strictly discursively) to our 
experiences of nonhuman bodies or agencies. This has led recently to different 
alternatives among materialists like Alain Badiou or Quentin Meillasoux to turn to 
mathematics as a formal language that is capable of thinking the thing in itself.506 
Closer to home, new materialism in the U.S. media studies context has turned to 
the historical and particularly Foucauldian archaeology in order to trace its 
nonhuman objects. Meanwhile, the emergence of Object Oriented Ontology has 
seen the turn to such a strict anti-anthropocentric epistemology that its 
conclusion is that all individual objects (including humans) withdraw from the 
attempts to know or understand them. The response is not “how can we know 
these objects,” but “can we recognize that we can never know these objects?”  
 Ticineto-Clough has recently called for a turn to science and technology, 
specifically for feminist theories of affection, in order to face this problem of 
accessing or understanding the nonhuman. 
The feminist theorists I have engaged are focused on bodies other than 
human bodies but not only to revise accounts of relations between human 
bodies and technologies, especially those technologies which are 
presently bringing into human experience what only technology can 
enable, the experience below human conscious and cognition, outside the 
current understanding of life itself.507  
 
The power in Anthropomorphism lies first in its reminder that no radical system of 
thought or theory of subject oriented to the nonhuman can circumvent the 
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materiality and situatedness of our humanity. This is precisely why this project 
has stressed the continual recursive dynamic between a pervasive articulation of 
the human in scientific thought and the emergence of a nonhuman subject as a 
result. Jane Bennett believes that  
maybe it is worth running the risks associated with anthropomorphizing 
(superstition, the divinization of nature, romanticism) because it, oddly 
enough, works against anthropocentrism…too often the philosophical 
rejection of anthropomorphism is bound up with a hubristic demand that 
only humans and God can bear any traces of creative agency.508  
 
To go a bit further with Bennett’s thought, a “careful course of 
anthropomorphism” will illustrate that, as per affection, it is in fact the only course 
available to our capacity to inquire. All of our experience of the world must (for 
now) mediate our bodies, sensoriums, and intellects. To say that those 
experiences move beyond or below our scales of discourse and representation is 
true, but it is also the case that in order to conceive of them for the purposes of 
philosophy, politics, or ethics—and especially if we desire to communicate them 
to other human beings—they must mediate anthropomorphism. In this sense our 
humanity is just as much a medium as any machine or image that we put 
ourselves in relation to, and to think or hope for an unmediated access to 
nonhuman entities is fallacious.  
 
Ergonomics, the study of affection 
The anthropomorphism of Human Modeling and Computer design have 
been of major importance to opening up Ergonomics to the affective well being 
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resulting from human machine interaction. In 1995 Rosalind Picard, who would 
later form and head the Affective Computing Group within the MIT Media Lab 
wrote the article “Affective Computing,” which laid out some foundational 
thoughts on the general benefits of bringing emotion into computing for “learning, 
human-computer interaction…creative arts and entertainment, human health, 
and machine intelligence.”509 Picard discusses in philosophical terms the taboo of 
bringing emotions into science because of the negative description of human 
emotion based on rationalist positions in science. It is a taboo she would 
comment on further in her book of the same title:  
Being a woman in a field containing mostly men has provided extra 
incentive to cast off the stereotype of “emotional female” in favor of the 
logical behavior of a scholar. For most of my life my thinking on emotions 
could have been summarized as: “Emotions are fine for art, entertainment, 
and certain social interactions, but keep them out of science and 
computing.” Clearly some kind of conversion has happened; this is a book 
about emotions and computing. Moreover, it is not about how people feel 
about computers, but about something of more questionable cause: giving 
emotional abilities to computers.510  
 
Picard’s work explores a range of issues for the founding of affective 
computing. For example, she brings up the ethical concern of emotional 
manipulation in humans which is another reason against bringing the study of 
emotion into science. The key issue being that in designing computers that 
perceive, adapt to, and simulate human emotion, inevitably two issues arise.  1) 
Are affective computers merely adding to the exploitative tools at the disposal of 
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parties interested in particular emotional responses out of human beings? 2) If 
we are able to, through affective computing, design a computer with human-like 
free will, can we build that machine and “give up control over it?”511 Picard 
argues that attempting to understand emotion scientifically is a necessity for 
“greatly improving the interactions between humans and machines.”512 
Additionally, Picard insists that “a quantum leap will occur” in communication 
when computers “become able to recognize and express affect.”  
A final note on Picard’s essay is that she illustrates an understanding 
shared in this dissertation of the importance of physiology to the communication 
of affective states of human beings.   Affect is both “physical and cognitive” and 
the indication of her work is that affective computing research will lead to a new 
theory of “affective communication” that will change the direction of the study of 
communication. The major reason affective computing machines would harken 
such a change is in the shift away from a computing interface that is 
representational, linguistic (semantic), and visual in nature—namely as the figure 
of a screen. The new interface, exemplified by what Picard calls affective 
“wearables” would communicate based on  
affective information, such as facial expressions, gaze, tone of voice, 
gestures,  and physiology; (ii) creating new techniques to infer a person’s 
affective or cognitive state (e.g., confusion, frustration, stress, interest, and 
boredom); (iii) developing machines that respond affectively and 
adaptively to a person’s state; and (iv) inventing personal technologies for 
improving awareness of affective states.513 
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The resulting wearable machine would have access to all of an individual’s bodily 
(and cognitive) processes, and its functions resemble more a hybrid between a 
smart mobile device and a personal medical diagnosis machine rather than a 
tablet or laptop. The affective wearable would not only communicate “awareness” 
to an individual about her affective state, it could, given the user’s permission, 
communicate her affective information to other individuals in proximity to her.  
One of the distinguishing features of wearable computers, as opposed to 
merely portable computers, is that they can be in physical contact with you 
in a long-term intimate way.514 
 
Picard speculates that in general these wearables could augment your memory 
similarly to contemporary smart devices, as well as the reality of your perception 
(it might have a camera that could magnify your view from the back of a large 
room). However the most radical changes remain the social aspects of being 
able to enhance and communicate one’s affect.  
With willing participants and successful affective computing the 
possibilities are limited only by our imagination Affective wearables would 
be communication boosters clarifying feelings, amplifying them when 
appropriate, and leading to imaginative new interactions and games…it 
might recognize your emotional state could be improved by striking up a 
conversation with someone with common interests right now and it might 
let you know who’s available that would enjoy this opportunity.515 
 
Picard expressed the establishment of a fundamentally new design, aesthetic, 
and most importantly a mode of communication between human beings and 
machines. It was not just a move away from the design principles of the visual 
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interface and representational communication but also a move toward “a 
computer that takes the initiative to communicate with you, and to tune itself to 
your preferences, instead of expecting you to program it.”516  
Another feature of traditional computing removed from affective computing 
was the idea of the human user as a “maker” or “hacker” that actively fought 
against the predetermined design of her machine. The human-computer 
relationship was no longer about humans acquiring the “language” of computing, 
code, in order to unlock the power of customization or to possess higher levels of 
freedom in the virtual world. Instead the theoretical relationship was defined by 
the presence of a self-adapting machine that worked to fit itself to an individual.  
Picard realized even when affective computing was more a hypothetical 
than a field that the fitting of a machine to human raised “many new human 
factors problems.”517 With the focus on the physiological, or the confluence of the 
physical, cognitive, and affective aspects of life, took affective computing out of 
ordinary programming or computer engineering fields and into the expertise of 
Ergonomics. Additionally, the conception of wearable affective machines that 
were intimately connected to humans highlighted the benefit of the cybernetic 
thread within it.  
As Ergonomics sought the study of beneficial human-machine 
relationships across all aspects of life, the entrance of affective computing as a 
research problem meant that the purpose of these machines became expansive. 
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This sense of purpose would include not only new social practices and the 
management and promotion of personal medical health but also education, 
happiness and well being studies, and disability studies. In 1999, two years after 
Picard’s book on Affective Computing was published the first ergonomics studies 
on affective computing started to be published in its major journals and studies 
on affection between machines and humans would steadily increase for the next 
decade.  
 Particularly in the application of affective computing to educational and 
disability contexts, the ergonomics perspective produced radical conceptions of 
machines and their ontological relationship to humans. This conception that 
involved theories of affect and empathy would have serious implications for 
learning, socialization, and ethical communication as learned, lived practices for 
machines and humans alike.  
For example, Rosalind Picard and her colleagues discussed affective 
computing in relationship to people with Autism. They focused on the ability to 
empathize with others as the central problem for Autistics given that intelligence, 
memory, and language acquisition were major areas in which there was no 
difference. The set of cognitive-affective skills in empathy  
involves setting aside one’s own current perspective, attributing mental 
states to the other person, and then making sense and predicting that 
person’s behavior, given his or her experience.518 
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This part of social learning in human beings resulted in our ability to be an 
empathic observer and acquire “people intuition” and the proper affects to an 
observed state, such as showing compassion for someone in distress.519 The 
authors that there were mutually beneficial outcomes for a collaboration between 
affective computing and autism research in the form of computing machines that 
could affectively support autistics but also that looking to the processes of autistic 
life could help the development of socio-emotionally intelligent machines. The 
basis of this argument was an astonishing comparison: 
Computers, like most people with autism, do not naturally have the ability 
to interpret socioaffective cues, such as tone of voice or facial expression. 
Similarly, computers do not naturally have common sense about people 
and the way they operate. When people or machines fail to perceive, 
understand, and act upon socioemotional cues, they are hindered in their 
ability to decide when to approach someone, when to interrupt, or when to 
wind down an interaction, reducing their ability to interact with others. 
 
By way of ergonomic perspective this comparison both drew a pattern that 
connected computing machines and humans in cognition and affect as well as 
anthropomorphized what are seemingly cold, emotionless machines. Both people 
and machines fail perceptually and affectively and both can also fruitfully be 
educated in these areas to increase their abilities to succeed.  
 
Conclusion Ergonomics the study of Affection 
The majority DeLanda’s case studies or examples used to explicate either 
Deleuze’s or his own views on history and philosophy are subjects beyond the 
scale of human bodies, history, or culture. Thus the scale of history that he often 
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deploys is prehistorical, geological, and cosmic in nature.520 In order to explain 
expressivity beyond language he foregoes the range of human affect, instead 
citing the expressivity of crystalline objects before the Earth was even populated 
with humans!521 Human language is the target of DeLanda’s second foundational 
assumption and following his call to always start with the nonhuman his account 
of affect posits that all phenomena including linguistic ones have nonlinguistic or 
semantic meaning that may be observed.522  
Communication is key for DeLanda’s theory of affect in the form of 
“expressivity” that he takes from Deleuze, a communicative form in which 
“language should be moved away from the core of the matter, a place that it has 
wrongly occupied for many decades now.”523 Though he begins with nonhuman 
case studies and eschews the primacy of semantic language but Delanda is still 
centrally concerned with a theory communication. And his sense of affect comes 
closest to reconfiguring the problem of machines’ communicative abilities. He 
describes all objects as having the capacity to affect and be affected and also 
that affects are “constructive capacities.” DeLanda offers another contribution to 
how we communicate with machines and other nonorganic life forms with the 
simple provocation, “that humans did not really invent machines.”524  In order to 
illustrate that machines communicate DeLanda understands that they must be 
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given their own history or evolutionary story outside of the domain of human 
history.  
 Perhaps the most important part of DeLanda’s theory of affect is the 
concept of emergence. When Manuel DeLanda advocates for the study of 
emergence he begins to speak strongly as an ergonomist. Further, his argument 
for a creative practice of (social) science and a realist philosophy of affection and 
social complexity is a touchstone for the machine theories I have laid out in the 
previous chapters. DeLanda offers another contribution to how we communicate 
with machines and other nonorganic life forms with the simple provocation, “that 
humans did not really invent machines.”525  In order to illustrate that machines 
communicate, DeLanda understands that they must be given their own history or 
evolutionary story outside of the domain of human history.526  
 As I have discussed above, DeLanda’s theory of affect offers the most 
radical possibilities for studying the affect produced between humans and 
nonhumans. DeLanda’s reliance on the concept of emergence is the key to 
understanding these radical possibilities. As I have outlined in previous chapters, 
emergence is an important philosophical concept in both physiology and 
cybernetics. It is the key to a new understanding of freedom of action in both 
organisms and machines alike. DeLanda describes emergence as the result of a 
process where unique organizations or assemblages spontaneously form out of 
matter and energy. Importantly, DeLanda uses emergence to visualize and 
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understand these formations across all fields of life. An Emergent form can be 
expressed through a crystalline structure, as well as a constructed computer, a 
political infrastructure, or even an entire society. Or as he describes it, 
emergence can be studied as overlapping layers of complexity from,  
prebiotic soup, bacterial ecosystems, insect intelligence, mammalian memory, 
primate social strategies, and the emergence of trade, language, and institutional 
organizations in human communities.527 
DeLanda is fully aware that the emergence of a unique material or social 
formation cannot be predicted, managed, controlled, or produced solely based on 
human intentions. However, he feels strongly that emergence can be modeled or 
virtually simulated in order to better understand under what sorts of conditions 
certain emergences are possible. As discussed earlier, DeLanda takes the virtual 
to be just as real as things that exist materially in the world. So by virtually 
simulating, or modeling the affect that emerges alongside new formations we are 
being equally productive of emergence as participants in that very simulation. 
Like in ergonomics, where the simulation is the foundational method of 
experiment and insight, for DeLanda the simulation of emergence is key to 
understanding biological, material or social change.  
 The benefit of DeLanda’s emergence framework is an empiricism and 
methodology that augments Ticento Clough’s call in her introduction to accept, 
and not fear, new social formations. Emergence goes a step beyond the critical 
awareness of affect and how it moves us. With it and the practice of simulation 
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we can begin to actively participate in simulations of affect for the purposes of its 
novel and ethical use. We can see this framework of emergence at work in the 
ergonomic perspective. Whether dealing with standing desks, affective 
computers, or robots; ergonomics continually puts together humans and 
machines, charting the affects produced and changing particular variables for 
more “humane,” or desirable outcomes.  
The ergonomic study or experiment is the site of emergence where 
machines are concerned. It is where machines that continue to resemble humans 
more and more, both physically and behaviorally, end up seeming more alien to 
us than ever. And, just as with simulation and the modeling, the power of 
ergonomics as a study of human-machine affection lies in the ways that various 
individuals can make imaginative frameworks and creative experiments—
whether they identify academically as an ergonomist or not. Ergonomics is both a 
virtual space of communication and a set of technologies we may be able to use 
individually and collectively towards novel arrangements of affects and bodies.  
Ergonomics is where the human of sight, inscription, and representation is 
giving way as skeuomorph to a new figure, a new life form of affect. Whether 
intentional or not, ergonomists have now built in the reflexivity of 2nd order 
observation into intelligent machines, affective computers and companion robots. 
These machines study human physiology and recognize the production and 
transmission of affect therein—a practice that human scientists in ergonomics 
have been empirically studying for over 50 years. It may soon be entirely 
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possible for a population of citizens to begin to live ergonomically, to engage in 
an ergonomics-of-the-self through these machines. They will then be aware for 
the first time of an entire universe of communication below/beyond the discursive 
and representational register where humans purport to exist. 
 
Chapter 5 Conclusion: Robots Today or Beyond the Bare Life of Machines 
 
 
This dissertation attempted to show that through its historical relationships 
to physiological thought and to cybernetics, ergonomics has become a 
productive way to empirically study the production of affect between humans and 
machines. All three fields stand on a foundation of radical theories that decenter 
and problematize hundreds of years humanistic thought. However, physiology 
also provides a thread of what I have discussed as a critical vitalism, particularly 
with the implicit assumption that there is an immanent power of vitality or life-like 
behavior that all matter share. From cybernetics there is the overarching 
theoretical assumption that machines, real, abstract, or fantastical, are not 
radically distinct from organisms and specifically what we are capable of 
experiencing as human machine/organisms.  
I have discussed how these two tenets, which have been adopted in 
ergonomic study of the most “beneficial” human-machine relationships, push 
back against much modernist tendencies in both science and philosophy. As sort 
of anti-modernist inquiries, physiology and cybernetics constructed languages 
meant for integration not reduction, and for universal communication and 
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common knowledge not endless specialization of disciplines. These approaches 
were susceptible to two strong critiques from the scientific ideologies that 
encouraged the reduction of life processes on the one hand and the 
fragmentation of scientific expertise. One, as I discussed the physiologist 
experimenters who had interests in all forms of natural as well as social and 
philosophical phenomena would by contemporary standards be seen as 
unorthodox scientists at the very least and dilettantish at worst. Likewise the 
strongest proponents of cybernetics would be harshly criticized for defending 
“sloppy” metaphors between machines and organisms, physics and psychology, 
mathematics and human language.  
However, when Norbert Wiener stressed that the “organism is the 
message” or Gregory Bateson looked to the most general patterns in the 
universe that connect all life, or Hienz Von Foerster implored that all machines 
existing in the world are nontrivial and unpredictable—they each were continuing 
a kind of thinking that not only compares and reconnects matter and life but also 
opens up the possibility for communication about those processes across 
disciplinary divides. To add the viewpoint of another provocative scholar of media 
machines, Marshall McLuhan also seemed to be seeking a way for articulating 
universal problems of communication without regard for disciplinary battle lines. 
The study of communication theory and practice has recently been 
fostered by numerous separate approaches to the common problems of 
our present world. Yet there has been no spectacular sponsor of such 
study, no doctrinaire approach to distort the flexibility and sensitive 
awareness of its complexity. But such study seems inevitably to hold the 
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key to the unification of the proliferating specialisms of modern 
knowledge…[to the] harmonizing of the arts and sciences.528  
 
The belief that all organizations of matter and energy have the power of 
self-expression or communication binds the 3 fields I have discussed. The 
communication of self as both form and function, what is on the surface is taken 
to be reproduction or propagation, has long been a distinguishing characteristic 
between life and matter. It is a generality that, as I have mentioned before, is 
shared by philosophy and the life sciences: 
One of the most pregnant insights into the uniqueness of living beings was 
Aristotle’s observation that living matter possesses a special form, or 
organization, which is uniquely able to communicate itself to other suitable 
matter.529 
 
It is in this sense that ergonomics contains, if in an non-programmatic way, the 
history of this train of thought as well as the possibility for a sort of balance of the 
new and the old, of the modern and anti-modern and a holistic approach that can 
include the scientific, artistic, and philosophical. These characteristics make it a 
crucial inroad to the empirical, measured, and non-anthropocentric study of the 
most contemporary machines—those that are highly intelligent, affective, and 
anthropomorphic—these are the coming generations of industrial and service 
robots.  
Robots have become even hotter commodities not only in the U.S. military 
industrial complex, but also in industry and of course in popular culture. Robots 
continue to trend high in online and print news, and in every story they are 
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framed as harbingers, either of revolution, insecurity, or death. The United States 
Drone program has had the limelight for a while, but slowly the drone is being 
understood for what it is, a subset within a class of intelligent machines with a 
long complicated history.  As reported in Forbes there is a class of “killer” robots 
that the United Nations agreed to take steps to ban from conventional warfare in 
the next 3 years.  
The Federal Aviation Association has just recently allowed the commercial 
flight of domestic drones in U.S. airspace. Google has recently been buying up 
many robotics technologies/patents and are in the process of developing a robot 
ethics board of experts who ostensibly will be influencing their operationalization 
of new robots.  
Now it would seem that an even larger context is being produced for robots as 
people are recognizing a general “rise” of intelligent machines outside of the 
auspices of war.  
Within this context you have commentators like MIT scientist Illah 
Nourbaksh who writes that “Its time to Talk about the Burgeoning Robot Middle 
Class.”530 Nourbaksh also writes, in his blog of the same name as his book 
RobotFutures, that this decade is very much an “engineers revenge” which will 
see the speedy catching up of hardware ie material machines in everyday life to 
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the innovation of software and memory in computing.531 In Politico Magazine’s 
“The Robots are Here” predicts at least 3 major events from the rise of working 
robots: 1) a digital social Darwinism where those who ostensibly can design, 
program, or work well with robots become the new elites. 2) A new digital 
meritocracy, and 3) a new digital libertarian age where control over intelligent 
machines equals new economic freedom.532  
This machine driven dystopic future is reflected perfectly in the 
commercially and critically successful Elysium, where militarized robots are the 
bloody boot heels/immigration police for the ultimate gated community floating 
above an impoverished Earth.533 The 2014 Robocop remake of the 1980’s comic 
and film has dropped the political satire of Reagan age popular culture and 
corporate and government bureaucracy, in favor of a heavy handed allegory 
about futuristic military drones used domestically as police. In the film we find 
Samuel L. Jackson’s character, described vaguely as a powerful TV magnate 
who advocates any and all of the robotics market, shouting to us the audience, 
“Why is America so Robo-phobic?”534 This perhaps disingenuous conflation of 
robots with the LGBT movement expresses well Rosi Braidotti’s observation that 
those aligned with neoliberal, global economic forces tend to be more open to 
some of the characteristics of posthumanist condition than either liberal 
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progressives and/or critical scholars. This immanent arrival of machines in 
industrial and popular contexts is reflected in the significant increase in 
ergonomics publications studying human robot interactions since the middle of 
the 1990’s. 
Finally, a piece in the Atlantic “All Can Be Lost: the risk of putting our 
knowledge in machines” adds yet another element to our economic insecurities, 
the fear that intelligent machines makes for lazy, unintelligent human citizens.535 
This is a framing or enframing around machines that has been repeated 
historically for centuries, and derives in part from Plato’s Phaedrus, where the 
machine like quality of writing (i.e. its artificial supplement to the purity of 
memory) is, as Jacques Derrida observed, both curative and poisonous to 
human memory. As he explained, the thing itself, writing, or what could be called 
an ancient media-machine, was always more complicated, more ambivalent than 
the cure/poison binary that enframed it.536 Yet, the machine would always carry 
with it this framing of itself as dangerous. The event of the “pharmakos” was the 
ceremonial scapegoating/killing of a Greek citizen chosen to represent an evil 
outside presence.537 For Derrida it served as an example of the uneasiness of 
the original thing or machine (pharmakon) that was not human, that was then 
over determined, overlaid by Greek culture with another function.538 That new 
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function was actually the process of turning the uncertainty and non-meaning of 
what was not human but in constant interaction with humanity into the certainty 
and comfort of determining it as evil—as what must be expelled from the body 
and the polis.539 
 What is most important about Derrida’s analysis of pharmakon is that he 
translates the discussion of the medium of writing, the physical object and 
technology, into a discussion about human vs. nonhuman life, as well as the 
maintenance and security of an organism both literally in the individual and 
figuratively in society or the body politic. He thus opens up the possibility to talk 
about machines within the framework of the human and the animal (beast) what 
many biopolitical theorists have continued to work on as the distinction between 
political citizenship or fully realized humanity and bare life. I wish to continue my 
own research into the development of a biopolitics of machines in order to further 
understand how humans enframe them for the purposes of defining, producing, 
and managing modern forms of life.  
I borrow “frame” or “enframing” from Literary Theorist Cary Wolfe, who 
takes framing as a particularly violent production of knowledge.  
the question of framing is not simply a logical or epistemological problem 
but a social and material one, with consequences. Framing decides what 
we recognize and what we don’t, what counts and what doesn’t; and it 
also determines the consequences of falling outside the frame (in the case 
at hand, outside the frame as “animal,” as “zoe” as “bare life” ).540 
 
From Gestell in Heidegger’s “Question Concerning Technology” we get a 
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humanist’s definitional senses of machines as something that is both rigid and 
lacking of content—an armature, skeleton, rack. In Heidegger’s cautionary 
against modern technology he frames technology is neither human nor natural in 
essence, nor is technology important in and of itself, but rather for how it calls 
forth the world to our perception. As a third term between humans and nature a 
machine is thus a medium, one that in modernity calls forth an improper 
relationship between humans and technology (as in an utter reliance on 
calculation and rationality) and thus an improper relationship between humans 
and themselves. 
 The way then, Wolfe argues, that Heidegger’s humanism can be the cure 
to technology, (to quote Heidegger from letter on Humanism “for this is 
humanism: meditating and caring, that man be human and not inhumane, 
‘inhuman,’ that is, outside his essence.”—is precisely to continually draw and 
redraw the line between who are “fully human and less than human.”541 While 
much has been said on Heidegger’s question and its violent relationship to 
humans and the environment, in post-structuralist thought and in biopolitical 
theory, a common feature seems to be that in political and ethical contexts where 
machines are concerned, the machine as a subject is erased from a particular 
context of trauma or loss save for what it “brings forth” into a human world. This 
is what led Bernard Stiegler to determine that the technological has been 
immemorially repressed from Western Thought.  
In my dissertation I have argued that this repression can be thought of 
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fundamentally as a problem of communication. If a machine is merely a medium, 
or some substance intervening in two or more subjects, then it is both rejected as 
a subject with intention or capability to communicate itself. As mentioned before, 
if technology is not important per se, if it has neither intention or purpose, but 
rather merely frames the world for us, then it is lacking in its powers of 
communication.  
To state it another way, in the relation between human, technology, and 
nature, none of these figures (subjects integral to biopolitical studies), the slave, 
the musselman of the Nazi Internment camp, the colonial subject, or the 
machine, have a fully realized capacity to communicate—whether that means the 
ability to literally enter the polis or give voice to indignity—or on a basic 
ontological level they cannot fully express what they are, the fact of their 
existence independent of the fully realized human life opposed them. Again, from 
my introduction and above, the idea of self-communication of form as the 
defining characteristic of life (as opposed to matter) is ancient and still thrives. 
This ability to communicate organization has impinged on the modern robot as a 
machine that while continually increasing in complexity is conceived of as 
fundamentally dependent on human creators for its existence. But Wolfe’s 
examination brings up a problem of the machine in my dissertation that relates 
directly to biopolitical theory. My guiding claim moving forward in research is that 
the machine, both as an abstract mimetic concept, as well as a material tool and 
service provider, has been inextricably linked to our modern conceptions of life—
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conceptions to which my study of physiology/cybernetics/ergonomics provide 
less fearful, exclusionary, and violent alternatives.  
Key to our anxiety over robot lives is also the continual problematizations 
and destruction of the hierarchical limits we feel compelled to continually 
construct between them and us. With robots this comes to mind as a very long 
list of humanness that we continue to cross off as they continue to evolve. In the 
general scheme from simplicity to complexity, machines seem to be acting 
equivalences in mobility, reflex, and memory. Though it has generally been held 
that the human mind, and its mysterious relationship to membrane and electro-
chemical reactions that has been the pinnacle of human consciousness is the 
difference by which robot intelligence comes up short and will never be like 
human intelligence. Very recently a “social bot,” was claimed to have been the 
first to pass the “Turing Test” and fool at least 30 percent of a panel of human 
judges into believing they were communicating with a 14 year old boy. Though 
less than a week later this feat was quickly dismissed as a failure and the AI 
computer deemed unimpressive. This backlash against the Chatbot, “Eugene 
Gustman,” did not dissuade CNN’s opinion page from echoing the sentiment 
from above that “The Robot Age is Here,” because of such a milestone.542 I 
believe that all this discourse over “robots to come” represents the longstanding 
problem of making machines an object that is both allowed and prevented from 
the sociality of human affairs, what I have touched upon as part of the bare 
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life/political existence distinction of modern biopolitics, and what Giorgio 
Agamben calls an “inclusive exclusion” of the biopolitical other.543  
Very recently Cary Wolfe put his thoughts together on the future of 
posthuman studies.544 One future, he claimed, was a biopolitical framework that 
is both Zoological and Ecological insofar as we can see through the regulation of 
our living environments and the animals surrounding us just how powerful our 
biopolitical production has become. The marriage of biopolitics and species and 
ecological  philosophies is doubly productive in that it reveals to both sides that 
an ethics committed to ending the production of bare life (zoe) for the sake of the 
existence of the good life (bios) must not end at the disposability of human 
beings alone. 
as many philosophers have emphasized, that “dehumanization” is a 
fundamental mechanism for producing a “Western” idea of the “man” over 
and against populations considered “dubiously human.” But as I have 
argued in detail elsewhere, as long as the automatic exclusion of animals 
from standing remains intact simply because of their species, such a 
dehumanization by means of the discursive mechanism of “ animalization” 
will be readily available for deployment against whatever body happens to 
fall outside the ethnocentric “we.”545 
 
A nonhuman biopolitical framework thus lays bare the common 
problematic for both radical theories of otherness as well as biopolitical theory—
the particularly humanist valuation of life. It is not that valuing life is itself a 
negative political proposition, it is rather that humanistic thought has long 
constituted its evaluation based on the absolute of the negative other to life.  
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Wolfe’s call for a zoological or cross species biopolitical theory might be 
construed as a less radical Cosmopolitan ethic based on liberal humanism—
whereby the sphere of political rights and inalienable dignity is pushed or 
expanded continually to include this and that subject. In this case at some point 
in time both fauna and flora will have their rights bestowed at the very least de 
jure. However, I believe that there is a more radical openness to his proposition, 
one that reflects a growing gesture to an affirmative biopolitics. This is the idea in 
general that the apparatus which regulates particular forms of life does not have 
to be based on the particular principles or valuation of life that currently exist. In 
this sense, if we recognize that our external management through technological 
and institutional infrastructure could indeed promote life more ethically, then it 
may occur to us that the only trauma we suffer is the loss of our engrained myth 
of a freely choosing, self-sustaining life form. Affirmative biopolitics also indicates 
that regardless of the apparatus in which life is regulated, in our case one that 
places a schism between life and matter, and then dictates lives’ values based 
on its proximity to a fully realized humanity—life persists in excess, life errs in the 
face of human life, and exists in spite of its regulation—as anomalous life. I have 
attempted, in particular in my discussion of the cybernetics of Michel Foucault, to 
show the confluence and inseparability between machine and organism that 
encourages a biopolitics of machines. What I believe is necessary for those of us 
interested in claiming that nonhuman and nonorganic bodies are caught up within 
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biopolitical regimes of production, is to start to find ways of translating such a 
radical notion into more familiar terms. 
Jane Bennett, who I have mentioned throughout and has already written a 
political ontology of the agency of nonorganic objects in the world, claims that our 
anthropomormism may begin with anthropocentrism, hierarchical judgment, and 
“narcissism” but can go much further:  “We at first may see only a world in our 
own image, but what appears next is a swarm of "talented" and vibrant 
materialities (including the seeing self).”546 She believes that there are ethical 
and political benefits to allowing ourselves to anthropomorphize because,  
We need to cultivate a bit of anthropomorphism-the idea that human 
agency has some echoes in nonhuman nature - to counter the narcissism 
of humans in charge of the world.547 
 
What Bennett suggests is that instead of avoiding anthropomorphism, our human 
scope of sensation and understanding, what is necessary are new images and 
new modes of anthropomorphizing. Perhaps we might project or imagine a 
Robot’s mimetic abilities, or equivalency—(recognizing all the while that mimesis 
is not the purpose of the robot but the necessary way we relate to it as other) not 
of human life per se but of life in general. But what might a non-reductive, non-
hierarchical anthropomorphism look like?  
The latest in computing and robotics have timely examples that might aid 
our imaginative anthropomorphism. DNA computing, which designs computing 
machines from living proteins and DNA, moves away from a human brain/mind 
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design aesthetic in favor of the molecular generation of life forms writ large. 
Programmable matter, which has received much buzz in robotics, is based on 
the idea that a robot is no longer of any particular shape with specialized parts or 
appendages, but rather can construct itself differently based on context-based 
problems. While DNA computing may easily be represented as Frankenstein’s 
post-industrial monster, and, as programmable matter has already popularly 
been likened to Terminator II, T-1000 liquid metal man—the conception of a non-
reductive machine life that does not threaten our own human identity, perhaps 
can lead our imaginations elsewhere.   
In conclusion, I plan to continue following the inroads into human machine 
interactions that my work on ergonomics has provided. I am interested in 
pursuing both ergonomics’ longstanding intellectual history as well as the 
sociopolitical implications of the most contemporary work in ergonomics. For 
example, I wish to continue studying ergonomics’ strong relationships to systems 
theory and cybernetics on the one hand, and its antagonistic relationship to 
capitalism on the other. I will build on my existing research to show that through 
ergonomics both the machine and the human being are theorized in 
fundamentally different, more ethical ways than they are when captured by both 
industrial and global capitalist frameworks.  
To give an example of contemporary research, I have begun research for 
one or two journal publications on a recent trend in “popular” ergonomics. 
Ergonomics is currently being deployed in business and self help contexts in 
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order to help individuals feel more powerful and to increase their levels of 
professional success and mental well being. Deemed “power poses” this new 
enterprise teaches individuals to control not only their body movements and 
postures but also their conscious sense of space and the objects of their lived 
environments. Power poses combines the sciences of biomechanics, 
anthropometry, and kinematics—all derived from a larger history of ergonomic 
science—with neoliberal practices of citizenship that render all forms of 
knowledge and all practices of everyday life as functions of entrepreneurship. 
This enterprise is gaining traction at the same time that psychologists are taking 
seriously the relationship between ergonomics or designed spaces and 
individuals’ capacities to be ethical.  
Finally, as a more long term and ambitious book length project, I would 
like to draw on my training in anthropology and secure funding for an 
ethnography on humans and robots in robotics and engineering cultures. There 
are numerous sites across the globe, for example, “Robot University” in affiliation 
with the “Arts and Queensland University of Technology” where researchers put 
humans and robots in constant interaction in order to “to transform negative 
attitudes towards robots.” I believe this project would serve two unique and 
productive ends. One, it would illuminate this burgeoning culture of robotics 
production, both in the institutional, aspirational, as well as creative productivities 
of human participants. Two, I believe it could contribute to the cutting edge 
methodology of ethnography by including machines as producers of culture. This 
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of course, resonates with the whole of my research imperative to push the 
theoretical conception of our being ethical through and with machines.  
 
Coda American Machine: 
 
 I would be remiss if I did not mention lastly that the most recent bit of 
writing I added to the dissertation is based on Jacques Derrida’s late work on the 
figures of the Beast and the Sovereign in early modern Europe, and American 
Sovereignty today. My new interest in this work of his has absolutely nothing to 
do with the present study on ergonomics, and everything to do with the events 
surrounding the killings of young black men in America—particularly the killings 
of Eric Garner in New York and Mike Brown, who lived in Fergusson, Missouri, 
about 2 hours away from my home town. This is particularly important to note 
because admittedly there is a profound lack of a political valence or description of 
the political stakes within my project. It has taken these abominable events 
perpetrated by U.S. law enforcement agents, characteristic of a history of such 
acts that has accompanied the history of the Nation from its beginnings—to offer 
me a shift in vantage point of the philosophical concepts of otherness that I have 
deployed. The following few fragments I leave as a documentation of what I am 
reconsidering and as a promise to myself and to others that I will work harder to 
connect the possibility of ethical subject to the hope for a just political 
arrangement where I live.  
 In one of his last publications Jacques Derrida wrote, as an admission of 
sorts,  
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I had to cite Tocqueville, and particularly Democracy in America, without 
letting too much more time go by, in order to announce from afar that, at 
the end of a long detour, right near the end, it will perhaps become clear 
that democracy in America or, more precisely, democracy and America 
will have been my theme.548 
Derrida had acknowledged America’s thematic importance to his work years 
before when he declared that,  
I would risk, with a smile, the following hypothesis: America is 
deconstruction (I' Amerique, mais c'est Ia deconstruction). In this 
hypothesis, America would be the proper name of deconstruction in 
progress, its family name, its toponymy, its language and its place, its 
principal residence.549  
 
This is a hypothesis he would retract just as soon as he posited it, as was the 
ambivalent character of deconstruction. However, it was also because of the 
great ambivalence Derrida felt toward America as a rhetorical figure of 
international sovereignty and perceived rule of the people domestically. The 
problem was inherent in the “representational” character of America’s signs, of 
both its State and its People, both, as it were, independent. 
 It is the "good people" who declare themselves free and 
independent by the relay of their representatives and of their 
representatives of representatives. One cannot decide-and that's the 
interesting thing, the force and the coup' of force of such a declarative act-
whether independence is stated or produced by this utterance.550 
 
The problem emerges from the double declaration, the two separate (but equal?) 
declarations of independence. On the one hand the sovereign people, 
represented in as unadulterated a manner as possible by the pen of the 
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representatives of government. On the other, the representatives of government, 
being wholly different from any form of sovereignty that came before, represent 
their own independence—the independence of a State founded on and 
embodying individual sovereignty. Derrida astutely noted the “force and the coup 
of force,” within this double declarative act. And to answer my own question 
above, they are definitely not equally powerful declarations in political context as 
a citizens representational independence becomes, as Derrida might say, 
difference—or a deferral of right in the face of the immediacy of the power and 
independence of his governor. Derrida offered two interrelated concepts that 
might describe the violence that would spring forth from the coup of force in 
American independence, Autoimmunity and Rogue. In mentioning autoimmunity I 
only wish to say that it integrates nicely with both Roberto Esposito’s Immunitary 
Paradigm as well as with Giorgio Agamben’s State of Exception. A particular kind 
or class of citizen, particularly in America, must become forfeit so that other 
classes may feel re-secured in their representational independence that had 
already been subject to deferral. For Derrida this had historical precedent in 
Europe in the figures of the beast and the sovereign. In America, the beast has 
been proven, through time and blood, to without a doubt be of color. 
 Another result of this force is violence, and the violence can be seen in the 
figure of the Rogue as Derrida discussed late in his career. Of the rogue I will 
only add that Derrida gave us insight again into America in presenting a notion of 
a rogue that was in part playful, ironic, and endearing. It is this playfulness that 
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leads America on in defending their rogues. Whether it be a rogue citizen 
(shooter), a rogue political administration pushing U.S. exceptionalism, or now a 
rogue police office. Citizens find comfort in the possibility of becoming rogue in 
order to re-represent a lost power, one that Derrida noted was inherent within our 
radically representational system of governance.  
 Finally, to put a finer point on it, Derrida’s late work on biopolitics and the 
American State is useful in understanding the technologies of policing black 
Americans as well as those protesting in solidarity with racial and class struggles 
in the U.S. I have found one more of his concepts,  “animal-machine,” as an 
arresting description of the dark political repercussions of a mechanistic, 
instrumentalist epistemology. I leave the following passage at length as a guiding 
element towards understanding the connection between the epistemological and 
ethico-political contexts of the kind of mechanism I have discussed. Derrida 
rightly notes that the animal-machine is a construct of Cartesian tradition551, and 
reads that tradition through a thinker in Thomas Hobbes, who took scientific 
instrumentalism into the social, but also, and in a reductive fashion, took 
animalistic fear into the legitimacy of policy.  
 And there we should find. as close as can be to sovereignty-which 
is, as it were, its correlate-fear: fear as It is defined by the Leviathan, for 
example. Leviathan is the name of an animal-machine designed to cause 
fear or of a prosthetic and state organon, a state as prosthesis. The organ 
of contempt, and then exert terror (Hobbes's word: "Terrour"} by "private 
revenge; this terror I exert is a crime. So that everything comes down to 
fear: I can commit a crime and exert terror by fear, but it is the same fear 
that makes me obey the law. Fear is "sometimes cause of Crime, as when 
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the danger is neither present, nor corporeal (p. 150). This is an important 
precision: Hobbes privileges "Bodily Fear" and the "present" of the body, 
but there is in all fear something that refers, essentially, to non-body and 
nonpresent, if only the future of a threat: what causes fear is never fully 
present nor fully corporeal, 111 the sense that the purely corporeal is 
supposed to be saturated with presence.552 
The, “republic, state, commonwealth, civitas,”553 only ever come into existence 
based on the fear driven animal-machine sovereignty. The fear that the beast 
instills is also the fear of the machine, the combined power of the animal-
machine is the power,  
to amplify the power of the living, the living man that it protects, that it 
serves, but like a dead machine, or even a machine of death, a machine 
which is only the mask of the living, like a machine of death can serve the 
living.554 
 
I have seen all to clearly the power of the animal-machine encounter between 
police officer and black male. The amalgam emerges from the various machines 
of arrest that the officer deploys—handcuffs, night sticks, tasers, handguns, riot 
gear, shields—in contact with the animalistic responses the civilian is left with. 
One either takes flight or freezes in the face of a machine of death with arms 
risen. I have also seen the representational power of wearable policing 
technologies as documenting or witnessing eyes and their effects on the status 
quo of American authority. Wearable video cameras have, in the light of recent 
civilian killings, gotten much publicity as a means of visual documentation and for 
police to “self-police,” and to curb excessive force. However, police forces are 
also poised to use a battery of other wearable technologies including smart 
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watches and tactical headset computers—all functional because they are hands 
free tech used in the heat of an altercation when police hands are occupied with 
other low-tech wearables, namely tasers, pepper spray, or handguns. I will 
pursue further the analysis of this wearable-police officer as a subject of 
prosthetics, as an animal-machine designed to symbolically legitimate a form of 
sovereignty that, as Derrida describes it, is a machine of death meant to protect 
the living. While police literally perform incapacitating and lethal violence to 
certain bodies wearable technologies identify, document, and informationalize 
citizen lives that are racially and ideologically marked as improper.  
The wearable-police officer subject is rearticulating the early modern 
political theory Derrida discussed while updating it with the power of new 
technological devices. What separates Men from beasts is the artifice of his 
invention, these machines. Men rule over beasts through their machines. Finally, 
there is no possibility of the good of justice in Man without (righteous) force over 
beasts and the production of their fear. This has important implications today not 
just for racial tensions or the militarization of law enforcement. It also works to 
explain the legal system’s inclusion of certain violent acts by rogue males and 
rogue police forces as part of the public service and good, as well as the 
increasingly violent nature, and inherent danger involved in a citizen resisting or 
speaking out against the status quo. A popular phrase has emerged out of police 
brutality against Brown, Garner, and others—black lives matter—has circulated 
powerfully through images and social media, and attests to a new declaration (of 
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independence?) by a particular citizenry, those who would be advocates for the 
recuperation of the black body into the polis, into the envelope of the sacred and 
outside of its beastly opposition, that Americans with the “good life” enjoy. 
However, police killings of black citizens constitute an entire system of authority 
and administration—what Agamben describes in biopolitical terms as an 
apparatus—and this apparatus is founded on a logic that is more complicated 
than the disposability of black Americans. Black American lives matter a great 
deal in our moment, first, in representing the latest iteration of the kind of life that 
must be produced, then recognized and circulated to the public—in order for U.S. 
sovereignty to legitimate a particularly roguish form of democratic agency. 
Second, judging by the continued killings, the organization of protest, and the 
obstinacy of police departments and some white citizens—black lives matter 
crucially by showing that traditional responses of resistance that deploy concepts 
like equality, civil rights, and especially freedom, may be unequal to the task of 
transforming this animal-machine apparatus. It is, in fact, a system where 
authoritarian declaration of right and citizen declaration of right to fully realized 
political life share the same philosophical basis for defining justice. The tyrannical 
rule of authority to maintain the American status quo and the urgent outcry of 
American citizens in support of black citizens both hinge upon a “right to life.” 
Agamben may be correct in asserting that only a biopolitical reflection,  
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“will be able to bring the political out of its concealment and, at the same time, 
return thought to its practical calling,”555 where its practical calling is an 
institutional transformation out of an apparatus that kills some so that many 
Americans may live particular lives.  
In the end, I resist saying definitively that my project has always been or is 
now primarily concerned with otherness or even more specifically with racial 
inequality and violence in America. I do recognize that the machine continues to 
be a productive philosophical figure for understanding otherness, and the strict 
way that it is excluded from life and poised against it. This melded relationship 
between animal and machine can be enlightening if not horrifying when seen 
alongside the extreme exclusions, not just to citizen status but to life itself, for the 
actual citizens we live with. I will follow this biopolitical line that merges machine 
with animal, epistemology with governing practices, ethics with politics. I will 
continue to say that my object is the machine, and… 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
555 Giorgio Agamben, Homo Sacer: sovereign power and bare life, ed. Werner Hamacher and 
David E. Wellbery, trans. Daniel Heller-Rosen (Stanford University Press, 1998), 4-5. 
   268 
 
 
Agamben, Giorgio. “Absolute Immanence,” Potentialities: collected essays in  
philosophy (1999): 220-39.  
 
trans. Daniel Heller-Rosen, Homo Sacer: Sovereign power and bare life. 
ed. Werner Hamacher and David E. Wellbery. trans. Daniel Heller-Rosen 
Stanford University Press, 1998. 
 
Ampère, André-Marie. Essai Sur la Philosophie Des Sciences, ou, exposition  
analytique d'une classification naturelle de toutes les connaissances 
humaines. Chez Bachelier.1856. 
 
“ASIMO Development Story,” The Honda World Wide ASIMO Site, accessed  
May 1st 2014, http://world.honda.com/WalkingTogether/. 
 
Ashby, W. Ross. An Introduction to Cybernetics. London: Chapan and Hall,  
1957. 
 
Basalla, George. The Evolution of Technology. Cambridge, UK:  
Cambridge University Press, 1988. 
 
Bennett, Jane. Vibrant Matter: a political ecology of things. Duke University  
Press, 2009. 
 
Bernauer, James W and Michael Mahon. "The Ethics of Michel Foucault." The  
Cambridge Companion to Foucault. Cambridge University Press, 1994. 
 
Bertalanffy, L. Von. General System Theory: foundations, development,  
applications. New York: Braziller,1968. 
 
Braidotti, Rosi. The Posthuman. New York: John Wiley & Sons, 2013. 
 
Brand, Stewart. “For God’s Sake Margaret: conversation with Gregory Bateson  
and Margaret Mead,” Downloaded from Project Alice, accessed May 1st 
2014, http://www.alice.id.tue.nl/index.htm 
 
Brett Buchanan, Onto-Ethologies: the animal environments of Uexkull,  
Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty, and Deleuze. New York: SUNY Press, 2008. 
 
Butler, Judith. “Bodies and Power Revisited,” edited by Dianna Taylor and Karen  
Vintges. Feminism and the final Foucault. University of Illinois Press, 
2004. 
 
Carey, James.“Cultural Approach to Communication.” Communication as  
   269 
 
Culture. Revised Edition: essays on media and society. New York: 
Routledge, 2008. 
 
Carr, Nicolas. “All Can Be Lost: The Risk of Putting Our Knowledge in the Hands  
of Machines.” The Atlantic online, accessed April 30th 2013, 
http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2013/11/the-great-
forgetting/309516/ 
 
Cooper, John M. and D. S. Hutchinson. Plato Complete Works. Hackett  
Publishing, 1997. 
 
Cooper, Melinda. Life as Surplus: biotechnology and capitalism in the neoliberal  
era. University of Washington Press, 2008. 
 
Christensen, Julien M. "Ergonomics: where have we been and where are we  
going: II." Ergonomics 19 no. 3, (1976) 287. 
 
DeLanda, Manuel. "A New Ontology for the Social Sciences." New Ontologies:  
Transdisciplinary Objects. University of Illinois (2002) 
 
A New Philosophy of Society: Assemblage theory and social complexity. 
Continuum, 2006, 16. 
 
A thousand Years of Nonlinear History. New York: Zone  
Books, 1997. 
 
"The Expressivity of Space," Some Things Happen More Often Than All of 
the Time. Turner/A&R Press, 2007. 
“Out of Control,” Interview Survival Research Labs, accessed May 5th, 
2014, http://www.srl.org/interviews/out.of.control.html. 
“Virtual Environments and the Emergence of Synthetic  
Reason,” accessed June 1st 2014 
http://www.t0.or.at/delanda/delanda.htm. 
 
Deleuze, Gilles “Postscript on Control Societies,” Negotiations. New York:  
Columbia University Press, 1995. 
 
Derrida, Jacques. Of Grammatology, translated by Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak.  
Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997. 
 
The Beast and the Sovereign Vol. 1. eds. Michel Lisse. Marie-Louise 
Mallet, and Ginette Michaud. Translated by Geoffrey Bennington. 
University of Chicago Press, 2009. 
   270 
 
“Declarations of Independence.” New Political Science 15 (1986): 9. 
 
Memoires for Paul de Man, translated Cecile Lindsay, Jonathan Culler, 
Eduardo Cadava, and Peggy Kamuf. New York: Columbia University 
Press, 1989. 
 
Rogues: two essays on reason. Translated by Pascale Ann-Brault and 
Michael Nass. Stanford University Press, 2005. 
 
Without Alibi, translated by Peggy Kamuf, California: Stanford University 
Press, 2002. 
 
Duffy, Elizabeth. "Emotion: an example of the need for reorientation in  
psychology." Psychological Review 41, no. 2 (1934): 184. 196. 
 
Duffy, Vincent G ed. Handbook of Digital Human Modeling: research for applied  
ergonomics and human factors engineering. CRC press, 2008. 
 
Dupuis, Jean Pierre. On the Origins of Cognitive Science: the mechanization of  
the Mind, Cambridge: MIT Presse, 2009. 
 
El Kaliouby, Rana, Rosalind Picard, and Simon Baron-Cohen, “Affective  
Computing and Autism,” Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences 
1093, no. 1, 2006. 
 
Estay, Christophe C., Lakshman, and Jacques-Olivier Pesme. "Profit Sharing in  
the nineteenth century: history of a controversial remuneration system." 
Social Responsibility Journal 7, no. 1 (2011): 23-41.24 
 
Foucault, Michel. Aesthetics, Method, and Epistemology, James D. Faubian ed.  
Translated by Robert Hurley et al., New York: The New Press, 1998. 
 
Paul Rainbow ed. Essential works of Foucault, 1954-1984. Vol 1., Ethics: 
subjectivity and truth. New York: Penguin, 1997. 
 
“For an Ethics of Discomfort,” The Politics of Truth, Sylvere Lotringer & 
Lysa Hochroth ed. Semiotexte, New York, 1997, 137. 
 
“Life: Experience and Science.” Aesthetics, method, and epistemology. 
Vol. 1. The New Press, 1998. 
 
Technologies of the Self: a seminar with Michel Foucault.  
University of Massachusetts Press, 1988.  
 
   271 
 
The Birth of Biopolitics: lectures at the Collège de France, 1978-1979, 
trans. Graham Burchell. New York: Picador, 2010. 
 
The Hermeneutics of the Subject: lectures at the Collège de France 1981-
1982. New York: Macmillan, 2005. 
 
History of Sexuality Vol. 2: the use of pleasure. New York: Penguin, 1987. 
 
Galison, Peter. “The Ontology of the Enemy: Norbert Wiener and the Cybernetic  
Vision,” Critical Inquiry, (1994) 21:1. 
 
Galloway Alexander. Protocol: how control exists after decentralization,  
Massachusetts: MIT press, 2004. 
 
Gelbin, Cathy S. The Golem Returns: from German romantic literature to global  
Jewish culture., 1808-2008 Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. 
 
Geoghegan, Bernard Dionysius. "From Information Theory to French theory:  
Jakobson, Levi-Strauss, and the cybernetic apparatus." Critical Inquiry 38, 
no. 1. (2011). 
 
Goldfeder, Mark.The Robot Age is Here, CNN online, accessed on June 5th  
2014, http://www.cnn.com/2014/06/10/opinion/goldfeder-age-of-robots-
turing-test/ 
 
Gramsci, Antonio. Selections from the Prison Notebooks of Antonio Gramsci Ed.  
and Transl. by Quintin Hoare and Geoffrey Nowell Smith. International  
Publishers, 1971. 
  
Further Selections from the Prison Notebooks. University of  
Minnesota Press, 1995. 
 
Grusin, Richard. Premediation: affect and mediality after 9/11. New York:  
Palgrave MacMillan: 2010. 
 
Haraway, Donna J. Simians, Cyborgs, and Women: the reinvention of nature.  
New York: Routledge, 2013. 
 
Hayden, Dolores. The Grand Domestic Revolution: A history of feminist  
designs for American homes, neighborhoods, and cities. MIT Press, 1982, 
284. 
 
Hayles, N. Katherine. How We Became Posthuman: Virtual Bodies in  
   272 
 
Cybernetics, Literature, and Informatics, (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1999), 86. 
"Afterword: the human in the posthuman." Cultural Critique (53, no. 1, 
2003), 137. 
 
Hayles, N. Katherine. in Critical Terms for Media Studies. Mitchell, WJ Thomas,  
and Mark BN Hansen, ed., Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2010. 
 
The Cosmic Web: scientific field models and literary strategies in the 
twentieth century. Cornell University Press, 1986. 
 
Isadore of Seville, Encyclopedia of the Dark Ages, Indiana University Press,  
 1912. 
 
Jaki, Stanley L. Brain, Mind and Computers, Indiana: Gateway Editions, 1969. 
 
Jastrzebowski, W. “Outline of Ergonomics or the systematic study of the human  
body as governed by the laws of physics,” Occupational Ergonomics. 
 
Lafontaine, Céline. "The Cybernetic Matrix of French Theory'." Theory, Culture &  
Society 24, no. 5 (2007): 27-46. 
 
Lancaster, Jane. Making Time: Lillian Moller Gilbreth, a Life Beyond" Cheaper by  
the Dozen". UPNE, 2004; Des Jardins, Julie. Lillian Gilbreth: Redefining 
Domesticity. Westview Press, 2013. 
 
Liu, Lydia H. "The Cybernetic Unconscious: rethinking Lacan, Poe, and French  
theory." Critical Inquiry 36, no. 2 (2010): 288-32. 
 
Kittler, Friedrich. "The History of Communication Media." Ctheory web site 1996,  
accessed February 12th 2011. 
 
McCormick, Ernest J. Human Factors Engineering. McGraw Hill, Inc., 1965. 
 
McLuhan, Marshall. The Guttenberg Galaxy, University of Toronto Press, 1962. 
 Understanding Media: the extensions of man. MIT Press,1964. 
 
"The Later Innis," Queen\'s Quarterly 60, no. 3 (1953): 393-394. 
 
McCulloch, Warren S. "Toward Some Circuitry of Ethical Robots: or an  
observational science of the genesis of social evaluation in the mind-like 
behavior of artifacts,” Embodiments of Mind, (2nd printing. Cambridge, 
Mass.: MIT Press 1989). 
 
   273 
 
Mead, Margaret and Rhoda Bubundey Métraux eds. The Study of Culture at a  
Distance, Berghahn Books, 2000. 
 
Murrell, KF Hywel. Ergonomics: man in his working environment. London:  
Chapman and Hall, 1965. 
 
Nissan Mindel, “Rabbi Judah Loew – ‘The Maharal of Prague’" “Chabad.org”,  
accessed May 5th, 2014, 
http://www.chabad.org/library/article_cdo/aid/111877/jewish/Rabbi-Judah-
Loew-The-Maharal-of-Prague.htm 
 
O’Farrell, Clare. Michel Foucault, New York: Sage, 2005. 
 
Ouellette, Laurie and James Hay. "Makeover Television, Governmentality and  
the Good Citizen." Continuum: journal of media & cultural studies 22, no. 4 
(2008): 471-484. 
 
Pask, Gordon. The Cybernetics of Human Learning and Performance: a guide to  
theory and research, London: Hutchison and Co., 1975. 
 
Picard, Rosalind Wright, “Affective Computing,” MIT Media Laboratory  
Perceptual Computing Section Technical Report No 321, Submitted for 
publication, 1995. 
 
Picard, Rosalind W and Jennifer Healey. "Affective Wearables." Personal   
Technologies 1, no. 4 (1997): 231-240. 
 
Pickering, Andrew. “Ontological Politics: Realism and Agency in Science, 
Technology and Art,” Insights, Institute of Advanced Study. 
 
Psychology’s Feminist Voices web site, accessed on April 30th, 2013,  
http://www.feministvoices.com/lillian-gilbreth/. 
 
Spinoza, Baruch. "Spinoza: complete works." Trans. Samuel Shirley, et. al. Ed.  
Michael Morgan. Indianapolis: Hackett, 2002. 
 
Gilbreth, Lillian, Spriegel, William Robert, Clark E. Myers, Frank Bunker Gilbreth,  
and Lillian Moller Gilbreth, eds. The Writings of the Gilbreths. (RD Irwin, 
1953). 
 
“Stanford Researchers Produce First Complete Computer Model of an  
Organism,” Stanford University News Web Site, accessed June 1st 2014, 
http://news.stanford.edu/news/2012/july/computer-model-organism-
071812.html 
   274 
 
 
Tesla, Nikola. "The Problem of Increasing Human Energy-Through Use of the  
Sun's Energy." The Century Illustrated Magazine (1956). 
 
Ticineto Clough, Patricia. "Bodies, Science and Technology," The Routledge  
Handbook of the Body. New York (2013). 
 
Turner, Richard A. Inventing Leonardo. Berkeley: University of California Press.  
1994. 
 
Jacob Von Uexkull, A Foray into the World of Animals and Humans, Joseph E.  
O’Neil trans., (Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press), 53. 
 
"An introduction to Umwelt.” Semiotica no. 1/4, 2001. 
 
“Using Anthropomorphism to Improve the Human-Machine Interaction in  
Industrial Environments (Part I)” Digital Human Modeling and Applications 
in Health, Safety, Ergonomics, and Risk Management Human Body 
Modeling and Ergonomics, New York, Springer. 
 
Valery, Paul. Introduction to the Method of Leonardo da Vinci. John Rodker tran.  
1929. 
 
Waltner-Toews, David, James J. Kay, and Nina-Marie E. Lister ed. The  
Ecosystem Approach: complexity, uncertainty, and managing for  
sustainability. Columbia University Press, 2008. 
 
Webber, Bonnie L, Cary B. Phillips, and Norman I. Badler, Simulating Humans:  
computer graphics, animation, and control, Oxford University Press,1999. 
 
Wiener, Norbert. Cybernetics or Control and Communication in the Animal and 
the Machine. MIT press, 1965. 
 
God and Golem Inc. Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1964. 
 
Wolfe, Carey. Before the law: humans and other animals in a biopolitical frame,  
University of Chicago Press, 2012. 
 
Plenary Speech of Society for Literature Science and Art 2012  
Convention, Nonhuman. 
 
Wood, Michael C. and John Cunningham Wood, eds. Frank and Lillian Gilbreth:  
critical evaluations in business and management. Vol. 2. Taylor & Francis, 
2003, 299. 
   275 
 
 
Zielinski, Siegfried. Deep Time of the Media: toward an archaeology of hearing  
and seeing by technical means, Gloria Custance trans. Massachusetts: 
MIT, 2006. 
 
 
 
 
 
